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Abstract 
Nowadays, accounting, charging and billing users' network resource 
consumption are commonly used for the purpose of facilitating reasonable 
network usage, controlling congestion, allocating cost, gaining revenue, 
etc. In traditional IP traffic accounting systems, IP addresses are used to 
identify the corresponding consumers of the network resources. However, 
there are some situations in which IP addresses cannot be used to identify 
users uniquely, for example, in multi-user systems. In these cases, network 
resource consumption can only be ascribed to the owners of these hosts in-
stead of corresponding real users who have consumed the network re-
sources. Therefore, accurate accountability in these systems is practically 
impossible. This is a flaw of the traditional IP address based IP traffic ac-
counting technique.  
This dissertation proposes a user based IP traffic accounting model 
which can facilitate collecting network resource usage information on the 
basis of users. With user based IP traffic accounting, IP traffic can be dis-
tinguished not only by IP addresses but also by users. In this dissertation, 
three different schemes, which can achieve the user based IP traffic ac-
counting mechanism, are discussed in detail. The in-band scheme utilizes 
the IP header to convey the user information of the corresponding IP 
packet. The Accounting Agent residing in the measured host intercepts IP 
packets passing through it. Then it identifies the users of these IP packets 
and inserts user inforation into the IP packets. With this mechanism, a m e-
ter located in a key position of the network can intercept the IP packets 
tagged with user information, extract not only statistic information, but 
also IP addresses and user information from the IP packets to generate ac-
counting records with user information.  The out-of-band scheme is a con-
trast scheme to the in-band scheme. It also uses an Accounting Agent to 
intercept IP packets and identify the users of IP traffic. However, the user 
information is transferred through a separated channel, which is different 
from the corresponding IP packets' transmission. The Multi-IP scheme 
provides a different solution for identifying users of IP traffic. It assigns 
each user in a measured host a unique IP address. Through that, an IP ad-
dress can be used to identify a user uniquely without ambiguity. This way,  
traditional IP address based accounting techniques can be applied to 
achieve the goal of user based IP traffic accounting. In this dissertation, a 
user based IP traffic accounting prototype system developed according to 
the out-of-band scheme is also introduced. The application of user based 
IP traffic accounting model in the distributed computing environment is 
also discussed.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The boom of the Internet seems to be returning after the Internet bubble 
burst. The Internet is seeing exponential growth in the number of Internet 
users, connected hosts [GDS1], Internet service providers and traffic vo l-
ume. The Internet is now becoming a convergent platform providing di-
verse services to users all over the world. The Internet services cover wide 
areas such as business, communication, entertainment, news, education, 
etc. The Internet is gradually playing a more and more important role in 
people’s daily life and world economics.  
As a consequence of the growth of the Internet, more and more IP traffic 
is being poured into the Internet. According to [Odly03], Internet traffic 
was increasing very rapidly, close to doubling each year since 1997 in the 
United States. Moreover, it continues growing close to this rate. The in-
creasing number of Internet users, growing Internet economics, emerging 
Internet services and technologies such as peer to peer and Grid computing 
will contribute more IP traffic to the Internet.  
The increasing traffic volume causes pressure on the networks, which 
may suffer performance decline due to congestion. Packet loss, increased 
delay, throughput degradation, unsatisfied QoS, etc. are possible conse-
quences of congestion. In order to meet the increasing requirements of In-
ternet users on high speed and huge capacity, many efforts have been made 
in enhancing the network equipment by renewing network devices, adop t-
ing new techniques [TIA05, Pion06]. Besides improving the capability of 
the network hardware, measures should also be taken to facilitate reason-
able Internet usage and avoid unnecessary IP traffic generation to control 
network congestion and prevent Internet performance decline. IP traffic 
accounting is a solution which can provide information reflecting users’ 
network resource consumption for the purpose of charging and billing. 
Charging users for their network resource consumption can stimulate their 
reasonable network resource usage on the one hand, yet allocate cost to us-
ers according to their network usage on the other hand. Accounting for us-
ers’ network usage can also provide auditable information, which can help 
building a more secure Internet. A secure Internet is now considered to be 
one of the characters of future Ineternet by the NSF’s GENI project 
[KLAD05]. 
Nowadays, charging and billing users for network resource consumption 
is commonly used by Internet service providers (ISP). Although the flat 
rate charging policy still plays a dominant role, it is gradually being re-
8      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
placed by the IP traffic volume based charging policy. The flat rate charg-
ing policy is inefficient, wastes network resources, allocates cost unfairly 
and hinders deployment of broadband services [EdVa99]. The IP traffic 
volume based charging policy, on the contrary, can allocate cost according 
to users related traffic volume. This can facilitate reasonable network us-
age, allocate cost to users fairly and stimulate ISPs provide services with 
better quality. According to the analysis by the “Analysys Research” 
[Anal06], traffic volume based charging will become dom inant in Europe 
by 2008 [Anal03]. Figure 1.1 depicts the development of pricing structures 
for broadband in Western Europe.  
Although many researches have been made concerning IP traffic ac-
counting and charging [FaSP98, SFPW98, RFC2123, M3I00, KSWS98, 
KSWS99] and many commercial IP traffic accounting products [Apog, 
BeSy, Exte, NARUS, NeEy, Netflow, OpSy, XACCT] have been devel-
oped, almost all of them utilize the IP address based accounting technique. 
With the IP address based accounting technique, IP addresses are used to 
identify the corresponding consumers of the network resources. This is 
based on the assumption that each IP address is owned by one person or 
one institute, who or which will be responsible for this IP address. This is 
correct for IP traffic accounting in single user systems.  
 
Figure 1.1 Development of pricing structures for broadband, Western 
Europe [Anal03] 
However, there are some situations in which IP addresses cannot be 
used to identify users uniquely: 
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· In multi-user systems such as UNIX server, Windows 2000/2003 Ter-
minal Server, etc., an IP address may be shared by several users at the 
same time. In this case, an IP address cannot be uniquely mapped to 
one user. 
· In some hosts, a user account with special privilege may be shared by 
different users for the purpose of running applications that require spe-
cial authorization. The IP address based IP traffic accounting tec h-
nique cannot distinguish users of the IP traffic generated by different 
applications in this case.  
· Even in a single user system, different user accounts may exist. Al-
though these users cannot use the single user system at the same time, 
for the IP traffic accounting system the log information about users’ 
login and logout events must be collected to help identify the actual 
user of IP traffic. Usually this process cannot provide accounting in-
formation in real time.  
· With the development of distributed computing technology such as 
Grid computing [FoKT01, FKNT02], Web Services [BHMN04], etc., 
a single user system may virtually become a multi-user system, since 
different remote users can run their applications simultaneously in a 
distributed computing node which is a single user system. In the dis-
tributed computing environment, one or more user accounts may be al-
located to the remote users for the purpose of getting authorization to 
run their applications in the distributed computing node. When these 
applications access the network, the IP address of this distributed 
computing node cannot be used to identify the originators, i.e. the re-
mote users, of IP traffic uniquely.  
Therefore, network resource consumption described above can only be 
ascribed to the owners of these hosts instead of corresponding users who 
have consumed the network resources. Consequently, the problem of how 
to allocate costs of the network resource usage to different users will be 
left to the owners of the hosts. In fact, however, it is usually difficult for 
the owners of these hosts to distinguish different users’ network resource 
consumptions. Therefore, fair cost allocation in these systems is practically 
impossible. This is a flaw of the traditional IP address based IP traffic ac-
counting technique. This is a problem with which institutes, organizations, 
and especially the computer centers of universities are confronted. With 
the emergence of Grid computing, Web Services, this problem may even 
have to be faced by the owners of single user systems. 
The IP address based IP traffic accounting mechanism provides coarse 
granular accounting information, i.e. host level accounting information. In 
order to amend the insufficiency of the traditional IP traffic accounting 
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technique described above, the NIPON project [Muel00, NIPO00] was 
suggested to do research on user based IP traffic accounting techniques for 
the purpose of providing fine granular IP traffic accounting mechanisms to 
distinguish the network resource usage among users in the same host. This 
is also the motivation of this dissertation. 
In this dissertation,  the user based IP traffic accounting technique is 
proposed to provide more accurate and finer granular accounting informa-
tion corresponding to the real network resource usage of different users.  
1.2 Contributions  
The user based IP traffic accounting technique proposed in this disserta-
tion can provide more accurate and finer granular IP traffic accounting in-
formation than the traditional IP address based IP traffic accounting. With 
the help of the user based IP traffic accounting charging and billing on IP 
traffic can be more fair and reasonable. Compared with the traditional IP 
address based IP traffic accounting mechanism, several novel research 
contributions have been made in this dissertation. They are as follows: 
1. The dissertation distinguishes the user concept and proposes the user 
model for IP traffic accounting. User was an ambiguous and implicit 
concept in traditional IP traffic accounting. According to the user 
model proposed in this dissertation, the user based IP traffic account-
ing concept is clearly defined and explained. The flaw of the tradi-
tional IP address based IP traffic accounting can be explained with this 
user model. This user model can be further extended to provide more 
accurate accounting information in distributed computing environ-
ments, when process ID attributes are applied to identify users. 
2. An Accounting Agent mechanism is suggested for the purpose of iden-
tifying users of IP traffic.  
3. This dissertation proposes three different schemes to make the user 
based IP traffic accounting technique become reality. These three 
schemes are: 
a) The in-band scheme utilizes the IP header to convey correspond-
ing user information of IP traffic. A complete protocol mecha-
nism of the in-band scheme is illustrated. In this dissertation, the 
process of user identification, message format, user information 
transmission, security communication mechanism, and other is-
sues such as implementation, interoperability with other proto-
cols are carefully designed and defined.  
b) The out-of-band scheme does not utilize the IP header to convey 
user information. Instead, a packet with user information mes-
sage is transferred in a special channel between Accounting 
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Agent and meter separately and asynchronously from normal IP 
traffic transmission. The Accounting Agent can also function as a 
standalone meter to generate user based accounting information 
directly in the measured host.  
c) The Multi-IP scheme simplifies a multi-user system to single 
user systems by assigning different users in a multi-user system 
unique IP addresses. Through this mechanism, an IP address can 
be regarded as a user without ambiguity. Therewith the tradi-
tional IP address based accounting mechanism can be applied to 
achieve finer granular user based IP traffic accounting.  
4. The dissertation presents the design and development of a user based 
IP traffic accounting prototype system that realizes the user based IP 
traffic accounting architecture on the basis of the out-of-band scheme. 
The prototype system is implemented in two different non-open source 
operating systems, i.e. in Solaris and Windows 2000 Terminal Server. 
In this prototype system, the Accounting Agent is designed as a stan d-
alone meter to generate user based IP traffic accounting information in 
a MIB database. The SNMP protocol can be used to collect accounting 
records in MIB. The test results of the prototype system show that this 
user based IP traffic accounting prototype system does not affect too 
much the performance of the measured host in which the Accounting 
Agent resides. 
5. This dissertation also analyzes the necessity and requirements of ap-
plying the user based IP traffic accounting technique in distributed 
computing environments. In distributed computing situations such as 
Grid computing, Web Services the user model should be extended to 
use process ID combining with User ID and IP address to identify the 
users of IP traffic. This dissertation provides the user based IP traffic 
accounting solution in distributed computing environments. 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation  
The dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 Internet accounting techn ologies survey 
This chapter introduces the basic concepts and mechanisms of IP traffic 
accounting technology. It illustrates the Internet accounting architecture, 
investigates issues and mechanisms in Meter Layer, Mediation Layer, Bill-
ing and OSS/BSS Layer, Management Layer. In Meter Layer, meter loc a-
tion strategies, traffic measurement methods, metrics and format of meter 
records are analyzed. In Mediation Layer, the methods of collecting meter 
records, accounting protocols, meter records processing, usage records 
generation, formatting, storage, and transmission are addressed. In IP Bill-
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ing and OSS/BSS layer, the billing models are briefly reviewed. In Man-
agement Layer, issues concerning configuration, policies and rules, man-
agement interface, etc. are discussed. Criteria for designing and evaluating 
different layers of the Internet accounting architecture are also summa-
rized. This chapter also discusses the IPv6 and its impact on IP traffic ac-
counting. An overview of the IPv6 is introduced. The IPv6’s impact on 
Meter Layer and Mediation Layer is analyzed. 
Chapter 3 User based IP traffic accounting 
This chapter gives an overview of the user based IP traffic accounting 
technique. It analyzes the flaw of the traditional IP address based IP traffic 
accounting and explains the motivation for user based IP traffic account-
ing. The related works on user based IP traffic accounting are summarized. 
This chapter introduces the basic concept of user based IP traffic account-
ing, proposes a user model and discusses some basic principles required 
for realizing the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism. In this chap-
ter, the user based network access control mechanism is also addressed.  
Chapter 4 In-band scheme 
This chapter illustrates the in-band scheme of user based IP traffic ac-
counting. It explains the principle of the in-band scheme, describes the 
user identification mechanism of the in-band scheme and the process of 
transferring corresponding user information of IP traffic by integrating 
user information into IP headers. The format of the User Information op-
tion is defined, the principle of choosing the location for integrating the 
User Information option in IP packet is discussed, and the security mecha-
nism for transferring user information is carefully designed. This chapter 
also makes considerations on issues such as: where is it suitable for im-
plementing Accounting Agent; how does IP packet fragmentation influ-
ence the in-band scheme; how can the in-band scheme coexist with IPSec; 
performance and dependability issues. 
Chapter 5 Out-of-band scheme 
This chapter illustrates the out-of-band scheme of user based IP traffic 
accounting. It explains the principle of the out-of-band scheme, describes 
the process of transferring user information messages, and defines the for-
mats of user information message. This chapter also depicts the principle 
of utilizing the Accounting Agent as standalone meter. Security, depend-
ability and implementation related issues are discussed.  
Chapter 6 Multi-IP scheme 
This chapter illustrates the Multi-IP scheme of user based IP traffic ac-
counting. It explains the principle of the Multi-IP scheme, discusses the IP 
addresses assigning mechanism, and analyzes issues concerning Multi-IP 
scheme. In this chapter , a comparison of three different user based IP traf-
fic accounting schemes is made. 
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Chapter 7 User based IP traffic accounting prototype implementation 
This chapter introduces the implementation of a user based IP traffic ac-
counting prototype system. It presents the architecture of the prototype 
system, describes the details of implementing the Accounting Agent in S o-
laris and Windows 2000 Terminal Server. The implementation of meter, 
Reader and Manager are explained. The performance test of this prototype 
system is analyzed. 
Chapter 8 User based IP  traffic accounting in distributed computing 
environments 
This chapter introduces the application of the user based IP traffic ac-
counting mechanism in distributed computing environments. The requir e-
ments on user based IP traffic accounting in distributed computing envi-
ronments are analyzed, solutions in meeting these requirements and 
amending the insufficiency of the traditional IP traffic accounting mecha-
nism are proposed. 
Chapter 9 Conclusion and future work 
This chapter summarizes this dissertation, and gives a future vision of 
the user based IP traffic accounting technique. 
1.4 Guidelines 
To help reading this dissertation we give the following guidelines (Fig-
ure 1.2). Readers can choose different flows according to their preferences. 
 
Figure 1.2 Guidelines for reading this dissertation 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
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Chapter 2 Internet accounting technologies 
survey 
This chapter introduces the technologies of the Internet accounting. The 
common Internet accounting system architecture consists of three layers: 
Meter Layer, Mediation Layer and Application Layer. The issues in the 
Meter Layer concern how, where and which traffic should be measured, 
and how the measured metrics data should be organized, stored and trans-
ferred. The technologies applied in the Mediation Layer regard data collec-
tion and processing. The Application Layer consists of applications for dif-
ferent purposes such as billing, trend analysis etc. In this chapter the 
methods, protocols, standards and corresponding comparisons and evalua-
tions concerning Internet accounting will be surveyed. 
2.1 Internet Accounting Architecture  
2.1.1 Terminology  
Internet accounting related terminology has different definitions in dif-
ferent standard organizations such as  IETF (Internet Engineering Task 
Force)  [IETF], ISO (International Organization for Standardization) [ISO], 
ITU (International Telecommunications Union - Telecommunication Stan-
dardization Sector) [ITU-T], ETSI (European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute)  [ETSI]. In this dissertation, the definitions by the IETF are 
adopted. 
Accounting  
Accounting is the process of collecting and analyzing network service 
and resource usage metrics for the purpose of capacity and trend analysis, 
cost allocation, auditing, billing, etc. Accounting management requires that 
resource consumption is measured, rated, assigned, and communicated be-
tween appropriate business entities. 
Billing  
Billing is the process of consolidating the charging records on a per cus-
tomer basis and delivering a certain aggregate of these records to a cus-
tomer. 
Charging 
Charging means by help of needed functions to determine the tariffs to 
be assigned to the service utilization (i.e. the usage related elements appli-
cable for charging). 
Intra-domain accounting 
Intra-domain accounting involves the collection of information on re-
source usage within an administrative domain, for use within that domain.  
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In intra-domain accounting, accounting packets and session records typi-
cally do not cross administrative boundaries.  
Inter-domain accounting 
Inter-domain accounting involves the collection of information on re-
source usage within an administrative domain, for use within another ad-
ministrative domain. In inter -domain accounting, accounting packets and 
session records cross administrative boundaries. 
Mediation  
Mediation is the process of collecting network service and resource us-
age information from meters, processing the collected data to generate us-
age records, storing and distributing the usage records. 
Meter 
A meter is an application or device with metering functions. 
Metering 
Metering is the process of monitoring, measuring and recording re-
source consumption. 
Multi-user system 
A multi-user system is an operating system environment in which IP 
addresses of the environment are shared by different users at the same 
time. 
Network Element  
The network elements are the network devices or application servers 
that are used to provide communication services. 
Rating  
Rating is the process of determining the price of the unit service accord-
ing to the price schemes. 
Raw Data Record (RDR) or Metering Record 
Raw Data Records or Meter ing Records are the records containing the 
measurement results which are generated by meters through monitoring 
measured objects.  
Real time accounting 
Real-time accounting involves processing the information on resource 
usage within a defined time window.  Time constraints are typically im-
posed in order to limit financial risk. 
Resource 
A quantifiable asset employed by a Service Provider, or on behalf of a 
Service Provider by another Service Provider, to fulfill a request of a Ser-
vice Consumer. (Examples include: files, communications, goods, etc). 
Single user system 
A single user system is an operating system environment in which the IP 
addresses of the environment are exclusively owned and used by only one 
user during a period of time. 
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Usage  
Usage is the consumption of resources and services by a user. 
Usage Attribute  
A Usage Attribute is a parameter whose value indicates some aspect of 
usage of a given service and/or resource. 
Usage Record (UR) 
A Usage Record is a data item for a specific user containing information 
of resource or service usage.  
2.1.2 Internet accounting models 
The OSI proposed an accounting framework and terminology in 
[ISO74984]. In “Internet Accounting: Background ” [RFC1272] C. Mills et 
al adopted the OSI accounting framework for the purpose of reporting 
network usage.  The OSI accounting model consists of three basic entities: 
Meter, Collector, and Application (see Figure 2.1): 
· The Meter entity is responsible for network resource consumption 
measurement and aggregating the results of measurement. 
· The Collector entity gathers data from Meter and stores them. 
· The Application entity is responsible for processing, formatting 
and storing Meter data. In addition,  the management on Meter is 
implicitly performed by Application.  
 
Figure 2.1 OSI Accounting Model [RFC1272] 
The Meter collects resource consumption information in the form of ac-
counting metrics.  This information is then gathered by a Collector via an 
accounting protocol. After that, the Collector processes the Meter data to 
generate the Application required usage records. This process may include 
eliminating duplicate data, aggregating and correlating related records, 
calculating interim accounting information, and generating usage records. 
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which may carry out billing, auditing, cost allocation, trend analysis or ca-
pacity planning functions.   
 [RFC1272] proposed the accounting administrative domain concept. 
An accounting management system deals with and processes accounting 
related activities in a subset of the Internet, which is the accounting admin-
istrative domain. The accounting system cares only about the traff ic in its 
administrative domain or the traffic crossing the boundaries of its adminis-
trative domain. On the basis of the administrative domain concept, 
[RFC2975] proposed the accounting management architecture as Figure 
2.2. 
In this architecture, the accounting server should have the ability of dis-
tinguishing between inter-domain and intra-domain accounting events and 
routing them appropriately. A Network Access Identifier (NAI) 
[RFC2486, RFC4282] may be required for the purpose of identifying the 
accounting administrative domain of the accounting events. Intra-domain 
accounting events are typically routed to the local billing server, while in-
ter-domain accounting events will be routed to the corresponding account-
ing servers located in other administrative domains. Proxies can be used 
for the purpose of forwarding accounting events between different admin-
istrative domains.  
 
Figure 2.2 Accounting management architecture [RFC2975] 
N. Brownlee et al extended the OSI accounting model in “Traffic Flow 
Measurement: Architecture” [RFC2722]. Compared with the OSI account-
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ing model, the traffic flow measurement model in Figure 2.3 adds a Man-
ager component to explicitly configure and control the Meter and Meter 
Reader entities. With the new added Manager, the accounting system can 
be managed with a unified pattern. This is better than the implicit man-
agement by applications in the OSI Accounting Model which is implemen-
tation dependant. The Meter Reader is the same as the Collector in the OSI 
Accounting Model. 
 
Figure 2.3 Traffic Flow Measurement Model [RFC2722] 
After surveying commercial accounting system products such as 
NARUS, XACCT, etc. [Zhan01], the Internet accounting architecture can 
be concluded as Figure 2.4. 
An Internet Accounting system consists of three layers: Meter Layer, 
Mediation Layer and OSS / BSS (Operating / Business Support System) 
Layer. The Meter Layer monitors the network activities and records the 
measurement results in Raw Data Records (RDR) like an electricity meter. 
The Mediation Layer collects the Raw Data Records from various Net-
work Elements, and processes the RDRs to produce the Usage Records 
(UR), stores the Usage Records in a database, and distributes the Usage 
Records to different app lications in the Layer 3. The applications (e.g. 
Billing, Fraud Detection, Traffic Analysis, etc.) in the Layer 3 process the 
Usage Records for different application purposes and generate various re-
ports. According to the definition, accounting functions mainly concern 
Meter Layer and Mediation Layer in the architecture depicted above.  
Application 
Meter Reader  
Meter 
Manager  
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Figure 2.4 Internet Traffic Accounting System Architecture 
2.2 Meter Layer 
2.2.1 Function requirements for the Meter Layer 
The Meter Layer is composed of Network Elements which have the ca-
pability of monitoring, measuring and logging information about traffic 
passing through them. The Network Elements record network activities in 
RDRs and store them in certain formats. These RDRs can be sent to or col-
lected by the Mediation Layer. 
The main functions of the Meter Layer are: 
l Monitor and measure the traffic 
l Record the measurement information about  network activities in 
RDRs 
l Normalize the RDRs into a certain format and store them temporarily 
l Provide mechanism to transport RDRs to the Mediation Layer  
The meter process can be described as Figure 2.5 below. 
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Figure 2.5 Accounting processes in the Meter Layer 
2.2.2 Meter location 
According to [RFC1272], metering is the process that examines the traf-
fic that takes place in a communication medium or between a pair of 
communication parties. In order to fulfill the meter functions, the place-
ment choice of the meter plays a crucial role. When choosing meter pla-
cement, factors such as availability, accuracy, overhead and efficiency 
need to be taken into consideration. 
2.2.2.1 Availability of network activity information 
The availability is the most important factor in choosing meter place-
ment. Meters must be located in the place where corresponding network 
activities can be watched and all needed traffic information can be col-
lected. Otherwise, not all or even no network resource usage information 
can be gathered. For example, in order to achieve user based traffic ac-
counting1  in multi-user systems, not only IP addresses but also user infor-
mation needs to be gathered. Therefore, in order to collect user informa-
tion, the meter must be placed into the multi-user host, rather than outside 
the multi-user host as in traditional IP address based accounting. Outside 
the multi-user system, no mechanism can obtain user information directly.  
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2.2.2.2 Accuracy and granularity 
Accuracy and granularity of the meters are decided by the accounting 
policies. They can also affect the decision of the meter placement. A Net-
work Address Translator (NAT) [RFC1631, RFC3022] server, for exam-
ple, can translate private IP addresses to a public IP address. If a NAT ser-
ver is used by a company to translate IP addresses of its intranet to a public 
IP address for Internet access, and if a coarser granularity policy is applied 
for the meter to measure only the Internet traffic generated by this com-
pany, then the meter can be placed outside the NAT server (e.g. in the 
routers with which the NAT server is linked). If a finer granularity policy 
is applied, e.g. to measure the Internet usage of every Intranet host, placing 
the meter in the NAT server is the best choice. Figure 2.6 depicts the meter 
location choices for this NAT server example in the case of coarser and 
finer granularity policy.  
 
Figure 2.6 Meter location decided by granularity requirement 
2.2.2.3 Efficiency and overhead 
Theoretically, there are two extreme choices for meter placement: one 
choice is to distribute meters in all network elements; another choice is to 
place meters in the locations where all traffic must pass through, e.g. in 
routers. 
The first choice is not efficient since every meter can only measure its 
corresponding host. Overhead is another problem for the first location 
choice. Integrating meter function into a host will cause system perform-
ance decline, although more or less of the resulted effect on performance 
depends on the complexity of the meter and the hardware ability of the 
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traffic when RDRs are collected. Despite of these disadvantages, accurate 
and finer granularity are advantages of this choice. 
Contrary to the distributed meter placement, the second choice of plac-
ing the meter in the traffic aggregating center is more efficient. Only one 
meter is needed to measure all the traffic that goes into and out of a net-
work. This meter location strategy can also decrease the unnecessary traf-
fic related to RDRs collection. Routers are usually located in the position 
where traffic is aggregated and are suitable places for integrating meter 
functions. Routers located in the network boundaries are suitable for me-
tering traffic between networks. Therefore, meters are usually placed in or 
near routers. In this case,  the overhead accompanied with the meter func-
tions has to be suffered alone by the network element with meter function. 
Other two advantages of choosing routers as the placements for integrating 
meter functions are the traffic control ability and their ability of facilitating 
intermediate system accounting [RFC1272]. However, the precondition for 
this choice is that the availability and accuracy requirements can be met.  
2.2.2.4 Network topology 
Network topology also plays an important role in choosing meter loca-
tion. Considering to measure traffic generated by hosts in a network seg-
ment, if this network segment is designed with bus topology, all traffic can 
be seen by all nodes connected to this network segment. Therefore, a meter 
can be placed in any location to watch traffic in this network segment 
(Figure 2.7a). If a network segment with ring topology needs to be meas-
ured, then every node in the ring network segment must be equipped with 
a meter in order to collect all traffic information of this network segment 
(Figure 2.7b). Physically, a bus or a ring network can be wired with a star 
topology by a hub. Therefore, the center position of the star topology is the 
best location for placing the meter (Figure 2.7c). In addition, for the mesh 
topology,  meters must be distributed into every node to gather all traffic 
information of the network (Figure 2.7d). 
2.2.2.5 Accounting policy 
Accounting policies can affect the accuracy and granularity of meters 
[RFC3334]. Consequently, these policies can affect the choice of meter lo-
cation indirectly. If the charging policy decides that traffic inside intranet 
is free whereas the traffic related to the Internet needs to be charged, then 
meters only need to be located in the boundary routers of the intranet to 
collect required accounting information of Internet traffic. If intranet traf-
fic must be charged also, then meters must be placed in the corresponding 
locations in the intranet to gather accounting information. 
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Figure 2.7 Meter location and network topology 
2.2.3 Traffic measurement technology 
The main task of a meter is to monitor and measure the network activ i-
ties for the purpose of collecting traffic information. This can be done 
mainly through two different kinds of monitoring and measurement means, 
i.e. active and passive methods.  
2.2.3.1 Active method 
The active measurement method is to watch the response to the simu-
lated network usage activities of actual users for the purpose of obtaining 
the corresponding statistics information. In Figure 2.8, a Traffic Generator 
and Traffic Monitor are located outside the measured network. The Traffic 
Generator sends the simulated traffic into the network. The Traffic Moni-
tor receives the simulated traffic which crosses the measured network and 
then records the one-way traffic measurement information. The traffic 
round trip measurement can also be made by configuring a Response Me-
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Figure 2.8 Active measurement method 
As illustrated in Figure 2.8, the active measurement method utilizes a 
black-box methodology. The measurement mechanisms are not required to 
be integrated into the intermediate network elements such as routers. For 
example, the active method can be used to measure an ISP system without 
any measurement mechanism being integrated in the ISP system. The ac-
tive method is usually suitable for measuring network performance such as 
availability, packet loss, delay, throughput, etc. For example, in order to 
test the availab ility of a host, the tool application “ping” can be used to 
send ICMP Echo request packets to the host. Through checking the re-
sponse packets, performance information such as the availability of the 
host, the round trip time, packet loss, etc. can be gathered.  
The ICMP protocol [RFC792, RFC2463] provides a feedback mecha-
nism about network problems. Hence, it is often used for reporting net-
work errors and congestions to assist network troubleshooting. “Ping” and 
“Traceroute” are two frequently used ICMP tools for testing hosts’ con-
nectivity and detecting the packets transmission path, respectively. Even 
though ICMP suffers from bad reputation from denial of service attacks, 
ICMP is still the most widely applied active measurement mechanism. 
TCP and UDP protocols are also used for active measurement purposes 
to assess network bandwidth, packet loss, etc. NetPerf [Netp], for example, 
is an active measurement tool implemented with TCP and UDP protocols. 
The active method is simple and easy to be deployed. Its measurement 
ability does not rely on any measurement capability built in the network 
devices such as routers. The traffic generation is controllable and predict-
able on a continuous basis. 
The active method has, though, several disadvantages: 
1. The first disadvantage is its effect to the performance of the measured 
network due to injecting extra traffic into the network. In addition,  the 
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2. Test packets may be transferred along a totally different path as the 
real transmission path. This may generate incorrect measurement re-
sults. 
3. Some types of test packets may be rejected by firewalls or may be 
processed at low priority by routers. This may also influence the fea-
sibility of this method and also the correctness of the measurement re-
sults. 
4. The accuracy of this method may be low because the simulation 
mechanism cannot reflect the statistics of the real world. Cons e-
quently, this method is limited to be applied only for network QoS as-
sessment and problem diagnosis. 
5. Some periodic events cannot be reflected by this simulation method.  
The active method may be not suitable for accurate accounting meas-
urement, since this method can only reflect network performance, but not 
the network resource usage. However, the information collected through 
this method can be used as complementary information for Internet ac-
counting.  
2.2.3.2 Passive method 
The passive measurement method observes and analyzes real network 
traffic to collect the statistic information [PHGG04].  This method is usu-
ally used to measure network performance, real network traffic, resource, 
and service usage. The passive measurement methods can be classified 
into three categories: packet based method, flow based method, and sam-
pling method. 
1. Packet capturing 
In traffic measurement, packet capturing is a key technique to imple-
ment the passive measurement method. Packet capturing is a mechanism 
used to capture packets along their way from source to the destination. 
Therefore packet capturing can be performed either in two endpoints of the 
communication pair or in the intermediate points such as routers. Which 
one is chosen for packet capturing depends on the strategy of the meter lo-
cation selection described in 2.2.2. Packet capturing in end-systems can be 
realized with software mechanisms such as libpcap [Libp] in UNIX and 
LINUX systems and Winpcap [Winp] in Windows systems. In routers and 
switches, packets can be captured with either Port Mirroring or Network 
Splitter mechanism. The Port Mirroring mechanism copies all packets 
passing through a port to a destination port. Through that, the mirrored 
packets can be collected and processed. This mechanism requires no add i-
tional hardware, but the mirror operations will cause processing overhead 
on the routers or switches. The Network Splitter is a hardware which can 
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split the signal and then send a signal to the original path and another to 
the packet capturing device. The advantage of this mechanism is obviously 
that no processing overhead will be applied to routers or switches, but the 
additional hardware requirement is its disadvantage.  
The challenge for packet capturing is the problems caused by the mas-
sive amount of data, especially when capturing packets in backbone net-
works. Below a data volume calculation example is given.  
Assuming packet capturing in a 100Mbps network, the link utilization is 
50% and the average packet length is 1000 bytes. The amount of packets 
that should be captured is: 
Packet amount = Link Speed x In & Out x Link Utilization / average 
packet length 
                         = 100 Mbps   x 2             x 0.5                     /  (1000 x 8) 
                         = 12500 packets/s 
If every packet must have an entry to record the measurement result, in 
each second 12500 entries will be generated. If attributes such as source IP 
address (4 bytes), destination IP address (4 bytes), source port (2 bytes), 
destination port (2 bytes) and packet size (4 bytes) are recorded in each en-
try as measurement metrics, the required total storage space for one second 
packet capturing is: 
Size of records = (4 + 4 + 2 + 2 + 4) x 12500 packets/s = 200000 bytes/s 
The packet amount will further explode accompanied by the increment 
of the port speed or the decrement of average packet size. The experience 
of capturing all packets in an Internet backbone described in [FDLM01] 
has shown that the amount of the collected data in 24 hours exceeded 3.3 
TB.  
From above we can draw the following conclusion: the great amount of 
captured data requires huge memory or storage space for storing the data 
temporarily.  Consequently, the traffic information entries will grow very 
fast coordinately to the packet amount and powerful CPU processing abil-
ity will be required to analyze and process the captured data. The solutions 
for these problems include: 
l Distributed packet capturing. This can alleviate the pressure from one 
central captor through distributing the packet capturing operation to 
more capturing points. Consequently, the requirements on huge stor-
age space and power ful CPU capability can be easily met with the dis-
tribution mechanism. 
l Design filter policy to avoid capturing unnecessary traffic. For exam-
ple, filtering all traffic inside an intranet by traffic captors may reduce 
the data volume significantly. 
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l Apply flow  based measurement. This can greatly reduce the generated 
table size of the collected information through compressing the en-
tries. 
l Utilize sampling method if accuracy requirement can be met. 
2. Flow based measurement 
A traffic flow is defined as a sequence of packets that share the same 
protocol and transport layer information between a given source and desti-
nation endpoints pair during a period of time [CISCO, RFC2724, 
RFC3917].  
Flows are usually identified by protocol related properties of IP packets 
between endpoints. For example, an 8-tuple <Source IP Address, Destina-
tion IP Address, Source Port Number, Destination Port Number, Protocol 
number, Type of Service, Start Time, End Time> may be used to identify a 
flow. Flows may also be distinguished by the protocols. For example, TCP 
packets are different to UDP packets, therefore TCP and UDP flows can be 
distinguished even if their source and destination hosts are the same. Flows 
may have different granularities.  4-tulpe <Source IP Address, Destination 
IP Address, Start Time, End Time> identifies an end-to-end flow, whereas 
the above 8-tulpe identifies an application-to-application flow. 
A flow may be uni-directional or bidirectional. For uni-directional 
flows, IP packets from endpoint A to endpoint B and IP packets from the 
endpoint B to the endpoint A belong to two different flows. Whereas for 
bi-directional flows, IP packets from endpoint A to endpoint B and IP 
packets from the endpoint B to the endpoint A belong to the same flow. 
The process of the flow-based measurement is: when the first packet of 
a flow is captured, an entry for this flow is created to record the flow in-
formation that is extracted from the packet header ; the subsequent packets 
of this flow are recorded and identified within the same flow entry. When 
the flow expires, all RDRs of this flow can be exported to the Mediation 
Layer. Generation of the RDRs is based on decoding and analyzing the 
packet headers in flows. Cisco NetFlow uses this approach. Figure 2.9 be-
low illustrates the principle of flow based measurement. 
Many efforts have been made by standard organizations and companies 
to provide standards and products for flow based measurement.  
The IETF Real-time Traffic Flow Measurement (RTFM) WG [RTFM] 
has proposed a general flow based measurement architecture [RFC2722] 
(see Figure 2.3 in 2.1.2). Under this architecture, the RTFM meter MIB, 
required attributes, etc. are proposed [RFC2720, RFC2723, RFC2724]. 
NeTraMet, an open source implementation of the RTFM architecture, is 
also developed by N. Brownlee et al [RFC2123]. 
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Figure 2.9 Principle of flow based measurement 
 NetFlow is a flow based measurement software application, which is 
part of the IOS of CISCO routers and switches. While the NetFlow en-
abled routers and switches capture flow information from the first packet 
of a flow to build an entry in the NetFlow cache, information of subse-
quent packets with the same flow properties is recorded in the same flow 
entry. The information of flows is temporarily stored in the NetFlow 
cache, which is managed by the NetFlow cache management software. 
Expired flows are grouped together into a “NetFlow Export” UDP data-
gram (see Figure 2.10) for exporting from the NetFlow enabled device. For 
example the Flow datagram can be exported from NetFlow enabled de-
vices at least once per second, or, as soon as a full UDP datagram of ex-
pired flows is available. The NetFlow Export capability can be configured 
to meet different performance requirements. 
Figure 2.10 NetFlow Export Datagram Format of Version 1, 5, 7, 8 [Netf] 
The flow based measurement approach has several advantages: 
· With flow based measurement, even if every packet is still cap-
tured, entries for every flow instead of for every packet will be 
created. Through this, the size of generated RDRs will be signifi-
cantly reduced. Therefore, less memory or storage space will be 
required and consequently the transmission of these RDRs will re-





A model for user based IP traffic accounting     29 
· Pre-processing the captured packets to form flows in Meter Layer 
will lessen the processing pressure in Mediation Layer. 
· The Raw Data Records are organized on the basis of flows. They 
can be easily collected and correlated by the Mediation Layer. 
Despite of the above described advantages, the flow based measurement 
also has disadvantages. Flow classification, aggregation, etc. processing 
operations will affect the performance of the network elements in which 
the meter functions are integrated. Especially when these processing op-
erations are performed in network devices such as routers, the effect on 
performance may become more noticeable. For example, according to 
[LuCo99], enabling NetFlow on a Cisco router can drain CPU usage as 
much as 30 percent. 
3. Sampling 
Sampling is the process of systematic or random selection of a subset of 
elements (the sample) out of a set of elements (the parent population) 
[RFC3917]. Sampling can be regarded as a discontinuous packet capturing 
method. Sometimes, it is an alternative method to the continuous packet 
capturing method if measurement accuracy can be achieved. Sometimes, 
when traffic rate is too high to capture all packets reliably, sampling is the 
only choice to provide approximate measurement results. Sampling meth-
ods for network traffic measurement have been presented for instance in 
[ClPB93, CoGi98, DuLT01, Zseb03]. 
Time based sampling, count based sampling or content based sampling 
strategies can be utilized for selecting the packets. The count based sam-
pling strategy selects one packet from a fixed number of packets for meas-
uring purpose, whereas the time based sampling strategy sets a fixed time 
interval to perform the packet capturing operation. The content based sam-
pling strategy selects the packets according to some characteristic param e-
ters in the packets. Sampling packets in which the protocol field of IPv4 
header is set to TCP can be regarded as an example of applying the content 
based sampling strategy. The concrete sampling strategy is decided by the  
measurement policy and can be configured during the measurement proc-
ess. 
The sampling method provides an average or statistic level measure-
ment result. This method is suitable for measuring video, audio, etc. data 
transmissions in which the transmission rates are stable. In these cases, 
sampling results can provide near real results. However, sampling cannot 
provide accurate measurement result, and sometimes it may even miss 
valuable data. For example, if the time interval is not configured suitably 
(e.g., the time interval is too large), some burst packets cannot be captured. 
Therefore, sampling is not suitable for accurate accounting, charging and 
billing purposes. 
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2.2.4 Measurement metrics 
The measurement metrics are the properties and quantities which can be 
measured and reported to reflect the status of the measured objects. They 
designate what kind of attribute information of the measured object should 
be collected. What should be measured by meters is decided by accounting 
policies. Different application areas, different charging and billing policies 
require different measurement metrics. The measurement metrics is also 
decided by the measurement accuracy and granularity. Time based flat rate 
charging policy for dial-in Internet service, for instance, requires only re-
cording the login and log-out time of users whereas volume based charging 
policy for the same dial- in Internet service requires recording how many 
bytes are consumed by users.  
Many accounting attributes have already been described in IETF and 
ITU-T documents [RFC2866, RFC3588, RFC2720, RFC2512, RFC2212, 
ITU-T Q.825]. Generally, the traffic measurement metrics fall into three 
categories: 
1. Identification attribute 
Identification attributes indicate the classification property or the owner 
of a meter record. Usually they are used as index for meter records aggre-
gation. The Source IP address, for example, is generally used as an index 
for aggregating records to accumulate calculable information of the same 
host. In this case, the Source IP addres s identifies the host uniquely. Sev-
eral attributes can be grouped together as identification attributes to iden-
tify a meter record. An example is the identification attributes for a flow. 
8-tuple flow identifier <Source IP Address, Destination IP Address, Source 
Port Number, Destination Port Number, Protocol number, Type of Service, 
Start Time, End Time> can be regarded as an identification attributes 
group.  
2. Statistic attribute 
Statistic attributes are the quantifiable characteristics reflecting the sta-
tistic of the measured objects. The value of the statistic attributes can be 
generated and updated through calculation operations. These attributes 
may be updated continuously reflecting the changing status of the meas-
ured objects until the meter records are collected by the Mediation Layer. 
For traffic measurement, bytes sent, packets received, time duration, etc. 
are normal statistic attributes. 
3. Status attribute 
Status attributes are the attributes that describe the status, types, etc. un-
quantifiable characteristics of the measured objects. These attributes can 
be used by applications in OSS/BSS Layer for qualitative analysis or proc-
essing. For example, the “Acct-Terminate-Cause” attribute defined in 
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RADIUS Accounting attributes [RFC2866] can be considered as a status 
attribute, since it records the reason of the session termination and may be 
a valuable parameter for charging and billing. Identification attributes and 
status attributes can be overlapped. Still using the Source IP address as an 
example, it can be used as an identification attribute for the purpose of 
uniquely identifying a flow and it can also be regarded as a status attribute.  
An example of classifying accounting attributes defined in several ac-
counting documents is given below: 
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The measurement metrics usually depend on the application area of the 
accounting, the charging policy, Service Level Agreement (SLA). 
Through analyzing accounting standards, we can find that different ap-
plication areas of accounting may have different measurement attributes. 
However, the same attributes may be defined with different names. Stan-
dards need to be defined to facilitate the compatibility among different 
standards. That is why IPFIX WG [IPFIX ] was built to unify the report. 
Otherwise, the adaptation mechanism must be built in the Mediation Layer 
for the purpose of merging these records together following different stan-
dards.  
The charging policy also plays an important role in deciding the meas-
urement metrics to be used. Flat-rate charging policy does not require any 
traffic measurement. Different usage based charging policies require dif-
ferent measurement metrics. Duration based charging requires network us-
age time to be recorded, volume based charging policy requires the sent 
and received bytes to be recorded and calculated, whereas the content 
based charging policy requires what kind of information is consumed to be 
recorded. 
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As the Internet is becoming a convergent service platform, Service 
Level Agreements (SLA) are more and more used by service providers to 
define contracts for providing services to customers. The SLA signed be-
tween a service provider and a service subscriber prescribes not only legal 
obligations for both sides but also the agreed QoS parameters. Monitoring 
and controlling the fulfillment of the agreed QoS are interested by both 
service provider and consumer. QoS parameters of different services de-
fined in SLAs construct the measurement metrics. With the emergence of 
more and more new services, each service may have its own QoS parame-
ters. Different attributes require different measurement techniques. As 
[HaRa01] described, the measurement activities can be classified into four 
levels: traffic level, network traffic, system level, client side application 
measurement and application wide measurement. 
2.2.5 Raw Data Record format 
Raw Data Record (RDR) format specifies how meter information is or-
ganized and encoded into a record. Usually the decision of choosing what 
kind of RDR format depends on the accounting protocols. If an accounting 
protocol is chosen for conveying the RDRs, the RDRs’ format must be 
compatible with the requirement of the accounting protocol. Otherwise, the 
RDRs must be converted before transmission. Certainly, proprietary for-
mats may be used or defin ed by different vendors, but this may cause 
compatibility problems in exchanging accounting information. 
A survey of different accounting protocols showed that the accounting 
record formats can be classified into several categories:  
l ASN.1 format.  
It uses ASN.1 Basic Encoding Rules (BER) to encode lists of at-
tributes into a record. For instance, SNMP MIB, RTFM and AToM-
MIB use this format. This scheme can fit well with SNMP based net-
work management systems and provides a good way to record the 
network activ ities. However, the structure of ASN.1 based scheme is 
very complex. Purpose build tools are needed to deal with these struc-
tures.  
l Binary format.  
It uses octets to encode the attributes into records. RADIUS and 
DIAMETER use this type of record format. The structure of this 
scheme is simple, but it also needs to be processed with purpose build 
tools. Furthermore, its extensibility is not good.  
RADIUS utilizes <Type, Length, Value> triple format depicted in 
Figure 2.11 to construct accounting records.  
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0                       7 8                     15 16 
Type Length Value …  
Figure 2.11 Accounting record format used by RADIUS 
DIAMETER uses a similar Attribute Value Pair (AVP) format to 
assemble accounting records. Figure 2.12 below depicts the AVP 
format of DIAMETER. 
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 AVP                       Code  
V M P r  r  r  r  r  AVP Length  
 Vendor                    ID (opt)  
Data …     
Figure 2.12 AVP format of DIAMETER 
l Plain Text format. 
It uses ASCII text to encode attributes into a record. Accounting 
Data Interchange Format (ADIF) is an example of this kind of record 
format. It was proposed in [AbLi01] and aimed at becoming a stan-
dard accounting record format. ADIF is a text based format described 
in BNF grammar and it is designed to compactly represent accounting 
data in a protocol-independent manner. It is easy to read and under-
stand the records in this format.  
l Tagged Text.  
Tagged Text format has not only the advantage of good readability 
but also enhances the flexibility and extensibility of record structure. 
Compared with the record structure in which the data type of a record 
is implicitly defined by its position, tags can explicitly identify the 
data type of a record. Therefore, the record format alteration such as 
removing or adding data elements can be easily performed without af-
fecting the record structure. IPDR [IPDR06], TIPHON [TIPHON] are 
examples using XML tag based format. The size of files or records  
with this format might be bigger, but compression can be used to re-
duce the file size before storage or transport. 
Different accounting record formats cause problems for sharing ac-
counting information among different accounting systems. With the 
achievement of new techniques in areas such as wireless communication, 
Web Services, Grid computing, etc., inter -domain accounting tends to be 
increasingly required. Standard accounting formats will facilitate the ac-
counting information exchange among different administrative domains. It 
is generally agreed that a standard record format is needed for communic a-
tion between service elements and accounting servers. In order to develop 
this kind of standard record format, issues like separating accounting re-
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cord format from accounting protocols, standardizing data types, compact-
ness, extensibility, etc. must be taken into consideration. The ADIF is an 
effort by the IETF for this purpose, although the ADIF still needs to be fur-
ther developed. It is designed not only for meter devices storing and trans-
ferring accounting information with the ADIF format (in the Meter Layer), 
but also for accounting servers generating ADIF format data after process-
ing meter records gathered by accounting protocols (in the Mediation 
Layer). The IPDR is another effort on standardiz ing accounting informa-
tion formats made by the IPDR organization. It uses XML based format 
for encapsulating accounting attributes into records. Due to lack of com-
pactness of the XML based format, the IPDR format is more suitable for 
representing Usage Records in Mediation Layer. For the introduction 
about the IPDR format, please refer to chapter 2.3.4.1 
2.2.6 Category of meters  
The Meter Layer includes different kinds of network elements that can 
be used for metering purposes. These network elements are provided by 
different vendors, and most of them are not designed only for meter ing 
purposes. Therefore, the approaches of measuring traffic  and the formats 
of Raw Data Records are different. According to [Schw99], till September 
1999 there were about at least 160 types of network elements. These net-
work elements can be classified into three categories: traffic based meter, 
application level meter and probe meter. 
2.2.6.1 Traffic based meter 
Traffic based meters are network devices that are integrated with meter 
functions. Routers, although they are applied for traffic forwarding pur-
poses, can be configured to provide traffic meter  functions . They can 
monitor every packet passing through them and extract accounting infor-
mation from packet headers to generate RDRs. Traffic based meters pro-
vide only network level accounting information. 
Below are some network elements that can be used as traffic based me-
ters: 
l Cisco NetFlow capable devices 
l RMON I, RMON II devices 
l Routers 
l Switches 
The traffic based meters have several advantages: 
l They provide finer granularity of the resource utilization infor-
mation. The RDRs include attributes such as source and destina-
tion IP addresses, source and destination port numbers, packets 
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and bytes count, timestamps, type of service, etc. These attributes 
can be employed for usage based accounting. 
l The RDRs may be organized on flow basis. They can be easily 
collected and correlated by the Mediation Layer. 
l Since meter functions are integrated into the network devices, 
event driven RDR collection mode can be supported. This can 
improve the real time capability of IP accounting.  
The traffic  based meters also have some disadvantages: 
l Since traffic based meters usually work in the network layer, they 
cannot provide detailed information about application level usage. 
For example, although NetFlow can record the Type Of Service 
(TOS) attribute, it cannot provide more detailed attributes of the 
services it records. 
l The traffic based meter function is usually embedded in network 
elements such as routers. Since the network elements are in gen-
eral not designed for dataflow metering purposes, such a function 
may affect the performance of the network elements [LuCo99]. 
2.2.6.2 Application level meter 
The Internet provides not only communication services  but also many 
value added services. Traffic based meters can only provide meter function 
in the network level. Application level meters can monitor application ser-
vice usage and generate corresponding RDRs.  
Application level RDRs can be generated with either passive or active 
methods. The passive method utiliz es log files generated by application 
servers while providing services. Usually log files are created for the pur-
pose of debugging or archiving, but they contain application service con-
sumption related information which can then be used partially or totally for 
accounting purposes.  
The main advantage of the log file based meters is that application serv-
ers have the capability of logging the service usage events when they pro-
vide various services. No special meter functions  need to be integrated. 
This is suitable for measuring legacy systems without modifying them. 
However, this type of meters has several limitations: 
l Completeness: Log files are not designed for the purpose of ac-
counting, so the log files from one network element cannot capture 
and record enough information about the customer activities. In-
formation about a single session may be composed of several at-
tributes that must be extracted from several log files in different 
network elements.  
36      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
l Real time: There is no event driver mechanism in the log file based 
meter. The network elements only record the network activities in 
the log files. They cannot inform other systems about their new log 
records. So the log files should be scanned periodically, this cannot 
meet the requirements for real time capability. 
l Different formats of log files: Different types of network elements 
or even the same type of network elements produced by different 
vendors have different formats of their log files. A custom interface 
must be added to process these log files of different formats. The 
Mediation Layer has to be flexible enough to process these formats. 
l Data redundancy: Since most of the log files are not designed for 
accounting, the log files may include many useless data for IP Bill-
ing; these redundant data must be filtered before or after they are 
sent to the Mediation Layer.  
l Coverage: Many application sessions can take place from client to 
client. In this situation, no server or middle node may exist for log-
ging the network activities. For example, Microsoft NetMeeting 
[Netm] can provide the communication between two PCs without 
using a server. In this case, there is no network element to log the 
information about the communication between the two PCs. 
l Maintenance: Log files are stored in disks. With increasing size of 
the log files, it may be necessary to backup or delete log files in or-
der to avoid running out of disk space. These processes must be 
synchronized with the Mediation Layer, but there is no mechanism 
to do this. For example, if an application server wants to delete a 
log file after backing it up, it must be known if all Raw Data Re-
cords in this log file have been collected by the Mediation Layer, 
before the application server finally deletes the file. 
Another method is integrating meter functions into application servers. 
The application servers can generate meter RDRs, and then accounting 
protocols can be used to gather these RDRs. Advantages for this method 
are: 
l More accurate service oriented RDRs can be generated. This can 
facilitate usage based accounting. 
l With integrated meter functions, application level meters can 
support event driven RDRs collection; therefore,  real time ac-
counting can be achieved. 
l With integrated meter functions, the RDRs can be managed effi-
ciently.  
The disadvantage of this active method is that the integrated meter func-
tion in application servers may affect their performance. 
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Some application servers that can provide application level meter func-
tions are listed below: 
l DNS servers – associate host names with IP addresses. 
l DHCP servers – assign IP addresses to users dynamically while they 
log on.  
l Firewall servers – ensure security of private networks. 
l LDAP servers – directory service to manage user accounts. 
l RADIUS servers – provide information on individuals logged in via 
modems or ISDN connections. 
l RAS servers. 
l VPN gateways  
l Broadcast servers – support music, video, games or education on 
demand. 
l Email servers – log information about each email sent or received 
across the corporate network or via the Internet. 
l Policy server – implement routing policy on request from subscrib-
ers, requiring quality of service through the network.  
l VoIP Gateways – support video conferencing or VoIP over LANs, 
intranets and the Internet. 
l WAP gateways – log information about the activity of each WAP 
session handled by the WAP gateway. 
l Web/Proxy servers – log access activities. 
2.2.6.3 Dedicated meter 
Traffic meters and application meters are adhered to network elements 
which are originally not designed for accounting purpose. Therefore,  they 
can only provide limited meter functions and may cause performance de-
cline problems to corresponding network elements. Dedicated meters are 
network elements designed specifically for accounting purposes. They are 
usually probe like devices placed at a key position in a network. They can 
capture IP packets through the network, extract the headers and specific 
data fields, and analyze the protocols of all layers to generate RDRs. 
Therefore, dedicated meters can provide comprehensive network re-
sources, and services consumption information.  
For example, the STA device of the Narus uses this approach [NARUS]. 
The STA device is a typical kind of network probe device; it uses a session 
based semantic analysis technique. The STA device can detect, analyze 
and characterize contextual information transacted by an application dur-
ing an identifiable period. Based on industry standard and proprietary pro-
tocol semantics, this device builds a statistical repository of all sessions per 
user over time.  
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The dedicated meters have several advantages: 
l They can capture all packets passing through the meter, they can ana-
lyze all seven layer protocols and they can record all information 
about the network activities and services .  
l They do not rely on other network elements to record information. 
They do not disturb the operation of the network elements. 
l The usage information is collected in real time. Therefore, they can 
meet the real time requirements of the Mediation and OSS Layer. 
l The RDRs can be recorded on the basis of sessions. It is easy for the 
Mediation Layer to generate the Usage Records for users. 
The dedicated meters also have some disadvantages: 
l They are additional network elements that must be invested, installed 
and maintained.  
l A large scale network requires more probes to be deployed to record 
all traffic flows. These probes must be synchronized to remove dupli-
cate events. This is a tough problem requiring a well considered solu-
tion.  
l Only existing standard applications can be correctly analyzed and 
measured. New protocols of custom designed applications may be 
hard for dedicated meters to be measured correctly.  
l Application semantics may be difficult for external meters to under-
stand. Especially when network traffic is encrypted, meters outside 
the application servers cannot get any usage information. 
l If the dedicated meters are located in high speed networks, massive 
traffic volumes will make real time measurement very difficult. 
2.2.7 Criteria for meter design 
Most of the network elements that are used as meters are not only de-
signed for generating meter RDRs. Therefore, there are no uniform criteria 
for evaluation of meter products. If a network element meets some basic 
requirements for a meter, it can be used as a meter. 
The basic criteria for a dataflow meter are: 
l Capability of measuring and recording one or more types of net-
work activity or service.  
l Capability of generating Raw Data Records and storing them for 
a period of time in some format. 
l Provision of a communication mechanism to support collecting 
Raw Data Records by the Mediation Layer devices. 
For measuring and recording the network activities better, meter prod-
ucts have to meet more advance requirements: 
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l Real time capability: recording network activities in real time, 
and reporting RDRs to the Mediation Layer in real time or sup-
porting RDRs collection by the Mediation Layer in real time. 
l Minimal impact on the performance of the network elements: 
Since most of the network elements with meter functions are not 
designed for the purpose of measuring and recording network ac-
tivities, the meter functions should not cause too much perform-
ance decline to the network elements. 
l Reliability: If failures of network or network elements occur, 
mechanisms, which can prevent from loss of recording network 
activities, have to be provided. For example, the RDRs have to be 
stored before they can be collected by Mediation Layer devices. 
Therefore, the non-volatile storage for undelivered Raw Data Re-
cords is a good way to achieve reliability. The reliable mecha-
nisms to transfer RDRs should be applied in order to avoid data 
loss. During the process of transporting RDRs to the Mediation 
Layer, a retransmission mechanism needs to be introduced. The 
Raw Data Records ought not to be deleted before a confirmation 
is received that they have been collected by the Mediation Layer. 
l Configurable rule sets for the generation of RDRs: the configur-
able rule sets define how to record network activities, which at-
tributes should be recorded, and how to generate the Raw Data 
Records. This can help the dataflow meter to be more flexible in 
recording network activities. 
l Capable of measuring and recording usage sensitive information: 
since usage based billing will be more popular in the future, me-
ters should provide enough parameters about the measured net-
work activities to meet more accurate requirements. 
2.3 Mediation Layer 
Since Internet accounting systems were first built on the basis of tradi-
tional telecommunication accounting technology, some of the concepts 
from telecommunication accounting technology are still used today for 
Internet accounting. The term “Mediation” in the traditional telecommuni-
cation field means taking data off the switch and capturing it. The data is 
then passed to a rating system to calculate the actual charges. The Internet 
mediation process is similar to the traditional telecommunication media-
tion, but the Internet mediation is more complex than the one that is used 
in traditional telecommunication. The Internet mediation layer first collects 
the RDRs from various network elements, and then, according to media-
tion rules, filters, de-duplicates, merges, correlates, aggregates, and nor-
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malizes the collected RDRs to generate the Usage Records (UR) in some 
format, stores the URs, and finally distributes these formatted URs to dif-
ferent applications in the OSS Layer for different application purposes. 
2.3.1 Functional requirements for the Mediation Layer 
The main functions of the Mediation Layer are: 
l Collect RDRs from different meters in the Meter Layer 
l Process collected RDRs 
l Generate URs in different formats 
l Store URs 
l Distribute URs adaptively to different applications in the OSS 
Layer 
2.3.2 Meter data collection  
The meter data collector is responsible for collecting RDRs from vari-
ous types of meter devices. The following factors must be taken into con-
sideration when using the meter data collector: interfaces with different 
types of meters, location of meter data collector, RDR collection modes, 
and accounting protocols choice. 
2.3.2.1 Interfaces with different types of meters 
Due to the diversity of meters, collectors should have the capability of 
interacting with different types of meters, adapting to different formats of 
RDRs, gathering RDRs according to different accounting policies. A col-
lector device can have one or more interfaces with corresponding meters. 
In order to collect RDRs from different meters, more than one collector 
device are usually required to be deployed in large networks. 
2.3.2.2 The placement of the collector 
Three principles should be taken into consideration in choosing the 
placement for collector deployment: 
l Completeness: Enough RDRs can be collected according to the 
mediation rule sets. This means that the collected RDRs can be 
used sufficiently to generate URs to meet the requirements of the 
applications in the OSS Layer. Therefore, usually the collector 
devices are located in key places, where enough RDRs can be 
collected, but less redundant or useless RDRs will be collected. 
l Low overhead: Minimal traffic on the network. This means that 
the RDRs collection should not cause too much impact on the 
performance of the network. Therefore, the collector devices are 
usually located close to the information sources. 
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l Efficiency: The collector should also be located in the place 
where RDRs can be gathered in time, so that the requirement for 
real-time accounting can be met. 
2.3.2.3 Approaches of Raw Data Records collection 
From the collector’s point of view, the RDR collection approaches can 
be classified into three types of modes: push, pull and hybrid mode. With 
the push mode,  the meters can send RDRs to collectors actively, whereas 
with the pull mode the collectors inquire meters actively for RDRs. The 
hybrid mode is a combination of push and pull mode. With the hybrid 
mode, both meters and collectors can start the data collection process ac-
tively according to configured rules. 
There are four data collection models which are used today by meter 
data collectors: polling model, event- driven model without batching, 
event-driven model with batching, event-driven polling model. These four 
models implement the push, pull or hybrid  approaches, respectively 
[RFC2975]. 
1. Polling model 
With the polling model, a collector polls meters for RDRs at regular in-
tervals. The polling interval should be proper ly configured against loss of 
data. The maximum polling interval is determined by the available mem-
ory for meters without non-volatile storage and by the size of non-volatile 
storage for meters with non-volatile storage. 
With this model, the collector needs to poll all managed meters periodi-
cally. In some cases, many meters may contain no relevant data during a 
period of time. Another problem of this model is the latency. The usage of 
the interval implies an average latency for each meter, which might be too 
high for RDRs that require low processing delay. Therefore,  this model is 
not suitable for real time RDRs collection.  
2. Event-driven model without batching 
In the event-driven model without batching, a meter will generate an 
event to inform the collector when the meter is ready to transfer RDRs. 
This model offers the lowest latency since events are processed immedi-
ately. This model can be used for real time RDRs collection. 
Event-driven without batching usually transfers one event per packet, so 
this model is inefficient. 
3. Event-driven model with batching 
In the event-driven model with batching, a meter will inform the collec-
tor when a batch of a given size RDRs has been gathered, or when RDRs 
of a certain type are available or after a minimum time has elapsed. With 
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this model, more than one RDR can be transferred in an event packet and 
consequently this model is more efficient. 
Since the event-driven model with batching usually triggers RDRs to be 
sent to the collector after a batch of RDRs is prepared, the latency of this 
model is lower than the polling model but higher than event-driven model 
without batching. With the help of implementing a schedule algorithm, 
event-driven model with batching is able to deliver urgent events to the 
collector immediately. For example, high-value RDRs can be sent at once 
without batching, while all other RDRs will be batched. With this ap-
proach, this model can be used for the real time RDRs collection. 
4. Event-driven polling model 
According to the event-driven polling model, a collector will poll the 
meter for RDRs only when it receives an event. The meter can generate an 
event when a batch transmission condition is triggered.  
Compared to the non event driven polling mode l, whenever the collector 
polls the meter , the meter already has RDRs to be sent. The blind polling 
without any result can be avoided and therefore the efficiency can be im-
proved.   
Since this model needs at least two round-trips to deliver RDRs, i.e. one 
for the event notification and another for the resulting poll, the latency in 
this approach is higher than that in the event-driven model with batching. 
2.3.2.4 Real time Collection Consideration 
Real time RDRs collection is the precondition of real time IP Billing. 
Different RDRs collection methods have different real time characteristics.  
l The pure batch approaches have poor real time capability. The RDRs 
will be collected only when a certain volume or time limitation is 
reached. Therefore, the RDRs collection is hard to be synchronized 
with the network activities.  
l The polling approaches can have near real time capability. This ap-
proach collects RDRs at regular intervals. If the interval is set short 
enough, the nearest synchronization may be reached with the network 
activities. 
l The event driven approach can collect RDRs in real time. An event 
will be sent to the collector at once when RDRs are generated by the 
network element. Then the collector is able to collect the RDRs. This 
approach has good real tim e capability. 
2.3.2.5 Accounting protocols  
Accounting protocols are used to convey meter data for accounting pur-
poses [RFC2975]. Accounting protocols define the specifications of trans-
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ferring meter records from Meter Layer to Mediation Layer. The rules for 
transferring meter data, exchanging message format and accounting attrib-
utes are prescribed in the accounting protocols. Usually accounting prot o-
cols utilize the client server model. An accounting client is generally a m e-
ter, which performs monitoring and measurement operations to generate 
meter records and reports them to the accounting server. An accounting 
server works in the Mediation Layer and is responsible for collecting and 
storing RDRs.  
Several international standard organizations such as the Authentication 
Authorization Accounting (AAA) Working Group of the IETF [AAAWG] 
and the Authentication Authorization Accounting ARCHtecture 
(AAAARCH) Research Group of the IRTF [A4RCH] have made efforts in 
constituting Internet accounting related protocols. The following protocols 
are of major importance in the Internet accounting area: RADIUS, 
DIAMETER, and SNMP.  
1. RADIUS 
The Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) protocol 
[RFC2058, RFC2138, RFC2865] was developed by Livingston Enterprises 
for exchanging authentication, authorization, and configuration inform a-
tion between a network access server (NAS), which operates as a RADIUS 
client, and a RADIUS server. [RFC2059, RFC2139, RFC2866] extended 
the RADIUS basis protocol to support accounting. This accounting prot o-
col prescribes accounting packet format, accounting attributes, and how 
the accounting information is transferred. RADIUS operates in a client 
server mode for authentication, authorization and accounting. Authentic a-
tion, authorization and accounting information details are carried by 
RADIUS attributes which are encoded in a type-length-value format. The 
flexible authentication mechanism of RADIUS can support multiple au-
thentication methods such as CHAP and PAP. The communication secu-
rity is guaranteed by encryption and shared secret key mechanisms. Figure 
2.13 below depicts an example of the RADIUS accounting process.  
The accounting function of the RADIUS protocol can work independ-
ently from RADIUS authentication and authorization. At the beginning of 
a session, an Accounting Start packet with type of service information is 
sent from a RADIUS client to the RADIUS server. Then, the server sends 
back an acknowledgement packet to the client. After that, the NAS can de-
liver service to the end-user. At the end of the session an Accounting Stop 
packet with information such as type of service, input and output octets, 
input and output packets, elapsed time, etc. is sent from the RADIUS cli-
ent, i.e. NAS, to the server, which in turn sends back an ac knowledgement 
packet. Through this process, the accounting information about the re-
source consumption of this session can be recorded. 
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Figure 2.13 Accounting process of RADIUS protocol 
After it was published by the IETF, the RADIUS protocol has attracted 
a wide range of customers, especially ISPs. It is a widely deployed Internet 
accounting protocol [Hass03]. Despite of the wide application of RADIUS, 
it has several drawbacks:  
l The extensibility of RADIUS is restricted by its limited command and 
attributes space [RFC3423].  
l UDP chosen by RADIUS for accounting information transmission 
cannot provide reliable transfer service.  
l RADIUS encrypts only the password in Access-Request packet. Other 
information in accounting packets is not encrypted. Security is thus a 
problem for RADIUS. 
2. DIAMETER 
Although RADIUS has been widely deployed and supported by ISPs 
and enterprise network managers, it cannot meet the further requirements 
of providing AAA services for hundreds and thousands of concurrent end 
users accessing network services over a variety of technologies. In order to 
eliminate the inherent deficiencies of RADIUS , the DIAMETER protocol 
[RFC3588] was defined as a successor to RADIUS. The DIAMETER pro-
tocol was developed to provide a framework for Mobile-IP [RFC3344, 
RFC3775] and NASREQ [RFC2881, RFC2882]. It is a lightweight peer 
based AAA protocol which can be used for AAA, policy and resource con-
trol [Metz99]. Moreover, DIAMETER has been chosen as the next genera-
tion AAA protocol by the AAA Working Group of the IETF [PBSP01].  
DIAMETER was designed to be compatible with RADIUS. Many mecha-
nisms in RADIUS, such as encoded attribute value pairs (AVP), proxy 
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DIAMETER base protocol provides facilities such as delivery of AVPs 
(attribute value pairs), capabilities negotiation,  error notification, extens i-
bility, user sessions, accounting, etc. DIAMETER accounting is based on 
the server directed model with the capabilities of trans ferring accounting 
information in real time. Batch accounting is not supported by 
DIAMETER. The DIAMETER base protocol did not define application 
service related accounting attributes except some mandatory AVPs such as 
Session-ID that must be included in the accounting records. Service spe-
cific AVPs need to be defined in separate DIAMETER application doc u-
ments. In order to provide reliable transport, the Stream Control Transmis-
sion Protocol (SCTP) is chosen by DIAMETER as a transport protocol. 
TCP can also be used. Improved retransmission and a fail-over scheme 
have also been employed in [RFC3588]. 
Figure 2.14 below illustrates an example of the DIAMETER accounting 
process.  
1. Authentication: The DIAMETER client (e.g. a NAS) sends an 
AA-Request with username/password pair of the remote user to 
the DIAMETER Server.  
2. Authorization: The DIAMETER server checks the password of the 
user. If it is valid, then it sends an AA-Response with authoriza-
tion information (e.g. IP-address, network mask, allowed session 
time, etc.) to the DIAMETER client.  
3. The DIAMETER client sends an Accounting-Request (ACR) 
command including AVPs (e.g. a unique Session-ID, Accounting-
Record-Type set to START_RECORD) to the DIAMETER server.  
4. The DIAMETER server replies with an Accounting-Answer 
(ACA) command including the same Session-ID and correspon d-
ing AVPs to acknowledge the accounting request.  
5. When the user logs out, the DIAMETER client sends an ACR 
command with Accounting-Record-Type set to STOP_RECORD 
to the DIAMETER server. The ACR command with 
STOP_RECORD type is sent to terminate an accounting session 
and contains cumulative accounting information relevant to the ex-
isting session.  
6. The DIAMETER server replies with an ACA to acknowledge the 
accounting request. 
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Figure 2.14 Accounting process of DIAMETER protocol  
3. SNMP 
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) proposes a man-
agement model to facilitate the exchange of management information be-
tween network devices. It is usually used by administrators for the purpose 
of managing network performance, finding and solving network problems. 
There are three versions of SNMP:  
· SNMP version 1 is defined by [RFC1155, RFC1157, RFC1212, 
RFC1215]  
· SNMP version 2 is defined by [RFC2578, RFC2579, RFC2580, 
RFC3416, RFC3417, RFC3418] 
· SNMP version 3 is defined by [RFC3411, RFC3412, RFC3413, 
RFC3414, RFC3415] 
These standards define the SNMP protocol, the architecture of SNMP 
management frameworks, the Structure of Management Information 
(SMI), protocol operation, security model, etc., respectively. Each new 
SNMP version is enhanced and improved on the basis of the earlier ver-
sion. The description of interoperability and compatibility among 
SNMPv1, SNMPv2 and SNMPv3 can be found in [RFC3584].  
In SNMPv1 and SNMPv2, an SNMP system is regarded consisting of 
three components: 
l Managed devices. A managed device is a network element in which 
the SNMP agent resides. A managed device collects management in-
formation and stores it in MIB, which can then be delivered to Net-
work Management Stations (NMS) through SNMP protocol by agent. 
1. AA- Request 
2. AA- Response  
6. ACA (Session-ID) 
5. ACR (Session-ID+STOP_RECORD) 
4. ACA (Session-ID) 
3. ACR (Session-ID+START_RECORD) 
DIAMETER Client DIAMETER Server 
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Managed devices can be network devices such as routers, hubs, 
switches, access servers, hosts, printers, etc. 
l Agent. An agent is a software component that resides in the managed 
device for the purpose of SNMP network management. It is respons i-
ble for communicating with NMS to fulfill SNMP management func-
tions. 
l Network Management Stations (NMS). NMS is responsible for mon i-
toring and controlling managed devices. 
Figure 2.15 below depicts the relationship between the above three 
components. 
 
Figure 2.15 components in SNMP protocol 
The managed information is stored in MIBs. The NMSs interact with 
agents residing in managed devices to retrieve the information using the 
“get” operation or to alter parameters using the “set” operation. In this op-
eration scheme, the NMS plays an active role whereas the agent plays a 
passive role. In order to be consistent with the simplicity strategy of the 
SNMP protocol, a limited number of unsolicited messages (“trap”) were 
proposed in SNMP. These traps are usually served for error reports. Dif-
ferent transport protocols can be served for exchanging SNMP messages. 
In the IPv4 environment, UDP is the preferred transport protocol for 
SNMP and must be implemented [RFC3417]. 
In SNMPv3, a new view of the SNMP entities is suggested. An SNMP 
management system can be regarded as any combination of the following 
types of application layer functionalities: 
l Command generators: Initiate read- and/or write-class messages.  
l Command responders: Respond to read- and/or write-class messages.      
l Notification originators:  Originate notification-class messages.      
l Notification receivers:  Receive notification-class messages.      
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In this new view, an entity of an SNMP system can play several differ-
ent roles through combining different functionalities. 
l SNMP entities with command responder and/or notification originator 
applications function as traditional SNMP agents. 
l SNMP entities with command generator and/or notification receiver 
applications function as traditional SNMP managers. 
l SNMP entities with command generator and/or notification receiver, 
plus command responder and/or notification originator applications 
function as SNMP dual-role entities. 
l SNMP entities with command generator and/or notification receiver 
and possibly other types of applications for managing a potentially 
very large number of managed nodes function as SNMP management 
stations. 
l SNMP entities with proxy forwarder applications function as tradi-
tional SNMP proxy agents. 
This new view on the SNMP entities can facilitate the design, develop-
ment and deployment of more focused and more complex SNMP man-
agement systems. 
SNMP utilizes Management Information Base (MIB) for storing infor-
mation of the managed objects. An MIB is a collection of information that 
is organized hierarchically. Objects in the MIB are defined using Abstract 
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [ISO8824]. The type of object is defined by 
name, syntax and encoding. The name is used to identify managed objects 
uniquely with an Object Identifier. The syntax defines the data type such 
as integer, string, etc. of the managed object. The encoding describes the 
format of the management information.  
[RFC1155] specifies the hierarchical tree structure in representing the 
Object Identifier. Each node except the root in the MIB tree is labeled with 
a number. Through traversing the tree from root to a node, a sequence of 
integers, which can then be used as the Object Identifier, can be con-
structed. Figure 2.16 illustrates how the flowDataSourcePeerAddress vari-
able in traffic flow meter MIB [RFC2720] is identified by the MIB tree. 
The managed object flowDataSourcePeerAddress can be uniquely identi-
fied either by the object name: 
iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.flowMIB.flowData.flowDataTable.flowData
Entry.flowDataSourcePeerAddress or by the equivalent object descriptor: 
1.3.6.1.2.40.2.1.1.9 
SNMP protocol operates in a request-response mode. The NMS sends a 
request and the managed device feeds back corresponding responses. 
SNMPv1 defines four protocol operations: Get, GetNext, Set, Trap. In 
SNMPv2, two new operations are added: GetBulk, Inform. Through the 
GetBulk operation the efficiency of data retrieving ability is enhanced. 
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Figure 2.16 Tree structure in representing Object Identifier in MIB 
SNMP is restricted to a low-frequency access scheme for MIB informa-
tion. Whether it can satisfy all requirements for authentication and authori-
zation is a controversial issue. Generally, it is not considered as an AAA 
Protocol [RFC3127, PBSP01]. However, it is commonly agreed that 
SNMP is suitable for accounting. Its support on accounting is mainly in its 
ability of transferring accounting records and storing them in an SNMP 
Management Information Base (MIB). 
4. Accounting protocols comparison  
This section provides a comparison among RADIUS, DIAMETER and 
SNMP protocols, especially on their accounting functionalities. The com-
parison is based on the RADIUS, DIAMETER and SNMP related protocol 
standard documents of IETF and [RFC3127, RFC2989, EkSP00]. 
l Operation model 
RADIUS operates in a client server model. The RADIUS server does not 
initiate any message, but only replies to the requests from RADIUS client. 
Therefore RADIUS can be regarded as operating in a pure client server 
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model. From the perspective of data collection, RADIUS works in an 
event based push mode. 
DIAMETER operates in a similar way like the RADIUS except that not 
only the DIAMETER client but also the DIAMETER server can initiate a 
request. Therefore DIAMETER can be regarded as operating in a peer to 
peer model. DIAMETER can be also regarded as working in an event 
based push mode.  
SNMP operates in the polling model. The NMSs initiate requests for re-
trieving data from management agents regularly. Through receiving re-
sponses from the management agents management information can be 
gathered.  
l Transport protocol 
RADIUS utilizes UDP as transport protocol for information delivery. 
Since UDP provides no reliable transmission mechanism, the RADIUS 
implementations have to handle acknowledgement, retransmission, etc. re-
liable transport related issues. 
DIAMETER, as it is developed to eliminate the inherent drawbacks of 
RADIUS protocol, emphasizes reliable transport through selecting SCTP 
(Stream Control Transmission Protocol) [RFC2960] or TCP for informa-
tion transmission. SCTP is a transport level protocol like TCP and UDP, 
and it has been approved by IETF as a standard. It can detect errors such as 
discarded, duplicated or corrupted data, and can retransmit damaged data 
or reorder data. TCP is a well known and most frequently applied reliable 
transport protocol. It can provide reliable transport services through 
mechanisms such as acknowledgement, sequence number, flow and con-
gestion control, etc. 
Principally, SNMP can utilize any transport protocol conveying SNMP 
information. Yet it prefers UDP as the transport protocol in IPv4 environ-
ment because of its simplicity and efficiency [RFC3417]. SNMP over TCP 
was proposed as an option and was suggested to be applied for bulk data 
transmission [RFC3430]. 
l Proxy mechanism  
Proxy is an intermediate node located on the path between two commu-
nication endpoints. It can usually provide additional functionalities or ser-
vices for specific purposes.  
RADIUS supports the proxy mechanism mainly for the forwarding pur-
pose. For example, a proxy server can adapt different types of links be-
tween client and server, or a proxy can be used for the purpose of retrans-
mission so that the retransmission policy is robust and scalable. Since the 
behavior of the proxy is not defined in RADIUS explicitly, it may vary be-
tween implementations [RFC3588].   
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In DIAMETER, the term agent instead of proxy is used. DIAMETER 
classifies the agents into four categories in  DIAMETER Base Protocol 
[RFC3588] according to the role an agent plays. Relay agents are respo n-
sible for forwarding requests and responses between clients and servers. 
They generate no messages and modify no messages. Proxy agents can not 
only forward requests and responses but also make policy decisions related 
to resource usage and provisioning. They may generate Reject messages in 
case of policies being violated. Redirect agents offer central DIAMETER 
routing configuration services for DIAMETER agents with relay function. 
Redirect agents do not provide relay service. The translation agent is re-
sponsible for translating protocols between DIAMETER and other AAA 
protocols such as RADIUS. 
In SNMP, a proxy is defined mainly for converting protocols, enhancing 
the accessing flexibility of the managed devices without increasing their 
complexity and providing the secure communication ability over insecure 
links. Proxy mechanism can also facilitate the coexistence between differ-
ent SNMP versions [RFC3584]. 
l Real tim e accounting 
Real time accounting requires that the accounting information process-
ing to be completed within a time limitation. Since both RADIUS and 
DIAMETER support event based push model data collection, clients can 
send accounting data to the accounting server synchronously with the 
event notifications within a time window. SNMP agents can send Trap or 
Notification PDU to SNMP manager. Through that, real time accounting 
can be achieved. 
l Accounting Record Extensibility 
RADIUS can support new attributes or vendor specific extensions. Due 
to the limited attribute number space of RADIUS, it is commonly consid-
ered as an accounting protocol with restricted extensibility.  
DIAMETER was designed to improve the extensibility of RADIUS. Its 
attribute code is expanded to 32 bits comparing 8 bits with RADIUS. This 
can enhance the accounting record extensibility greatly. AVP numbers 1 to 
255 are reserved for compatibility with RADIUS, and AVP numbers 256 
and above are used for DIAMETER. However, these AVP numbers must 
be allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [IANA]. 
The MIB structure provides strong extensibility inherently. Therefore, 
vendor specific extensions can be easily integrated into SNMP.  
l Batch Accounting 
Batch accounting is the ability of grouping accounting records for one 
time transmission rather than single record transmission.  
RADIUS accounting supports only the pure event driven data collection 
model without the batch function. 
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Although initially batch accounting for small batches has been taken 
into account in the DIAMETER accounting extension draft [ACPZ99], the 
DIAMETER standard [RFC3588] did not adopt the batch accounting abil-
ity.  
SNMP supports both polling and event driven data collection model. It 
can support methods for batch accounting. The GetBulk operation defined 
in SNMP offers a mechanism for retrieving a large amount of management 
information through exchanging a minimal number of request messages. 
l Guaranteed Delivery 
Both RADIUS and DIAMETER employ application level acknowl-
edgement and retransmission mechanism to guarantee data delivery. Since 
the retransmission behavior and fail-over mechanism are not exactly de-
fined in RADIUS, the retransmission algorithm and fail-over processing of 
RADIUS is implementation dependent. This makes protocol reliability 
vary between implementations. 
DIAMETER follows recommendations on the use of transport by AAA 
protocols in standard [RFC3539]. Fail-over algorithms and the associated 
state machine are well defined and supported by DAIMETER. Therefore 
DIAMETER can provide better support for guaranteed delivery.  
SNMP can also provide guaranteed data delivery. Especially when the 
pull model is applied for data collection, the collectors know whether all 
data has been transferred.  
l IPv6 support 
RADIUS was designed for running over IPv4. With the IPv6 slowly ap-
proaching, support for IPv6 has also been considered by IETF in 
[RFC3162]. Through introducing several new attributes, RADIUS can be 
integrated into the IPv6 environment. 
DIAMETER has no prob lem in being adopted into the IPv6 environ-
ment, since the IPv6 issues have been taken into consideration during the 
protocol development. The AddressType defined in Address AVP can 
identify the content and format in the corresponding AVP. 
l Security 
AAA nodes, due to their objectives for providing Authentication, Au-
thorization and Accounting services, are always interested by attackers. 
Therefore security is one of the most important issues that must be taken 
into consideration seriously when designing AAA protocols. 
Transport layer security is not explicitly defined in RADIUS documents. 
An exception is that IPSec [RFC1825, RFC2401, RFC4301] is implicitly 
expected to support RADIUS, due to the fact that IPSec is mandatory to be 
implemented for IPv6. The data confidentiality support by RADIUS is in-
sufficient. RADIUS encrypts only user passwords in the exchanged pack-
ets between client and server and leaves other information exposed to po-
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tential attackers. The proxies in RADIUS also play a role in affecting the 
data integrity and confidentiality. Since proxies may need to modify mes-
sages through them, this makes the entire encryption difficult and the 
RADIUS systems may be vulnerable against attacks from untrusty proxies. 
DIAMETER adopts IPSec and TLS [RFC2246, RFC3546] for providing 
transport layer security. DIAMETER clients must support IPSec and may 
support TLS, whereas DIAMETER servers must support both. IPSec and 
TLS can provide only hop to hop security. The security is not sufficient if 
relays or proxies are involved, since hop to hop security cannot protect the 
entire user session. DIAMETER also provides end to end security, which 
can protect the entire communication path from the originating node to the 
terminating node.  
SNMPv3 provides several security services to protect SNMP systems 
against potential attacks. [RFC3414] defines three different security func-
tion modules. The authentication module provides data integrity and data 
origin authentication to prevent SNMP systems from possible information 
modification or masquerade attacks. The timeliness module can provide 
protection against message delay or replay. The privacy module can pre-
vent the message payload from being disclosed. 
2.3.3 Raw Data Record (RDR) processing  
After RDRs are gathered, they will then be further processed to generate 
Usage Records  (UR) for different application purposes. Policies or rules 
will be applied in the course of RDRs processing to control the generation 
of the URs. The main processing functions include: validation, de-
duplicating, filtering, correlation, aggregation, and normalization. 
2.3.3.1 Validation & Correction 
After the RDRs are collected, some of them may be invalid or may con-
tain errors. The Validation & Correlation module checks, if the RDRs are 
valid. If a RDR is verified to be valid, it can be handed down to other 
modules for further processing. If a RDR is not valid, then the validation 
module will try to correct the errors according to the predefined rules. If 
these errors can be corrected and the RDRs become valid, then they will be 
handed down to other processing modules. Otherwise, the RDRs with un-
correctable errors will be discarded, and this discarding information will be 
written down in log files. 
2.3.3.2 Filtering 
The filtering module discards the RDRs which are worthless for gener-
ating URs. The filtering mechanisms can be integrated in both Meter Layer 
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and Mediation Layer. In meters, filter policies control what should be 
measured and transferred to collectors. Through that, worthless data will 
not be generated and transferred, and consequently less traffic will be pro-
duced. Although some meters can provide tailored information to collec-
tors according to filter policies, some meters without filter function, like 
log file based meters, may still generate worthless RDRs. After the RDRs 
are collected, the filtering module in the Mediation Layer can exclude use-
less RDRs according to filter policies. Through filter processing, the data 
volume that needs to be processed will be decreased.  
2.3.3.3 De-duplication 
The de-duplication module discards duplicated RDRs collected from 
different meters. Duplicated RDRs are usually generated due to overlapped 
meter policies. For example, router A is an edge router in network A and 
router B is an edge router in network B. These two routers are configured 
to perform meter operations. Both routers are configured to measure only 
traffic in and out their own networks. Therefore the traffic between router 
A and router B will be measured by both meter A and meter B, and dupli-
cated RDRs will be generated. When RDRs from these two routers are 
gathered by the same mediation system, many duplicated RDRs are in-
cluded. Discarding these duplicated RDRs will also reduce the data vol-
ume that needs to be processed to generate the URs.  
This module can be implemented by comparing the key fields of RDRs 
to decide if these RDRs are duplicated or not. For example, attributes in 
RDRs like source IP address, destination IP address, source port number, 
destination port number, timestamp, etc. can be used to distinguish the re-
dundant RDRs. If several RDRs from different meters have the same 
source and destination address, the same source and destination port num-
ber, and the same identification, only one of them needs to be kept, others 
can be discarded.  
2.3.3.4 Correlation & enhancement 
This module merges several RDRs, which are related to each other, to 
create a single record. Through that, the complete attributes of an event 
can be assembled. This can provide a single, complete view of information 
about an event. Figure 2.17 gives an example about how NetFlow records, 
RADIUS records, and LDAP records are correlated to generate a single at-
tribute rich record.  
In this example a NetFlow record needs to be mapped to the actual user 
who generates it. However, the record contains only source IP address in-
formation. A RADIUS record logs the information about this IP address 
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and to whom it was allocated during a period of time. Using the User 
Name found in the RADIUS record as an index, the corresponding regis-
tration information such as Real Name, Contact Address, etc. about this 
user can be discovered in a LDAP record. Through the above described 
correlation process, a more detailed single record can be generated. This 
process can also be called enhancement process. Enhancement is used 
when a RDR does not include enough information to generate a usage re-
cord, other RDRs will be referenced to enrich the information of this RDR. 
 
Figure 2.17 An example of the correlation process 
2.3.3.5 Aggregation 
An aggregation module accumulates a set of RDRs to produce a UR 
through statistical calculation according to corresponding rules. The UR 
can then be used by the OSS Layer applications. In the aggregation mod-
ule, different rules will be used to control the aggregation of the RDRs. 
The rules can define which fields are the key for the aggregation process, 
which operations should be performed on the aggregated fields, and under 
which circumstances the aggregation should be timeout. For example, dur-
ing a VoIP call interim RDRs are generated before the end of the call is 
reached. These interim RDRs of this VoIP call should be merged with the 
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VoIP call event. Although both correlatio n and aggregation modules util-
ize several RDRs to generate a single record, they are applied for different 
purposes. The correlation process assembles RDRs in a “horizontal” direc-
tion to generate a complete and more accurate record, whereas the aggre-
gation process consolidates RDRs in a “vertical” direction to generate a 
summary record.  
2.3.3.6 Normalization  
After the above described processes, Usage Records are generated. 
These URs can first be stored in an intermediate format, in a standard for-
mat, or even in the raw format as they are collected. The normalization 
module will then transform the URs to different formats according to the 
rules in order to meet the requirements of different applications in OSS 
Layer. Since different applications in OSS Layer  may need different for-
mats of URs to meet different requirements, the normalization module 
should support generating specified formats such as IPDR, XML, Text, 
etc. It should also have the extensible capability of supporting formats 
which might be developed in the future.  
The normalization process can be executed in static or dynamic ways. 
The static way is to generate URs in different formats for different applic a-
tion purposes, and then store them for future collections by OSS Layer ap-
plications. The dynamic way is to generate and store URs in a standard or 
intermediate format. If an application in OSS Layer requires the URs to be 
collected with some format, the normalization module converts the URs to 
the required format at first and then the URs are sent to the OSS Layer. If 
applications in the OSS Layer have the ability of adapting to different for-
mats or supporting the standard format, no normalizing process will be 
needed. This can certainly reduce the overhead caused by the normaliza-
tion process and speed up the whole accounting and billing process. 
Hence, standard format is very important and necessary.  
2.3.4 Usage Record format 
In order to interface with the OSS Layer applications easily, the Media-
tion Layer should have the ability of generating all formats which may be 
needed by different applications in the OSS Layer.  
Till now, there is no standard format recording Internet usages. Usually, 
even different accounting system providers define and use their proprietary 
UR formats. Different UR formats will certainly cause interoperation prob-
lems. Therefore it is necessary to develop a standard format to make it 
easy to exchange URs between Mediation Layer and OSS Layer. It is also 
necessary for future IP Billing applications. 
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IPDR (Internet Protocol Data Record) [IPDR02] is a record format, 
which is intended to be used as the standard. The IPDR format is defined 
by the IPDR working group. The IPDR organization is a non-profit open 
consortium consisting of equipment vendors and service providers. It aims 
to facilitate the exchange of IP usage data and control data information 
among different systems such as network elements, operation support sys-
tems, business support systems, etc.  
The IPDR standardizes a usage record format and delivery protocol. It 
represents the usage in encapsulation techniques such as XML. It defines 
an open, extensible, flexible record that encapsulates the essential parame-
ters for different IP service transactions. 
2.3.4.1 IPDR record structure  
The IPDR record structure is designed to have the ability of characteriz-
ing any type of usage. There are five components common to all IPDR re-
cords. These components are the ‘who, what, where, when, and why’ val-
ues that describe a particular usage event [IPDR02]. 
· Who 
 User ID (in some form, if available) 
· When 
Start and Stop Time or Event Time of service usage 
· What 
Service type 
Usage measures / quantities (e.g. bytes, packets, flows, hits, transac-
tions, time duration) 
QoS measures  
State information 
Event code (logon, logoff, threshold exceeded) 
Other information about state transition or current state 
· Where 
Traceability / Context 
Source Identifier  
Destination Identifier 
Service Element Identifier (originator) 
· Why 
Event trigger type – (i.e., why is the network and service element re-
porting this  data)  
In addition to the ‘5Ws’ defined, each record may include reference 
pointers to other IPDR records which either capture related usage inform a-
tion, or contain usage information that was used to create the given record. 
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In addition to the IPDR record structure, the IPDR specification defines 
a set of interfaces for exchanging IPDRs between IPDR-enabled devices or 
systems. 
2.3.4.2 Services considered in IPDR 
The IPDR considers that many services are structured in a hierarchy. 
For each service the IPDR specification describes the definition of the ser-
vice, service requirements, attribute list for service usage and, for some 
services, the basic flow. The IPDR also defines the formal specification of 
the records for each service considered.  
IPDR is an open standard; it can be extended to support new services in 
the future. Now the IPDR contains the following services [IPDR03]: 
l Application Services Provision 
l Voice over IP (VoIP) 
l E-mail Services  
l Access and Authorization Services(AA) 
l Internet Access 
l Content Service 
l Push Delivery 
l Wholesale Requirements 
l Streaming Media 
l Video on Demand (VoD) 
2.3.5 Adaptor for distribution of Usage Records  
The adaptor for distribution of URs interfaces with all applications in 
the OSS Layer. It communicates with the applications of the OSS Layer, 
and uses push or poll approaches to send the URs to the downstream appli-
cations. 
2.3.5.1 Transfer mechanism 
To interface with different OSS Layer applications, the adaptor for dis-
tribution of URs should support different kinds of transfer mechanisms 
such as TCP, UDP, FTP, SMTP, Network File Sharing, CORBA, COM, 
SQL, etc. This allows quick and easy integration of the mediation system 
with OSS layer applications. 
2.3.5.2 Reliability 
In order to achieve reliability, the re-transmission mechanism should be 
used to transfer the URs again, once the URs are not delivered correctly to 
the OSS Layer applications due to network failure or other reasons. 
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2.3.5.3 Security 
The URs contain private information. These records are concerned with 
money in the billing system, so keeping security during the transmission of 
URs is very important. It is more necessary to add the security mechanism 
when the URs are being transmitted to remote applications. 
2.3.6 Criteria for evaluation of the Mediation Layer 
The Mediation Layer acts as a bridge, enabling the RDRs to be collected 
from different kinds of network elements, and transforming it into high 
value information, and then distributing the processed information to var i-
ous downstream applications. 
Some criteria for the evaluation of the functionality of products used in 
the Mediation Layer are given below: 
l Can collect RDRs from multiple types of network elements 
l Support push and poll approaches for RDR collection 
l Support multiple transport protocols for RDR collection 
l Support multiple data formats in input streams 
l Support rule based RDR collection 
l Support rule based RDR processing, such as filtering, validation, cor-
rection, de-duplication, correlation, enhancement, normalizing, etc. 
l Can generate different formats of URs 
l Can manage the storage of URs 
l Support the distribution of URs to multiple applications 
l Support multiple transport protocols for the distribution of URs 
l Provide the management mechanism for the mediation system 
Some criteria for the evaluation of the performance of products used in 
the Mediation Layer are given below: 
l Scalability. The Mediation Layer can be dynamically extended to 
support adding new network elements and new OSS Layer applic a-
tions easily without affecting the system’s operations. The Mediation 
Layer should be able to accommodate to the changes in the Meter 
Layer or the OSS Layer.  
l Flexibility. The mediation system can easily support different network 
infrastructure and application logic with the configuration of the rule 
sets. 
l Reliability. The mediation system should be designed to be fault tol-
erant. During the collection of RDRs and the distribution of usage re-
cords, the data retransmission mechanism should be used if faults oc-
cur. The validation and correction mechanism should also be used to 
guarantee the availability of the RDRs. Non-volatile storage should be 
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used to facilitate disaster recovery and minimize the threat of losing 
valuable accounting data. 
l Security. Since data throughout the mediation system includes private 
information and concern money in IP Billing cases, the importance of 
keying the security of data is self-evident. During the transport and 
the processing of the data, security mechanisms should be considered.  
l Real-Time capability. Different applications require differ ent real 
time capabilities. In some business cases real time means better ser-
vice and more customers, and that also means more economic profit. 
In the Mediation Layer, the real time capability can be reached and 
enhanced in three stages: the RDRs collection, processing and usage 
records distribution.  
2.4 Management of accounting systems 
The accounting management system concerns Meter Layer and Media-
tion Layer. Its main functions include: configuration, policy or rule distri-
bution, rule explanation and execution, management interface offering, sta-
tus monitoring, operations control. 
2.4.1 Configuration 
Configuration is the process of adjusting an accounting system to regu-
late its running behaviors according to the predefined rules. 
In Meter Layer, issues like what should be measured, which measure-
ment granularity should be achieved, how often the RDRs should be re-
ported, which kind of accounting protocol should be supported, which kind 
of formats should be used for RDRs, how much storage space should be 
allocated for RDRs, etc. need to be configured before a meter measure-
ment start.  
Due to the diversity of meter devices, their configuration may be im-
plicit or explicit. Some network elements may be not designed and em-
ployed originally for meter purposes, despit e the fact that they can gener-
ate meter related information. In this case, these network elements are 
configured according to their original purposes instead of according to me-
ter rules, since configuration for meter purposes by accounting manage-
ment system may be impossible. Therefore the configuration for these 
network elements is implicit, and the Mediation Layer should be config-
ured correspondingly to accommodate these kinds of meters. Network 
elements that integrate meter functions can be configured according to me-
ter rules. This configuration is explicit. Their behaviors can be adjusted 
and controlled by the accounting management system. 
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The Mediation Layer is the bridge between Meter Layer and OSS Layer. 
On the one hand, there are many different types of network elements 
which can be used as meters. With the appearance of new network ele-
ments, in the future, these new network elements may also be used as me-
ters. Therefore the Mediation Layer should be flexible and extensible to 
accept these dynamic changes of network elements. On the other hand, the 
Mediation Layer has to interface with different applications in the OSS 
Layer. The Mediation Layer should also be flexible and extensible to meet 
the requirements of the changes of the OSS Layer applications. Further-
more, during the processing of the RDRs, the behaviors of different proc-
essing modules should also be controlled.  
All these requirements can be met through the dynamic configuration 
ability with the help of rules. The accounting management system can dy-
namically configure the mediation system by modifying the rule sets, ac-
tively adding or deleting its relationship with network elements or dow n-
stream applications. 
2.4.2 Policy and rule management 
Policies and rules play a very important role in regulating the behaviors 
of accounting systems. Policy and rule management concerns policy ex-
planation, rule distribution, and rule execution.  
Policy explanation is responsible for converting policies into executable 
rules. On the one hand, different policies may be derived from different 
application purposes. They must be translated into understandable accoun t-
ing system rules. On the other hand, since there is no standard rule suitable 
for all meter devices, the same policies may be required to be converted 
into different executable rules for different meter devices.  
After rules are generated from policies, they should be distributed to dif-
ferent components in the accounting system to control their behaviors. The 
rules setting can be static or dynamic. The static rules cannot be changed 
during a period of time. If an accounting component hard codes its rules, 
the rules cannot be altered except by modifying the source code of this 
component. Another situation for static rule setting is to mount rules when 
an accounting component is started. This setting will not be changed until 
the accounting component is stopped. The static setting has the advantage 
of simplifying the rule distribution process. The disadvantage of it is that 
the accounting components cannot meet the requirement of changing the 
environment dynamically. The dynamic rule setting can change the ac-
counting related rules on the fly during the accounting components ru n-
ning. The rules can be downloaded to the accounting components actively 
or passively from the accounting management system. Through that, new 
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requirements to the accounting components can be met effectively, and 
flexibility and extensibility can be easily achieved.  
Rules require to be enacted by execution engines.  Below an abstract 
rule set example is given: 
Rule Set ::= Rule | {Rule ;} 
Rule ::= Test ; Action 
Test ::= value=attribute & mask 
Action ::= operation_code | {parameter ;} 
The “Test” part calculates the condition value; the “Action” part oper-
ates according to the condition value. Different types of rule sets may need 
different rule execution engines. Usually these execution engines are inte-
grated into the accounting components as a part of the accounting func-
tions. 
In the Meter Layer, issues like what should be measured, which meas-
urement granularity should be achieved, how often the RDRs should be 
reported, which kind of accounting protocol should be supported, which 
kind of format should be used for RDRs, how many storage space should 
be allocated for RDRs, etc. can be controlled by meter rules. 
In the Mediation Layer, during the process of collecting RDRs, process-
ing RDRs and distributing URs, the rule sets control all these activities.  
During the collection of RDRs, the rule sets decide from which network 
elements RDRs should be collected, which kind of RDRs should be col-
lected, which RDRs should be filtered, the poll intervals of the collection 
of RDRs, and which transfer protocols should be used, etc.  
During RDRs processing, rule sets can control the validation, correction, 
filtering, de-duplication, correlation, enhancement, aggregation and nor-
malization of the RDRs. Rule sets also control the storage of URs.  
Rule sets also play an important role in the adaptor for distributing URs. 
They specify which applications the URs should be sent to, which transfer 
protocols should be used, which format of URs should be chosen to meet 
the requirements of the downstream applications, etc. 
2.4.3 Management interface  
The accounting management system should provide an administration 
interface to the accounting system administrator. Through that, an account-
ing system administrator can manage and control the accounting system. 
The management interfaces may concern operation interface, monitor in-
terface, report interface, policy and rule set interface, user management in-
terface, etc.  
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2.4.4 Status monitoring  
The accounting management system should monitor the status of the ac-
counting system and generate the monitoring report. The statistic results 
can be reported to the accounting system administrator through the man-
agement interface. By monitoring the accounting system, the accounting 
system administrator can verify the health status of the entire system and 
take corresponding management actions. 
2.4.5 Operations control 
The accounting management system can provide the control interface 
for the administrator to control the accounting system operations. The ac-
counting system administrator can start up, shut down, suspend or change 
the behaviors of operations in the accounting system through operation 
control mechanisms. 
2.5 IP Billing and OSS/BSS Layer 
The OSS/BSS Layer is the highest layer of the Internet accounting sys-
tem architecture. This layer consists of different types of applications such 
as Billing, decision support, fraud detection, trend analysis, etc. These ap-
plications use different communication mechanisms to gather the Usage 
Records from the mediation systems. These applications concern different 
application areas. Below only the technology of Billing will be discussed. 
Billing is the process of consolidating charge records on a per customer 
basis and delivering a certain aggregate of these records to a customer. 
Billing process consists of collecting URs from mediation devices, calc u-
lating the charge according to the price schemes, reporting their expend i-
ture to the customers or delivering the invoice. Figure 2.18 illustrates this 
process. 
 























64      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
2.5.1 Billing modules 
The Billing system consists of several modules. 
2.5.1.1 Usage Records collection module  
The Usage Records collection module interfaces with different media-
tion systems to gather the URs generated by the mediation systems. The 
push or pull approaches can be used in the collection of URs. If the media-
tion systems are designed flexible enough to transfer the URs of different 
formats with different kinds of transport protocols, the Billing systems 
need not pay more attention to interface with these mediation systems. 
Otherwise, the adaptation mechanisms must be applied in the Billing sys-
tems. During the collection of URs, rule sets can also be used to meet the 
dynamic change requirements, and this can make the system more flexible. 
After the URs are collected, they will be sent to the Charging module. 
2.5.1.2 Charg ing module  
The charging module accepts the URs collected by the URs collection 
module, and calculates customers’ actual charge according to the price 
schemes. The results of the calculation will be generated and stored as 
charge records. The charge records will be organized to be presented to the 
customers eventually. After the charge calculation the generated charge re-
cords are stored in a database, they can then be used to generate the de-
tailed reports or invoices to customers. 
2.5.1.4 Price Scheme module  
The price schemes define how the URs should be calculated, and they 
also define the price per unit of usage. The price schemes can be config-
ured dynamically to meet the requirements of a frequently changed charg-
ing and billing policy. This module should provide the interface for price 
rule sets definition and modification.  
In the course of charge calculation, the price schemes play a very impor-
tant role, since all calculating rules are defined in them. Through the ad-
justment of the price schemes, the billing system can provide flexible bill-
ing capabilities to meet the requirements of complex billing plans. 
2.5.1.3 Report module  
The report module uses the charge records to generate bills for every 
customer. A bill may be a printed invoice, or additionally the customers 
can inquire and browse the billing information with a web browser. There-
fore, the report module provides these functions: 
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l Organize and generate bills. The detailed usage information should be 
provided to the customers when needed. Customers can also design 
their own style of reports. 
l Inquire bill 
l Display bill 
l Print bill 
2.5.2 Criteria for evaluation of billing systems  
Here the criteria for evaluating IP Billing systems are listed: 
l Can gather IP usage records from different mediation systems 
l Can calculate the charge of the customers’ usage according to 
the price schemes  
l Can generate the charge records and store them in a database 
l Can organize the reports and generate the bills for customers 
l Can provide multiple forms of bills, such as web forms, printed 
invoices, etc., to customers 
l Can support flexible price schemes  
l Can provide system management interfaces 
l Can provide real time billing capability 
2.6 IPv6 and Internet accounting  
IPv6 [RFC2460], also known as IP the Next Generation (IPng), was de-
veloped to enlarge the available IP address space to meet the increasing 
requirements on the Internet. In addition to providing greater addressing 
space than IPv4, IPv6 can also provide built-in QoS, better routing per-
formance and services. As a new Internet protocol, IPv6 will certainly in-
fluence systems on the basis of IPv4 architecture. IP traffic accounting sys-
tems should also accommodate the new requirements of IPv6.  
This section takes a brief look at the IPv6 protocol at first, and then dis-
cusses possible challenges to Internet accounting accompanied by the 
emergence of IPv6, and at the end draws some conclusions. 
2.6.1 IPv6 in a nutshell 
IPv4 was published by IETF in 1981 [RFC791], and it has become the 
most popular network layer protocol. During the rapid development of the 
Internet more challenges have arisen due to the inherent deficiencies of 
IPv4. A prominent insufficiency of IPv4 is its limited IP address space, 
which may slow down the further growth of the Internet. In order to break 
the IPv4 address space limitation, NAT has been developed to reuse IPv4 
private address space through mapping private IP address and transport 
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layer port pair to public IP address and transport layer port pair. Although 
this solution can support more end-systems joining the Internet, it is still 
not perfect. Possible problems include: servers behind NAT may be un-
reachable if NAT and servers are not properly configured, the NAT servers 
become traffic bottlenecks because of burdensome IP address mapping for 
every IP packet, some types of traffic, e.g. IPSec packets, cannot pass 
through NAT due to the encrypted IP addresses. Therefore the NAT me-
chanism is regarded as a solution only to extend the life of IPv4 address 
space rather than a solution to solve the IPv4 address space problem [Da-
vi03].  
Besides the IPv4 address space problem, demands for simplifying router 
table and IP configuration, enhancing IP layer security and QoS support, 
etc. emerge progressively. All these improvements cannot be realized in 
the old IPv4 framework, hence IPv6, a new IP protocol, was developed to 
undertake all these tasks. Figure 2.19 below depicts the IPv6 header for-
mat. 
Figure 2.19 IPv6 header format 
Below we summarize IPv6 features by comparing it with IPv4. 
1. Header format simplification 
Compared with IPv4, one of the most important improvements of IPv6 
is its simple header format. The IPv6 header consists of eight fields and 
has a fixed size of 40 bytes versus 13 fields and 20 – 60 bytes in IPv4. Ex-
tensions and options in IPv6 are not included in the IPv6 header, and they 
belong to the payload of IPv6 packets. 
The number of fields is 12 (without Options field) in IPv4 whereas it is 
8 in IPv6. In addition, the number of fields that must be processed by an 
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A model for user based IP traffic accounting     67 
intermediate router is decreased from 6 in IPv4 to 4 in IPv6. Therefore 
routers can forward packets more efficiently.  
Fields such as Header Length, Identification, Flag, Fragment Offset, and 
Header Checksum in IPv4 header disappear from IPv6 header. Only Flow 
Label is introduced into IPv6 header as a new field. S ince IPv6 header has 
a fixed size, the Header Length field is not necessary. In IPv6 payload 
fragmentation is suggested to be processed only by communication pairs 
instead of intermediate routers. The fragmentation related fields such as 
Identification, Flag, and Fragment Offset in IPv4 header are not included 
in the IPv6 header. A Fragment extension header can be used for this pur-
pose. The Header Checksum field is also not contained in IPv6 header, 
since other layers instead of IP layer will be responsible for that. Through 
removing these unnecessary fields the efficiency of packets transmission 
can be improved. 
2. Larger Address Space 
Address space limitation in IPv4 was the main impetus for the emer-
gence of IPv6. In IPv4, 32 bits are allocated for representing an IP address, 
which can support about 4 billion hosts. With the explosion of the Internet, 
the Internet population grows rapidly. It was estimated that there were 
about 1.08 billion Internet users till 2005, which is less than 20% of the 
world population [CIA2]. With the development of pervasive computing, 
more and more devices, e.g. mobile phones, palms, PDAs, even refriger a-
tors, etc., may need IP addresses to join in the Internet. It seems that the IP 
addresses will be exhausted very soon. Although  efforts such as 
PPP/DHCP IP address sharing, Classless Inter-Domain Route (CIDR), 
NAT, etc. have been made to enhance the IP address reusability, they can-
not solve the IP address space limitation problem of IPv4.   
IPv6 uses 128 bits to represent an IP address, which can theoretically 
support 3.4 x 1038  possible hosts. This is more than enough from the point 
of view of current knowledge and technology. With the enough IP address 
space in IPv6, the deployment of network elements like NAT for IP ad-
dress reuse is no longer necessary.  
3. Automatic address configuration 
IPv6 brings not only larger address space but also an automatic address 
configuration mechanism [RFC3315]. With the IPv6 automatic address 
configuration mechanism, a host can obtain its IP address even without 
DHCP support [RFC2462].  
4. Improved extensibility 
Options in IPv4 header require all intermediate routers to check the ex-
istence of options and process them when they exist. This results in per-
formance degradation of routers. IPv6 introduces a new extension header 
mechanism to improve both extensibility and efficiency. The extension 
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headers are not included in the IPv6 header but placed between the IPv6 
header and upper layer header. In IPv6 only the Hop-by-Hop extension 
header needs to be handled by all intermediate routers. Other extension 
headers are processed by sender specified routers or destination host. This 
can improve routers’ packet forwarding performance. 
According to [RFC2460], the following six extension headers must be 
supported by IPv6 enabled nodes: Hop-by-Hop Options Header, Routing 
Header, Fragment Header, Destination Operations Header, Authentication 
Header, Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Header [RFC2402, 
RFC2460]. 
An IPv6 packet may contain zero, one or more extension headers. If 
more than one extension header is present in a packet, then these headers 
can construct a chain with the help of Next Header pointer in every exten-
sion header to indicate the immediate followed extension header. 
[RFC2460] recommends the following location order of extension headers 
in the case of more than one extension headers in a packet: 
1) Hop-by-Hop Options header  
2) Destination Options header (for the first destination defined in 
Destiantion address field and subsequent destinations specified in  
Routing header) 
3) Routing header  
4) Fragment header  
5) Authentication header  
6) Encapsulating Security Payload header  
7) Destination Options header (for the final destination) 
5. Built-in security 
In order to amend the insufficiency of IPv4 in security, a security 
framework for the IP protocol layer, i.e. IPSec, is proposed by the IETF IP 
Security Protocol Working Group in [RFC2401]. IPSec provides security 
services in the IP layer, which is transparent to the upper layers and can 
improve the communication security without any modification in upper 
layers. The IPSec provides a flexible framework by supporting different 
services, algorithms and granularities. IPSec is supported by both IPv4 and 
IPv6. In IPv4, IPSec supporting is optional whereas in IPv6 it is manda-
tory.  
Security is considered to be an important concern when IPv6 was devel-
oped. Many existing security threats or possible attacks happened in IPv4 
are taken into consideration in IPv6’s design. On the other hand, the new 
characteristics of IPv6 such as its expanded address space bring also addi-
tional functions against attacks. According to the analysis of S. Convery 
and D. Miller [CoMi04], some attacks in IPv4 become more difficult or 
even impossible in IPv6. 
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2.6.2 Challenges caused by IPv6 to Internet accounting 
With the emergence of IPv6, new challenges are also brought to Internet 
accounting. The expanded IP address space requires corresponding mod i-
fication in IP address related accounting attributes. Accounting protocols 
also require modifications to adapt to IPv6. Meter location consideration 
may also be different from that in IPv4. This section makes a survey on 
how IPv6 affects the traditional IPv4 based Internet accounting. 
2.6.2.1 Meter Location 
The 128 bits address space of IPv6 does not affect the choice of meter 
location. The possible IPv6 effect on choosing meter location may be the 
Routing extension header defined in IPv6. With the help of the Routing ex-
tension header, the address of a meter could be inserted in the Routing ex-
tension header. Through that, all the required IP packets can be sent to des-
tination via the designated meter. In this situation, meters can be located in 
any place. Although a similar mechanism has been defined in IPv4 as 
Loose Source Routing option, two disadvantages prevent this option from 
being widely applied. One is the limited option size of IPv4 that restricts 
the routing list size, and the other is the poor IPv4 options implementation 
in routers. 
2.6.2.2 Measurement technology: active and passive 
IPv6 introduces little impact on active measurement. The simulation ac-
tivities or injected packets should be compliant to the requirements for 
IPv6. ICMPv6 instead of ICMPv4, for instance, should be used for meas-
uring responses in the IPv6 environment. Other measurement tools such as 
“ping”, “traceroute”, etc. should be replaced with the corresponding IPv6 
version. Some existing active measurement tools may need to be modified 
to meet the requirements for IPv6.  
For passive measurement methods, not only the expanded IPv6 address 
space but also the new IPv6 header should be taken into consideration.  
The packet capturing method in IPv6 could generate an even larger vol-
ume of measurement data than in IPv4. Considering the calculation exam-
ple in section 2.2.3.2, with the source and destination IP addresses ex-
panded from 4 bytes in IPv4 to 16 bytes in IPv6, the record size grows 
from 200000 bytes/s to 500000 bytes/s, which is 2.5 times than that in 
IPv4. Consequently this means that more memory and storage space, and 
more powerful CPUs are required for IPv6 packet capturing. Furthermore, 
expanded IP address space will inevitably stimulate Internet traffic volume 
increasing as a consequence of more nodes joining into the Internet. This 
challenge must be confronted by the packet capturing method.  
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IPv6’s impact on flow based measurement method lies in flow identifi-
cation and its generation. The Flow Label field in the IPv6 header is a new 
field compared with the IPv4 header. It is used to identify flows. Rather 
than generating flow identification in routers or in flow based meters in 
IPv4, hosts sending flows are required to label flows by themselves in 
IPv6. Besides the advantage of informing routers to handle flow packets 
specially, the flow label in the IPv6 header simplifies the flow based 
measurement. In IPv4, an IP flow is usually identified by routers or flow 
meters through extracting source and destination IP addresses from IP 
header, source and destination port from transport layer header 
[RFC2063]. Analyzing both IP layer and transport layer protocol is ineffi-
cient and results in performance degradation on routers with meter func-
tions. Another disadvantage of identifying flows by routers or meters is 
that the generated flows cannot reflect the application purposes of the 
flows, since flows are classified only according to IP addresses and trans-
port layer ports and only for the accounting purpose. Therefore, flows in 
IPv4 accounting are usually considered as a sequence of meaningless 
packets between two communication entities. The third disadvantage of 
IPv4 flow based measurement is that different meters located between two 
communication entities may generate different flows for the same se-
quence of packets due to different flow classification rules. Sometimes, 
this inconsistency may make it difficult to correlate records from these dif-
ferent meters. In IPv6, the flow labels are identified by sending hosts ac-
cording to their application purposes. A flow can simply be identified by a 
flow label. Therefore, flow based meters need only extract information 
such as Flow Label, source address, destination address from IPv6 headers 
to fulfill flow based measurement. It is not necessary to analyze the upper 
layer of IP packets. The Flow Label improves the efficiency and simplicity 
of the flow based measurement. Since the IP packets with Flow Label 
mean that they require special processing, this can facilitate usage based 
charging and billing. The inconsistency problem in IPv4 flow based meas-
urement can also be solved. 
The Flow Label can also enable the flow based sampling strategy that is 
suitable for measuring multimedia service such as video and audio trans-
mission. 
2.6.2.3 Measurement metrics  
As a result of the new IPv6 header, the measurement metrics of meters 
are required to be adjusted accordingly.  
First, meters should have the ability to distinguish IPv4 traffic from 
IPv6 traffic through simply checking the version field of the IP header. 
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The Flow Label in IPv6 is a new attribute that can be extracted directly 
from the IPv6 header. This parameter should be monitored and reported 
for the purpose of flow based traffic accounting.  
Analyzing transport layer protocols such as TCP or UDP may become a 
little more complicated in IPv6 than in IPv4. The IPv4 header contains a 
protocol field used to identify the type of transport layer protocol header 
directly after the IPv4 header. Moreover, the location of the transport layer 
header can be obtained from checking the Header Length field in the IPv4 
header. In IPv6, if extension headers exist, the TCP or UDP header is lo-
cated after the extension headers chain. Therefore the only way to obtain 
transport layer protocol related information is to traverse the whole exten-
sion headers chain. This will certainly increase the overhead of analyzing 
transport layer information.  
IPv6 128 bits address requires corresponding adjustment to be made in 
Raw Data Records (RDR) to accommodate the IPv6 address attribute. In 
order to be compatible with IPv4 traffic measurement, IPv4 address attrib-
ute can be considered in RDRs in two ways. One way is that the IPv4 ad-
dress attribute can be explicitly defined in RDRs coexisting with IPv6 ad-
dress attribute. Another way is that IPv4 address can also be represented 
by IPv4 compatible IPv6 address or IPv4 mapped IPv6 address. This re-
quires only IPv6 address attribute and IPv4 address attribute is implicitly 
defined by IPv6 address attribute. 
2.6.2.4 Mediation Layer 
The Mediation Layer is affected by IPv6 mainly due to the IPv6 ad-
dress. Accounting protocols have to be improved to accommodate the IPv6 
address structure. RADIUS, DIAMETER and SNMP all extended the IPv6 
related attributes to support IPv6 address [RFC3162, RFC3588, 
RFC3419]. The legacy mediation system should also be improved to have 
the ability of processing, generatin g the IPv6 related records.  
2.6.3 Summary 
IPv6 can provide not only a huge address space, but also efficient rout-
ing, better QoS support and enhanced security mechanisms. With the in-
troduction of IPv6, traditional IPv4 based accounting mechanisms should 
be adjusted to meet the requirements for accommodating IPv6; and on the 
other hand the Internet accounting systems should also be improved to be 
able to utilize the new characteristics of IPv6 for the purpose of providing 
better accounting services. 
The adjustments of IP accounting systems are mainly caused by the in-
creased size of IPv6 address. Meter records and usage records should take 
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IPv6 address into consideration. When an accounting administrative do-
main contains both IPv4 and IPv6 networks, attention should be taken in 
processing these two different IP address formats. The new characteristics 
such as Flow Label, extension headers such as Routing header, Destination 
header, etc. can help to simplify IP accounting, and to provide more accu-
rate accounting information. Because IPv6 is still not widely applied, it is 
expected that accounting mechanisms could be integrated into IPv6 to fa-
cilitate the implementation of simple, accurate and finer granular IP ac-
counting systems.  
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Chapter 3 User based IP traffic accounting 
Nowadays IP traffic accounting systems are based on the assumption 
that one IP address is uniquely associated with one user during a period of 
time. However, this assumption cannot be applied to multi-user systems, 
where an IP address can be shared by multiple  users at the same time. In 
this case, an IP address cannot be uniquely mapped to a single user. There-
fore, now existing IP traffic accounting systems can only provide coarser 
granular IP address level accounting information. In order to provide finer 
granular user level traffic accounting information, we propose a user based 
traffic accounting concept which can facilitate collecting and analyzing 
network resource usage information on the basis of users. With user based 
IP traffic accounting, IP traffic can not only be distinguished by IP ad-
dresses but also be distinguished by users. The user based IP traffic ac-
counting mechanism can be regarded as an extension to the now existing 
IP address based traffic accounting mechanism. With user based IP traffic 
accounting not only an IP address attribute but also a user attribute is used 
as an aggregating index in collecting the network resource usage informa-
tion.  
In this chapter the principle of user based IP traffic accounting is intro-
duced. At first the motivation for user based IP traffic accounting is ex-
plained through analyzing the flaws of the traditional IP address based IP 
traffic accounting architecture. Then the user based IP traffic accounting 
concept is introduced and the user model for IP traffic accounting in multi-
user systems is proposed. After that, an overview about the user based IP 
traffic accounting technique is depicted. Issues such as the Accounting 
Agent and its location, IP traffic identification methods and user inform a-
tion transmission are briefly introduced. The related works concerning user 
based IP traffic accounting are also surveyed and analyzed. Finally the 
user based network access control mechanism with the help of user based 
IP traffic accounting technique is illustrated. 
3.1 Motivation for user based IP traffic accounting 
The Internet is now becoming a part of people’s daily life. With the 
rapid development of the Internet, more and more services are provided by 
the Internet, more and more users are attracted to enjoy these Internet ser-
vices, and consequently more and more traffic is produced. For example, 
according to the statistics from DFN, from 1997 till 1999 the IP traffic 
volume of the University of Kaiserslautern doubled every year [Muel00]. 
Figure 3.1 shows the traffic volume and corresponding cost forecasted af-
ter 1999. A similar statistic result was also found in [Odly03].  
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The increased traffic volume not only causes load on the network, which 
may decline the network performance due to congestion, but also means 
more money should be paid for this traffic. Users will not use the network 
resource responsibly if the usage is free of charge. In order to facilitate 
reasonable Internet usage and avoid unnecessary traffic generation, IP traf-
fic accounting is a solution which can provide accounting information re-
flecting the behavior of users’ network resource consumption. It is be-
lieved that traffic volume based charging will become dominant in Europe 
by 2008 [Anal03]. The traffic accounting information can be used not only 
for network performance trend analysis but also for charging and billing. 
Charging users for their network resource consumption can stimulate their 
reasonable network resource usage on the one hand, and allocate cost to 
users according to their network usage on the other hand. This was the mo-
tivation for the proposed user based IP traffic accounting project “NIPON” 
[Muel00, NIPO00]. 
Today billing is commonly used by Internet service providers (ISP). 
However, billing systems might be used even within LAN. This makes it 
possible to allocate the costs which are related to the network traffic of a 
single-user or an institution using a campus network. Nevertheless, billing 
has also an influence on the behavior of the users. Because of the rising 
costs, it is also reasonable to present bills to the end users. This aspect be-
comes very important when a network offers different Classes of Service 
(CoS). 
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Figure 3.1 Statistic and prognosis of IP traffic volume and cost in un i-
versity of Kaiserslautern made in 1999 [Muel00] 
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It is not relevant whether billing is used in a LAN to allocate costs or to 
motivate reasonable network usage. In both cases, it makes sense to be 
able to correlate the network traffic with the corresponding users, which 
are responsible for it. Despite the fact that there exist many IP accounting 
solutions today, almost all of these solutions correlate IP addresses, instead 
of users, with traffic. This is based on the simple assumption that an IP ad-
dress is equal to one user. However there are several scenarios where an IP 
address is not associated with one user. For example, the multi-user com-
puters which are commonly used in organizations like universities, insti-
tutes, etc. An IP address is shared by several users at the same time in 
these systems. The IP address based IP traffic accounting solution, which 
is referred to as the traditional IP traffic accounting mechanism in this dis-
sertation, is not able to distinguish between different users of the IP traffic 
in those systems. 
Therefore a more accurate IP traffic accounting mechanism is required 
to compensate the insufficiency of the traditional IP address based traffic 
accounting. The user based IP traffic accounting is the evolutional solution 
that meets the finer granularity requirement in multi-user systems.  
A secure Internet requires also that users’ network usage can be ac-
countable. Instead of hosts, users’ network usage should be accountable, 
traceable and controllable. Separating location information, host informa-
tion and user information from each other is regarded to be a very impor-
tant issue in designing future secure Internet by the GENI project 
[BCPS05]. 
3.2 The flaw of traditional IP address based IP accounting  
Before introducing the user based IP traffic accounting concept, let us 
first take a brief look at the user identification process in traditional IP traf-
fic accounting.  
Traditional IP traffic accounting is regarded as IP address based because 
the IP address is used as the unique index to aggregate RDRs. This means 
that if two RDRs have the same IP address, they are assumed to be gener-
ated by the same user. Then these two RDRs will be merged together as 
one record, which is assigned to the user who owns the IP address. There 
are two reasons why the traditional IP traffic accounting systems can only 
provide IP address based IP traffic accounting information.  
One is based on the assumption that one IP address is equal to one user. 
This assumption usually comes from the simplification of the accounting 
information collection. Since IP addresses can be extracted from IP pac k-
ets directly, if an IP address is equal to one user, through simply mapping 
IP address to the user, the IP traffic associated user can be identified. An-
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other reason supporting this assum ption is the fact that the accounting sys-
tems are often served for the organizations which need only coarser granu-
larity accounting information. For example, an ISP concerns only about 
how much traffic is inside and outside the networks of its costumers, e.g. 
universities, no matter whether the IP traffic is generated by single user 
systems or multi-user systems in the universities’ networks, although this 
is of great interest to universities. 
Another reason relates to the location of meters in traditional IP ac-
counting systems. Meters are usually placed in the location where not only 
all needed IP traffic can be monitored but also cost and overhead can be 
minimized. For example, routers in the network boundaries are typically 
chosen as a place to integrate the meter function. However, the general 
placement policy of the meter limits its ability to IP address based IP traf-
fic accounting, since only IP addresses rather than user information can be 
extracted from the IP traffic. The user information can be collected only 
from the end-system where the user has been authenticated via login. Out-
side the end-system no mechanism can distinguish users who generate the 
IP traffic. 
3.2.1 User identification process with traditional IP account-
ing mechanism 
We use an example in Figure 3.2 to illustrate how user information of 
single user systems is correlated to the corresponding IP traffic in a tradi-
tional IP traffic accounting system. 
Figure 3.2 IP address – User mapping with traditional IP address based IP 
traffic accounting 
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l There are n single user computer systems2 in the accounting adminis-
trative domain. Each computer has an IP address3 and a corresponding 
user. The IP traffic associated with these computers is measured by 
meters. 
l Meters store the measurement information of each computer in corre-
sponding RDRs. Every RDR may include not only statistic attributes 
such as sent and received bytes and status attributes such as tim e-
stamp, but also identification attributes such as source and destination 
IP addresses.  
l In the Mediation Layer, an IP Address & User Map Table records the 
relationship between IP addresses and users. This table may be cre-
ated when each IP address is registered by the corresponding user. It 
can also be dynamically adjusted when IP addresses are allocated with 
a DHCP mechanism. Time duration may also be required in this table 
to record the valid period for the relationship between an IP address 
and a user. In this table every IP address corresponds to a single user. 
l After the RDRs are collected by the Mediation Layer, the Correlation 
Module will use the IP Address & User Map Table to identify the user 
of every RDR. For example, an IP address 192.168.0.1 in a RDR can 
be found in the IP Address & User Map Table that it is allocated to 
“USER1”. Therefore the Correlation Module identifies this RDR with 
its corresponding user ID “USER1”.  
Through this process all URs generated by the Mediation Layer are 
identified with the corresponding users. In this process the IP Address & 
User Map Table plays an important role in providing the information about 
the relationship between IP addresses and users, which can be used by the 
correlation processing. 
3.2.2 User identification with traditional IP traffic accounting 
mechanism in multi-user systems  
A multi-user system may have more than one user sharing the same IP 
address, which belongs to the multi-user system, during a period of time. 
The traditional user identification mechanism, which utilizes only IP ad-
dress to identify the user of IP traffic, cannot distinguish the IP traffic gen-
erated by different users in the multi-user system. Figure 3.3 below shows 
                                              
2 In this example we use single user systems. The “single user” systems may be 
real single user systems, or they can also be multi-user systems which are regarded 
as single user systems. 
3 For simplicity a computer with more than one IP address is not discussed. The 
system with more than one IP address can be regarded as several single user sys-
tems used by the same user.  
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how user information is correlated to the IP traffic in a multi-user system 
with the traditional IP traffic accounting mechanism. 
l The multi-user system has an IP address 192.168.0.100. It is shared 
by several users who use the multi-user system. 
l Since this multi-user system possesses only one IP address, inbound 
or outbound IP packets of the multi-user system contain the IP ad-
dress 192.168.0.100 as destination or source IP address. Conse-
quently, RDRs, generated by the IP traffic accounting meters which 
measure the IP traffic related to this multi-user system, contain the 
same IP address attribute “192.168.0.100”. 
l In the Mediation Layer, the IP address “192.168.0.100” is identified 
with a user “USER100” in the IP Address & User Mapping Table. 
Therefore, after the RDRs correlated to different users in this multi-
user system are collected, the Correlation Module maps the IP address 
“192.168.0.100” in all RDRs to the same user “USER100”.  
 
Figure 3.3 IP address – User mapping with traditional IP address based 
IP accounting mechanism in multi-user system 
From the above described user identification process we can see that, al-
though the IP traffic may be generated by different users in the multi-user 
system, the traditional IP traffic accounting system treats all IP traffic of 
the multi-user system as generated by the same user, i.e. “USER100”. The 
traditional IP traffic accounting mechanism identifies th e originators of the 
IP traffic by IP addresses, which are bound to hosts instead of users. 
Therefore, an IP address can only be used to identify a host uniquely. If 
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this host is a single user host, this IP address and the user of the host can 
be regarded as identical. However, for a multi-user host in which many us-
ers share the same IP address, this IP address cannot be used to identify the 
originators of the IP traffic related to this host without ambiguity.  
This example shows that the IP address based traditional IP traffic ac-
counting mechanism cannot meet the requirements for accurate IP traffic 
accounting in multi-user systems. The traditional IP address based ac-
counting mechanism is a coarser granular mechanism. In order to distin-
guish the originators of the IP traffic generated by the same multi-user sys-
tem accurately, a finer granular mechanism should be developed to provide 
more accurate accounting information.  
3.3 User based IP traffic accounting concept 
In order to compensate the insufficiency of the traditional IP traffic ac-
counting mechanism, a user based IP traffic accounting concept was pro-
posed to provide more accurate accounting information in multi-user sys-
tems [ZhRM03].  
User based IP traffic accounting can be defined as the process of collect-
ing and processing network resource consumption data with corresponding 
(on the basis of) user information. Before we discuss about it, we should 
first answer the question: what is a user?  
Before introducing the principle of user based IP traffic accounting, 
some frequently used terms in user based IP traffic accounting are listed: 
Accounting Agent 
An Accounting Agent is a mechanism residing in the measured host to 
be responsible for user information collection, processing and transmis-
sion. 
Dynamic User Traffic Relationship Table (DUTRT) 
DUTRT is a table recording the relationship between IP traffic and cor-
responding users.  
Inbound IP traffic 
Inbound IP traffic denotes the IP traffic from a remote host to the meas-
ured host. From the measured host’s point of view, inbound IP traffic is the 
incoming or received IP traffic. 
Measured host  
A measured host is the host in which the user based IP traffic account-
ing mechanism should be applied. Usually the IP traffic of the host is 
monitored and measured for the purpose of IP traffic accounting.  
Outbound IP traffic 
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Outbound IP traffic denotes the IP traffic from a measured host to desti-
nation.  From the measured host’s point of view, outbound IP traffic is the 
outgoing or sent IP traffic. 
  
Redirected IP packet 
Redirected IP packets are the IP packets which arrive in the measured 
host and then are forwarded to the meter with user information by the Ac-
counting Agent. 
Traffic information 
Traffic information indicates the attributes in an IP packet concerning 
identif ication attributes, statistic attributes, and status attributes4. 
3.3.1 User model for IP traffic accounting systems  
The meaning of the term user depends on the context where the term is 
used. In the Meter Layer, a user is defined as a person who generates the 
network traffic from an end-system. When talking about traditional IP ac-
counting systems, a user is a host that is the source or the sink of IP traffic. 
In a multi-user system, a login name or an identifier represents a user. In 
the Mediation Layer, the term user can denote a person or a group of per-
sons who generate network traffic from the whole accounting administra-
tive domain. In the Application Layer or Billing Layer, the term user de-
notes a person or a group of persons who should be responsible for the 
consumption of the network traffic resources. Specifically for the IP Bill-
ing, a user is a person or a group of persons who should pay for her/their 
consumption of resources. Because of this ambiguous usage of the term 
user, we present some definitions of terms, which will be used within this 
dissertation: 
l Host-Identifier is a unique identifier for an end-system of the network 
layer. In the context of IP networks, an IP address can be used as a 
synonym for a Host-Identifier, since IP addresses are unique numbers 
for network layer devices, at least within an administrative domain.  
l User-Identifier or UID is a unique identifier for an account on a 
measured host. This term is commonly used in the context of multi-
user systems. 
l Traffic-Originator ::= <Host-Identifier> [<User-Identifier>]. A Traf-
fic-Originator (TO) is responsible for specific outbound and inbound 
traffic flows. A TO may be described only by a Host-Identifier which 
means that a TO is an exclusively used computer or by a combination 
of a Host-Identifier and a User-Identifier which means an account in a 
multi-user system. 
                                              
4 Please refer to chapter 2.2 
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l User::= 1*<Traffic-Originator> is a unique identifier for a real person 
or a group of persons which are associated with one or more TOs. 
Each TO is exactly associated with one user. Usually a user identifies 
one real person who has access to one or more single-user systems or 
accounts on multi-user systems. When a group of real persons shares 
an account or a single-user system, this group may be described by 
one user. 
l Purchaser::= 1*<User> is the unique identifier of a person or an insti-
tution who will pay for the traffic that is originated by one or more 
users. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the user model for IP traffic accounting systems. 
 
Figure 3.4 User model for IP traffic accounting systems 
With this user model, the relationship between UID and HostID in a 
single user system can be characterized as 1:n (n>=1), which means all IP 
addresses of the single user system belong to only one user during a pe-
riod. In this case, all HostIDs can be mapped to the single UID. The rela-
tionship between UID and HostID in a multi-user system can be character-
ized as m:n (m>1, n>=1), which means all IP addresses of the multi-user 
system are shared by many users at the same time.  
A HostID can only be mapped to only one TO, which is the case in tra-
ditional IP traffic accounting systems. A HostID combining with different 
UIDs can be mapped to different TOs. User based IP traffic accounting 
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3.3.2 User based IP traffic accounting definition  
According to the user model, traditional IP address based IP traffic ac-
counting can be described as the process of collecting and processing net-
work resource consumption information on the basis of the Host-Identifier, 
i.e. IP address. In this case, an IP address is the key index aggregating 
RDRs. 
User based IP traffic accounting can be described as the process of col-
lecting and processing information of network resource consumption on 
the basis of both Host-Identifier and User-Identifier. In this case, Host-
Identifier and User-Identifier combined as TO are used as the key index 
aggregating RDRs. 
Traditional IP traffic accounting distinguishes different users’ IP traffic 
by different Host-Identifiers, i.e. IP-Addresses only. Moreover, within the 
Mediation Layer only Host-Identifiers are mapped to users directly. In 
contrast to traditional IP traffic accounting, the user based IP traffic ac-
counting distinguishes different users of IP traffic by TOs, i.e. by both 
Host-Identifier and User-Identifier. One TO or a group of TOs in Meter 
Layer may be mapped to a user in the Mediation Layer. One user or a 
group of users, in turn, may be regarded as a purchaser in the Billing 
Layer. It is important to distinguish between TOs, Users and Purchasers, 
because of their different responsibilities. TO is only used to distinguish 
which User -Identifier in a host relates to the IP traffic, whereas the user 
identifies the real person or a group of persons who consume the network 
resources. If problems occur with some traffic flows or with the volume of 
traffic that is produced, then it is important to know who is responsible for 
the traffic. However, in order to send a bill to some person or inst itution it 
is only necessary to know who is responsible for paying for the produced 
traffic. 
Table 3.1 and 3.2 give two examples to show how this user model is ap-
plied to traditional IP traffic accounting and user based IP traffic account-
ing, respectively.  
Table 3.1 and 3.2 depict an example scenario in a university. Alice is a 
student. Bob and Charles are employees of the Computer Science (CS) de-
partment of the university. Bob is a member of the Work Group 1 (WG1), 
whereas Charles is a member of WG2. There are four computers with IP 
addresses IP1, IP2, IP3 and IP4, respectively. IP1 is allocated to Alice’s 
private computer in student dormitory and IP3 is allocated to Bob’s com-
puter in his office. These two computers are single user systems. IP2 is al-
located to a multi-user computer of the university. IP4 is also allocated to a 
multi-user computer which belongs to the CS department. Alice uses A1 as 
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UID for hosts IP1 and IP2. Bob uses different UID B1, B2 and B3 for 
hosts IP2, IP3 and IP4, respectively. Charles uses J1 as UID for host IP45. 
From table 3.1 we can find that the traditional IP traffic accounting 
mechanism utilizes only IP address as TO. With IP address as TO, there is 
no problem for single user system IP1 and IP3 to identify the users Al-
ice@Home and Bob@CS. But for multi-user systems IP2 and IP4, only 
two users User@UNI and Employee@CS can be identified respectively. 
Despite the fact that Alice and Bob have accessed network through com-
puter IP2 as different users, they cannot be distinguished by traditional IP 
accounting user model, therefore the university, as the purchaser UNI, 




Person UID HID TO User  Purchaser 
A1 IP1 <IP1> Alice@Home Alice 
Alice 
A1 <IP2> User@UNI UNI 
B1 
IP2 
<IP2> User@UNI UNI 
B2 IP3 <IP3> Bob@CS CS 
 
Bob 
B3 <IP4> Employee@CS CS 
Charles J1 
IP4 
<IP4> Employee@CS CS 
Table 3.1 An example of the relationship among TO, User, and Pur-
chaser in traditional IP traffic accounting system 
Supposing that the accounting policies for network usage in this univer-
sity are defined as follows: 
1. Students must be responsible for all their network usage, e.g. they 
must pay for it6.  
                                              
5 Here IP address is used as Host-Identifier. 
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2. Department CS pays for all network usage of their employees. 
3. University charges students and faculty for all their network usage.  
According to table 3.1, it is obvious that traditional IP traffic accounting 
system cannot meet the accounting policy because it is unable to distin-
guish users in the multi-user system IP2 and consequently the accounting 
policy 1 and 3 defined above cannot be met. Traditional IP traffic account-
ing systems can still meet the requirements of the accounting policies in 
multi-user system IP4. According to the accounting policy 2, i.e. CS de-
partment will simply pay for all network usage of their employees on this 
computer, there is no need to distinguish users in this system, and this 
multi-user system can be regarded as a single user system.  
As showed in table 3.2, with user based IP traffic accounting, Host-
Identifier and User-Identifier are combined to identify TO. Therefore traf-
fic related with Alice in IP2 can be identified with <IP2, A1> which in 
turn can be mapped to user Alice@UNI, whereas traffic related with Bob 
in IP2 can be identified with <IP2, B1> which in turn can be mapped to 
user Bob@CS. Hence, according to accounting policy 1 and 3, Alice as the 
purchaser should pay for her network usage in computer IP2, and accord-
ing to accounting policy 2 and 3, CS department as purchaser will pay for 
Bob’s network usage (first sub column in Purchaser column). If the ac-
counting policy 2 is changed to a more accurate accounting policy, e.g. , 
every work group in CS department should pay for all network usage of 
their members, with the help of 2-tuple TO the different purchasers can 
still be distinguished (second sub column in Purchaser column). With this 
user based IP traffic accounting mechanism, TOs information can help to 
distinguish which users should be responsible for what traffic related to 
multi-user systems. Hence, the requirement for finer granular accounting 
can be met.  
Comparing table 3.2 with table 3.1 we can find that, with the traditional 
IP traffic accounting mechanism, only the IP address is used as TO to 
identify the consumer of IP traffic. It can only distinguish IP traffic from 
different hosts. Distinguishing IP traffic from different users with this 
mechanism can be achieved only when only one user uses a host. If IP traf-
fic related to a single user host should be identified with corresponding us-
ers, who may utilize this host in different time with different user names, 
the traditional IP traffic accounting mechanism can distinguish the IP traf-
                                                                                                         
6 The meaning of “responsible” may depend on the management policy, e.g. 
when a user generates traffic volume less than 1GB in a month she pays nothing, 
otherwise she pays 1 cent for every extra 1MB or she still pays nothing but she is 
banned from accessing network for a period of time as a result of her excessive 
network resource consumption. 
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fic’s originators with the help of timestamp combined with login inform a-
tion recorded in system log.  
Real 
Person UID HID TO User Purchaser 
A1 IP1 <IP1, A1> 
Al-
ice@Home Alice Alice 
Alice 
A1 <IP2, A1> Alice@UNI Alice Alice 
B1 
IP2 
<IP2, B1> Bob@CS CS WG1 
B2 IP3 <IP3, B2> Bob@C S CS WG1 
 
Bob 
B3 <IP4, B3> Bob@CS CS WG1 
Charles J1 
IP4 
<IP4, J1> Charles@CS CS WG2 
Table 3.2 An example of the relationship among TO, User and Pur-
chaser in user based IP traffic accounting system 
Table 3.3 compares the ability of identifying IP traffic with correspond-
ing users by traditional IP address based traffic accounting and user based 
traffic accounting under different situations. 
According to Table 3.3, the following situations are considered: 
1. One user has one or more User ID in a host.  
If this host is a single user host, IP address based IP traffic account-
ing can identify the user of IP traffic with the help of IP address and 
the log information about users’ login and logout. User based IP traffic 
accounting can identify the user of the IP traffic with the 2-tuple TO 
<User ID, IP address>.  
However, if this host is a multi-user host, the IP address based IP 
traffic accounting can identify the user of the IP traffic only when this 
host is used by only one user. Otherwise, when there are more than 
one user that utilize the host at the same time, the users of IP traffic 
cannot be identified by the IP address based accounting mechanism. 
There is no problem for user based IP traffic accounting to identify us-
ers of IP traffic in the multi-user host. 
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IP address based IP 
traffic accounting 


















1 1 n 1 ü û ü ü 
2 1 n n ü û ü ü 
3 n 1 1 û/ü û û/ü û/ü 
4 n 1 n ü û ü ü 
5 n n 1 ü û ü ü 
6 n n n û/ü û û/ü û/ü 
Table 3.3 A comparison of the user identification abilities between IP 
address based traffic accounting and user based traffic accounting under 
different conditions  
2. One user has more than one User ID in different hosts. If these hosts 
are single user hosts, both accounting mechanisms can distinguish the 
users of IP traffic. For multi-user host, only user based traffic account-
ing can identify the user of the IP traffic. IP address based accounting 
has the same problem as in situation 1. 
3. Several users have only one User ID in a host, i.e. these users share 
one User ID in a host. These users may share the User ID in a host in 
two different ways. One is that every user logs in with the shared User 
ID and accesses the network only when other users with the same User 
ID logout. Another is that after login with the User ID, one or several 
other users access the network from the same host at the same time.  
The first share manner is a time-share manner of the User ID. In this 
case, the user identification of IP traffic in single user system can be 
achieved with the help of the log information and timestamp by either 
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IP address based traffic accounting mechanism or user based IP traffic 
accounting mechanism. However, the user identification of IP traffic 
in multi-user systems can be achieved only by the user based traffic 
accounting mechanism. 
With the second User ID share manner, no matter in single user sys-
tem or in multi-user system, no matter using IP address based traffic 
accounting or using user based traffic accounting, the users of the IP 
traffic cannot be distinguished. For example, user A logs into a com-
puter, uses a browser to access the Internet for 10 minutes and leaves 
without logout. After that, user B can use the same computer to access 
the Internet without login. Another case is that user A logs into a 
multi-user system with her UserID, and user B also logs into the same 
host with the UserID of user A from another terminal. In these two 
cases, it is difficult to distinguish the Internet access activities per-
formed by user B. Only user A is regarded as the user of the IP traffic 
which is produced after her login in the computer. However, for dif-
ferent users running different applications under the same user ID, 
which is normal in distributed computing environments, the user 
model should be extended for distinguishing the users of IP traffic in 
this case. Chapter 8 will illustrate the details of the extended user 
model. 
4. Several users have the same User ID in different hosts. This is the case 
when different users register in different hosts with the same User ID. 
Despite the fact that the User IDs used by different users are the same, 
these users login into different hosts. Therefore, their IP traffic can be 
identified with the corresponding users according to IP addresses in 
single user systems. However, in multi-user systems only user based 
traffic accounting can distinguish the user of the IP traffic. 
5. Several users have different User IDs in one host. If the host is a single 
user host, these users must use this host exclusively at a time. There-
fore, both IP address based traffic accounting and user based traffic 
accounting can identify the users of IP traffic in this case. However, if 
the host is a multi-user host, only user based traffic accounting can dis-
tinguish the user of the IP traffic.  
6. Several users have different User ID in different hosts. This can be 
simplified as case 3, 4, or 5.  
From the above we can see that traditional IP traffic accounting can only 
provide host level IP traffic accounting information, whereas user based IP 
traffic accounting can provide more accurate and finer granular accounting 
information.  
The user based IP traffic accounting extends the concept of traditional 
IP accounting by considering User-Identifiers in addition to Host-
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Identif iers. Traditional IP  traffic accounting can be regarded as a special 
case of user based IP traffic accounting, since in traditional IP traffic ac-
counting the TOs of the traffic flows related to the same host have always 
the same User ID. Compared with traditional IP traffic accounting, user 
based IP traffic accounting should provide information about User -
Identifiers as a measurement metrics in RDRs, which must be correlated to 
the accounted IP traffic. Therefore, the following issues should be taken 
into consideration in user based IP traffic accounting: 
l Identify traffic with corresponding User ID and IP address. The rela-
tionship between a TO and a traffic flow must be recorded. User and 
IP traffic relationship information can be collected only within the 
multi-user system, since this information is not available outside of 
the multi-user system. 
l Store and transfer user traffic relationship information. 
l Correlate RDRs with TOs for identifying users of RDRs. 
Since user based IP traffic accounting concentrat es on the user concept 
in Meter Layer, i.e. TO, hereafter the term user and TO are used to mean 
the same user term in this layer. 
3.4 Related work 
Till now, several standards and documents have been published by IETF 
concerning the Internet Accounting. However, all of them are IP address 
based IP accounting. [RFC1272] introduced the basic information about 
the Internet accounting architecture whereas [RFC2063] suggested the 
traffic flow measurement architecture. A flow based accounting system 
“NeTraMet” [Netr] has been implemented based on the [RFC2063] sug-
gested the Internet accounting architecture. Although the user information 
has been defined as attributes "flowDataSourceSubscriberID" and "flow-
DataDestSubscriberID" in the MIB [RFC2720], these two attributes are 
neglected by the RTFM implementation “NeTraMet”. No user identific a-
tion and user information processing function was integrated in “Ne-
TraMet”. Actually, the IP packet capturing mechanism with the help of 
Libpcap and Winpcap cannot obtain any user information of the IP traffic. 
In this implementation, user information may be obtained simply by map-
ping the IP address to its owner.  
Many reseaches have also been made in Internet Accounting and charg-
ing. M3I (Market Managed Multi-service Internet) project provided a 
framework in managing Internet resource usage through market forces, i.e. 
through charging and accounting multiple levels of network services. With 
this framework, customers can purchase their required services and QoS, 
whereas congestion can be reduced through pricing. However, despite that 
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the CAS system in M3I intends to provide network resource usage infor-
mation on a per-customer basis, only IP address based user IP traffic ac-
counting and charging can be realized due to the fact that routers are com-
monly supposed to be the location in which the traffic information is 
collected [M3I00] [KSSW00].  
In ETSI’s document three charging relationships between Internet ser-
vice providers and customers are summarized [ETSI99]: 
· Every provider chages the end user individually 
· One provider chages the end user on behalf of the all providers 
· One providers buys the service from the other providers, and the 
user is only a customer of one of the providers 
But in user based IP traffic accounting, a new intermediate role exists, 
i.e. the host provider, between the users and ISPs. Therefore, except that 
the users are charged directly by ISPs, the host provider can also charge its 
users on behalf of the providers or buy services from ISPs. Currently, due 
to lacking of user based IP traffic accounting mechanism, host providers 
are difficult to distribute network costs to its users. 
S. Blott et al proposed a user level billing and accounting mechanism in 
IP networks [BMBB99]. A special purpose network probe, called Net-
Counter, is applied to correlate network traffic with individual users that 
generated it in real-time. The principle of the NetCounter is illustrated in 
Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 NetCounter – A Dual-Ported Accounting Device within an IP 
Network [BMBB99] 
In Figure 3.5, the NetCounter is a network device with two network in-
terfaces. It aims at collecting usage data for individual users with the help 
of RADIUS or DHCP servers. When a user logs on, she is assigned an IP 
address when she registers herself with either RADIUS or DHCP server. 
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Then the association of user and IP address is sent to NetCounter immedi-
ately. After that when this user sends and receives IP packets, the Net-
Counter can identify the user of these IP packets according to the regis-
tered user IP address association. This user identification mechanism is a 
typical user identification mechanism applied in traditional IP accounting 
systems. User identification operation is performed outside the users’ hosts 
through checking the logs of user IP address association in authentication 
devices. This user identification mechanism is still IP address based due to 
the fact that the user IP address relationship is 1:1. When a multi-user sys-
tem is allocated an IP address by a DHCP server, the IP traffic generated 
by different users in this system cannot be distinguished with this Net-
Counter mechanism. 
Many commercial accounting systems such as XACCT [XACCT], 
NARUS [NARUS], etc. have also implemented their accounting systems 
with a similar Internet accounting architecture. However, they all provide 
IP address based accounting. Their user identification process is achieved 
with the same mechanism as NetCounter through applying logs of user IP 
address association.  
 Figure 3.6 NARUS Internet Business Infrastructure (IBI) [NARUS] 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the NARUS accounting system architecture, which 
is a typical traditional accounting system architecture. From this architec-
ture, we can find that all IP traffic information is directed and captured 
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with the help of third party network elements such as routers, gateways. 
The meters of this architecture are located in key position devices such as 
routers and gateway in which user information cannot be collected di-
rectly. Whereas  the Server Logs in an Application Server can only provide 
application related information which is usually used for enhancing and 
correlating traffic information gathered by network devices. This system is 
still IP address based and it concentrates mainly on accounting information 
processing. 
There are not many researches concerning the theme of user based IP 
traffic accounting. R. J. Edell et al proposed a user based IP traffic  ac-
counting method only for TCP traffic  [EdMV95]. The principle of this 
method is to intercept the TCP connection establishment request, and then 
to verify user's authorization of network resource usage to control the TCP 
connection establishment. If a user’s TCP connection is allowed, corre-
sponding measurement on this TCP flow will be recorded. Figure 3.7 de-
picts the process of TCP connection establishment with this method.  
 
Figure 3.7 TCP connection establishment process in billing system sug-
gested by [EdMV95] 
According to the process illustrated in Figure 3.7, when a user’s applica-
tion on host B attempts to establish a TCP connection to a remote host 
through sending a TCP SYN message, the Billing Gateway (BGW) inter-
cepts this message and holds it on to ask the Access Controller whether the 
user initiating this message is allowed to build this TCP connection with 
the outside world. At first, the Access Controller asks the User-id Daemon 
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to identify the user of the TCP SYN message. Then the Access Agent que-
ries the Purchasing Agent of the user to verify whether the user is able to 
pay for this connection. After that, the Access Controller responds the 
payment information to the BGW. In the end, if the payment cannot be af-
forded, the BGW denies the connection. Otherwise, the BGW forwards the 
TCP SYN message to the remote host and creates an entry for this connec-
tion. The created new entry of the connection will be used for identifying 
the user of successive IP packets of this TCP connection. Through this 
mechanism, user based IP traffic accounting can be achieved for TCP traf-
fic. 
Although this user based IP traffic accounting mechanism works well 
for TCP traffic, it has several limitations. This method cannot be applied 
for metering non-connection oriented protocol traffic such as UDP, and an 
extra verification server is needed. Checking a TCP SYN message requires 
the TCP header to be examined, which may result in more CPU burden in 
BGW. When IPSec is applied, the TCP header may be encrypted by the 
ESP [RFC2406] protocol. In this case, TCP connection establishment 
packets cannot be detected by the Billing Gateway. Consequently, this 
method cannot be applied to communications with IPSec mechanism. How 
this mechanism coexists with tunnel mechanisms is also not explained. 
[RFC1413] also suggested a simple Identification protocol to retrieve 
user information of established TCP connections. This protocol utilizes an 
identification server application to serve for requests querying about user 
identification of established TCP connections. Requests contain informa-
tion of port number pair related to TCP connection. The identification 
server retrieves user information of the established TCP connection ac-
cording to the port number pair. If the requested user information is found, 
it is sent with a response message to the querist. Otherwise, an Error mes-
sage will be sent back. Figure 3.8 illustrates the principle of this protocol. 
This protocol may encounter errors in querying user information for short 
time lived TCP connections, and it is also impossible to meter the UDP 
traffic.  
In the early stage of IPng development, B. Carpenter suggested utilizing 
IP packets to carry triplet <source, destination, transaction> for the pur-
pose of facilitating traffic authentication, policy-based source routing and 
detailed accounting [RFC1671]. Further in [RFC1672] N. Brownlee pro-
posed integrating an accounting tag into the transaction field of the afore-
mentioned triplet. 
An accounting tag can be an arbitrary string identifying the party re-
sponsible for the packet. This tag can be used by the meter to simplify 
identif ying the party responsible for the traffic flow. Initially an accounting  
tag would be set by the host when a packet is sent. At that stage, the tag 
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would identify the user who sends it. The tag could be changed along the 
packet’s path to the destination to identify the party responsible for this 
packet. 
 
Figure 3.8 Identification protocol proposed by [RFC1413] 
[RFC1672] does not explain the concrete accounting tag mechanism. 
How it is constructed, how it is transferred, how it is collected by meter, 
security and implementation issues, etc. are not specified in this document. 
Finally in the IPv6 protocol, the user information is not taken into consid-
eration into the protocol design. With the development of the Internet, the 
issue arises again: should people have identities that cross application 
boundaries. This issue is now taken into consideration by GENI for de-
signing new Internet architecture. “A Future Internet should include a co-
herent design for the various name-spaces in which people are named. This 
design should be derived from a socio -technical analysis of different de-
sign options and their implications. There must be a justification of what 
sort of identification is needed at different levels, from the packet to the 
application ” [ClSF06]. 
The Host Identification Protocol (HIP) [RFC4423, MNJH06] is now an 
effort made by the IETF HIP WG for the purpose of decoupling of host 
identifiers and locators (i.e. IP addresses). HIP introduces a new name 
space, the “host identity” name space, to the Internet architecture. With 
this new name space, some challengers in mobility, multihoming, IPv6 
transition and network level secrity can be solved. Till now, this protocol 
is still under developed. By design HIP is located between IP layer and 
transport layer in the TCP/IP stack.  For user based IP traffic accounting, 
this protocol may be extended to convey both host identity and user iden-
tity information. 
Considerations have been made on collecting, storing and transferring 
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the possibility of utilizing IP packets conveying user information. Concrete 
solutions and mechanisms were not suggested. 
“UserIPAcct” [Smey01] has realized a per user IP statistic mechanism 
in Linux. It can provide information about users’ bytes sent and received 
on the IP level. However, this implementation is limited in open source OS 
Linux.  
The NIPON project was proposed to aim at improving the accuracy and 
granularity of IP traffic accounting technique in multi-user environment 
with user based IP traffic accounting mechanism [Muel00]. At first tradi-
tional IP traffic accounting technology and products were surveyed, ana-
lyzed and compared [Zhan01]. Then an Accounting Agent mechanism was 
suggested for user based IP traffic accounting [ZhRM02]. Based on the 
Agent mechanism, a user based IP traffic accounting system architecture 
with out-of-band scheme was suggested [ZhRM03]. In addition, a user 
based IP traffic accounting prototype system was deve loped [NIPO03]. In 
[ZhRM05], several user based IP traffic accounting schemes were dis-
cussed. The research results of user based IP traffic accounting described  
in this dissertation are based on the achievement of the NIPON project. 
3.5 Overview of the user based IP traffic accounting tech-
nique 
User based IP traffic accounting requires all IP traffic to be identified 
with the corresponding users, i.e. with corresponding TOs. Then this user 
information should be stored and transferred. With this user information, 
different RDRs can be correlated to their consumers. User information of 
IP traffic related to a multi-user host can only be obtained inside the host. 
In other words, inspecting IP traffic related to the multi-user host cannot 
acquire any accurate user information. Hence,  a mechanism must be inte-
grated into the multi-user host to perform the task of identifying IP traffic 
with the corresponding users. This mechanism is called Accounting Agent. 
The Agent can be located in different layers of the TCP/IP stack for col-
lecting user information in the measured host. It can identify users of IP 
traffic on the basis of packets, flows or TCP connections. User traffic rela-
tionship information can be stored and transferred with the in-band or out-
of-band method.  
3.5.1 Accounting Agent 
The key of user based IP traffic accounting is to identify the related user 
of IP traffic. Since IP header can only carry the IP address information, 
which is not enough to identify a user uniquely in multi-user systems ac-
cording to previous discussion, an additional mechanism is needed to asso-
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ciate the IP traffic with the corresponding users. This identification 
mechanism is called Accounting Agent mechanism.  
An Accounting Agent, in short Agent, is responsible for recording the 
relationship between IP traffic and user. Its functions include: 
l Identify IP traffic with corresponding user. 
l Store the IP traffic and user relationship information temporarily.  
l Transfer IP traffic and user relationship information. If needed, some 
security mechanisms should be applied to guarantee the confidentia l-
ity and integrity of data transmission.  
l Perform access control according to network access control polic es. 
3.5.2 Agent location 
Considering the meter location principle introduced in 2.2.2, in order  to 
identify the user of IP traffic, the Agent should be located in the place 
where both IP traffic and user information can be gathered. Although IP 
traffic information can be obtained outside the measured host from moni-
toring the IP headers, user information cannot be extracted from IP head-
ers. Therefore, the Agent must be integrated in the measured hosts. The 
TCP/IP reference model is composed of five layers: Application Layer, 
Transport Layer, Internet Layer, Data link Layer and Physical Layer 
[Tane03]. The Data link Layer and Physical Layer are not suitable for in-
tegrating Agent due to their hardware related characteristics. The other 
three layers are possible for integrating the Agent. Considering the fact 
that the Transport Layer and the IP Layer are usually implemented as a 
TCP/IP kernel in operation systems, figure 3.9 shows the possible loc a-
tions for an Agent to be integrated in a multi-user system. 
If the Agent is integrated into the Application Layer, it is easy to obtain 
the user information. This may be realized by providing network APIs 
which bind Agent functions. However, this cannot be applied to the legacy 
applications which did not bind these APIs. Another problem is that some 
users may avoid using these APIs because of its metering function. Since 
the measurement information may be used for charging and billing pur-
poses, the information should be dependable. Agents integrated into every 
application instance may be easily attacked or cheated. Dependability in 
this environment is hard to be achieved.  
Another problem is that if the Agent works in the Application Layer, the 
collected user information may be inserted into Application Layer PDUs 
for IP packet transmission. This is inefficient for a meter to extract ac-
counting information from Application Layer PDU of IP packets. 
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Figure 3.9 Possible locations for integrating Agent into a multi-user sys-
tem 
The second possible location is right above the IP kernel. In this posi-
tion, the Agent can intercept all IP requests between the IP kernel and ap-
plications. This does not require the Agent mechanism to be integrated into 
every application. IP traffic generated by legacy applications can also be 
measured, since this Agent works in a non-intrusion position, i.e. the 
Agent is transparent to the applications and users. Since the Agent may 
cause system performance decline, therefore it should be carefully de-
signed. Otherwise, the Agent will become system bottleneck. This position 
is suitable for implementing the Agent in non open source OSs. In the 
NIPON project, the user based IP traffic accounting prototype system real-
ized the Accounting Agent at this position in Solaris and Windows 2000 
Terminal Server, respectively [NIPO03]. These two OSs are not open 
source systems. With this method, the direct modification on OS can be 
avoided. However, this location is not suitable for in-band scheme which 
integrates user information in the IP packets, because the user information 
can only be inserted into transport layer’s PDU at this location.   
The third position is in the IP kernel. Agents integrated at this location 
can work efficiently. This is suitable for open source OSs like LINUX or 
OS producers. The disadvantage is that the Agent cannot be integrated into 
legacy OSs without source code or support from OS producers. 
The fourth position is underneath the existing implementation of an IP 
protocol stack, between the native IP and the local network drivers. This 
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grating the Agent in this position may not require to access source code. 
The disadvantage of this position is that user information may not be able 
to be obtained. According to our experience in the Agent implementation 
in Windows 2000 Terminal Server, if the Agent is located in this position, 
user information cannot be obtained directly. A mechanism must reside 
above the TCP/IP stack implementation to provide user information of IP 
packets. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the characteristics of these four possible Agent 
locations according to above analysis. 
 Effect on 
performance 
Need source 




In Application Low  No Bad No 
Above TCP/IP May be 
high 
No Good Yes 
In TCP/IP  Middle Yes Good Yes 
Below TCP/IP May be 
high 
No Good Yes 
Table 3.4 Characteristics of possible locations for Agent implementation 
3.5.3 IP traffic identification methods  
An Agent identifies the users of IP traffic when the IP traffic passes 
through the Agent. The Agent can identify users of the IP traffic on the ba-
sis of IP packets, IP traffic flows or TCP connections. 
3.5.3.1 IP packets based user identification 
With the IP packets based user identification method, the Agent inter-
cepts every IP packet to identify its corresponding user, and then generates 
records to store the user IP traffic relationship information. The advantage 
of this method is that it is very accurate. But its disadvantage is also obv i-
ous, i.e. its efficiency is very low, since every packet must be checked and 
identified, and,  accordingly, the relationship between every IP packet and 
its user must be recorded. If a User IP Traffic relationship table is gener-
ated to store the IP traffic identification results, this table will become 
huge. Therefore, for IP packets based user identification method, inserting 
the user information into the IP packets is a better choice than the User IP 
Traffic relationship table mechanism (see chapter 4, 5).  
98      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
3.5.3.2 IP traffic flow based user identification  
The IP traffic flow identification method is an improved method com-
pared with the IP packets based identification method. This method identi-
fies the user of each flow instead of each packet. Especially with the help 
of the Flow Label in the IPv6 header, flow recognition becomes easier and 
simple. The Agent needs only to check the Flow Label rather than to ex-
tract source IP, source port, destination IP and destination port information 
from the IP header to distinguish flows as processing IPv4 flows.  
Flow can be defined as a uni-directional or bidirectional traffic from the 
source end-point to the destination end-point during a period. The traffic 
flow based user identification process is described as follows: 
1. When an IP packet passes through an Agent, the Agent identifies its 
user and extracts traf fic flow attributes such as source IP, source port, 
destination IP and destination port from its IP header. For IPv6 pack-
ets with Flow Labels, the Agent simply extracts this information from 
the IP packets as flow attribute.  
2. Then the Agent uses these flow attributes with the user information as 
a key index to search the user IP traffic flow relationship table.  
3. If there exists an entry for this user IP traffic flow relationship, then 
this entry can be updated (or no update needs to be made on this entry 
if this table stores only relationship information).  
4. If there is no entry for this user IP traffic flow relationship, a new en-
try is created for it. In user based IP traffic accounting, the 6-tuple 
<source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, start time, 
end time>in IPv4 or <Flow Label, start time, end time> in IPv6, 
which identifies a flow uniquely, is combined with the User ID to 
construct an entry in the user IP traffic flow relationship table. 
5. If the user traffic flow relationship information is stored locally, i.e. it 
is not transferred with IP packets, it should be reported to or collected 
by the correlation module regularly to correlate flows with the corre-
sponding users. 
The advantage of this method is that it greatly decreases the size of the 
user IP traffic relationship table. User information will be recorded only 
when the first IP packet of a flow appears. This can also save bandwidth 
for transferring user information. Flow Labels in IPv6 headers can further 
improve efficiency of the flow identification process. However, this 
method still needs to check every IP packet to decide to which flow the 
packet belongs. 
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3.5.3.3 TCP connection  based identification  
The TCP connection based user identification method monitors every 
TCP connection and finds the corresponding user of the TCP connection. 
This method can also be regarded as a special traffic flow based identific a-
tion method. The principle of this method is that the Agent monitors and 
records only the connection establishment and release activities of a TCP 
flow to generate the user and the TCP flow relationship information. The 
external meter records all packets of this TCP flow and utilizes the user 
TCP flow relationship information to identify the user of the TCP packets 
during the correlation process. In this process, the Agent is called only 
when the TCP connection is established or released. Other packets of the 
TCP connection generated after connection establishment will not be in-
spected by the Agent. Therefore, the performance decline caused by the 
Agent can be reduced. Moreover, the performance for metering TCP traf-
fic can be improved. [EdMV95] adopted a similar mechanism to control 
TCP connections. The limitation of the connection based identification is 
that it can only be applied to TCP traffic. For UDP, the connectionless 
transport protocol, every packet is still required to be checked to identify 
the user. The user identification process can be described as follows: 
1. When a TCP connection request packet with a TCP SYN message 
comes into the Agent, it finds out the user related to this TCP connec-
tion and then extracts this TCP connection related information such as 
source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port from the request 
packet. 
2. The Agent records the user TCP connection relationship information 
either into a local table or directly into the TCP connection packets. 
Then the IP packet is forwarded.  
3. After that, other TCP packets of the same connection will not trigger 
the Agent.  
4. When a TCP connection termination message TCP FIN comes into the 
Agent, it also finds out the corresponding user and updates the user 
TCP connection relationship information in the local table or inserts 
user information into this IP packet. Then the IP packet is forwarded. 
3.5.4 User traffic relationship information storage and trans-
mission 
After the IP traffic is identified with the corresponding users, this rela-
tionship information should be stored and then transferred to the meters. 
Here we consider two different storage and transmission methods: in-band 
method and out-of-band method. 
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1. The in-band method utilizes the IP packets to carry their corresponding 
user information. According to the discussion in 2.2.4, accounting at-
tributes can be classified into three categories: identification attribute, 
statistic attribute and status attribute. These attributes, such as IP ad-
dress, bytes, etc., are already included in the IP header of the IP 
packet. With in-band method for user based IP traffic accounting, user 
information is inserted into IP pac kets to identify the users of corre-
sponding IP packets. With this method, the IP packets can convey the 
user traffic relationship information to the meter actively. This method 
does not require the user and IP traffic relationship information to be 
stored in the measured host. 
2. The out-of-band method does not utilize IP packets to convey their 
user information. The collected user and IP traffic’s relationship in-
formation is encapsulated in dedicated user information message pack-
ets and transferred to the meter separately from the identified IP traf-
fic. Before the user IP traffic relationship information is transferred, it 
can be stored in the measured host temporarily.  
3.6 User based network access control 
Collecting users’ network resource consumption is not the goal of user 
based IP traffic accounting technique. Providing statistic information about 
users’ network resource consumption is for the purpose of charging, bill-
ing, network access control, etc. Access control is a commonly applied 
mechanism to adjust network resource allocation through limiting or pro-
hibiting network usage. Access control is usually applied by ISPs when a 
user’s quota, such as duration, volume, deposit, etc., is exhausted.  
With the help of traditional IP address based traffic accounting, access 
control can only control users’ network access on the basis of IP address, 
i.e., access control can be performed only on the host level. This kind of 
access control is similarly called traditional IP address based access con-
trol. Access control must be user based, since quota allocation and calcula-
tion are based on users. For traditional IP address based access control, an 
IP address belongs to only one user in a period. Therefore, a general net-
work access control architecture with the IP address based traffic account-
ing mechanism is shown in Figure 3.10.  
In the Figure 3.10 illustrated traditional access control architecture, us-
ers’ network consumption information is collected by meters, which are 
usually integrated in the network elements such as routers, switches, etc. 
Different users’ network usage can be calculated and their corresponding 
quotas will be checked according to the accounting information. If a user’s 
quota is reached, access control policy will be applied. For example, this 
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user will not be allowed to access the network any more. Therefore, the 
access control component will inform access devices such as routers to re-
ject forwarding IP packets related to this user’s IP address. 
 
Figure 3.10 Traditional access control architecture with IP address based 
IP accounting 
 
The traditional IP address based access control suffers also from the 
similar problem as the traditional IP address based IP traffic  accounting, 
i.e. it cannot achieve access control on the basis of users in multi-user sys-
tems. The inability of controlling access on the basis of users by the tradi-
tional IP address based access control mechanism lies in two factors. One 
factor is that traditional IP address based accounting cannot provide user  
based IP traffic accounting information. This makes it impossible to calc u-
late users’ network resource consumption in multi-user systems. Another 
factor is that no access control mechanism can perform user level network 
access control, since usually acces s control can be applied only on the ba-
sis of IP addresses in the network access devices. Even if user based IP 
traffic accounting information can be provided for calculating different us-
ers’ network resource consumption, without the corresponding user bas ed 
access control mechanism the more accurate user based access control 
cannot be achieved. 
With the help of the user based IP traffic accounting technique, not only 
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Agent can also play a user based access control role. The user based IP 
traffic access control architecture is depicted in Figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.11 User based access control architecture with user based IP 
traffic accounting 
The main difference between Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.10 is the Ac-
counting Agent located in the multi-user host. With the help of the Ac-
counting Agent, User based IP traffic accounting can be achieved. A meter 
located in the key position, e.g. in a router, cooperates with the Agent to 
collect network resource consumption information on the basis of users 
(user based IP traffic accounting schemes are discussed in chapter 4, 5, 6).  
Routers or other access devices can only provide IP address based access 
control. User level access control in multi-user systems can be made only 
in the measured hosts. With the Agents integrated in the multi-user sys-
tems, user based access control can be easily achieved.  
In the user based access control architecture, the following two compo-
nents are critical for performing access control: Accounting Agent and Ac-
cess Control component. 
The Agent performs the following functions for user based access con-
trol: 
1. Monitor and validate different users’ network access authorization. 
2. Maintain and synchronize access block list. This includes downloading 
a block list from the access control component, processing block list 
synchronization between Agent and access control component by re-
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3. Block or allow users’ network access according to the block list. 
The access control component performs the following functions: 
1. Calculate different users’ network usage according to the accounting 
information provided by the user based IP traffic accounting system. 
2. Compare different users’ network usage with their quota.  
3. Maintain block lists of different hosts. Update the block list when a 
user’s quota is used up or when a blocked user obtains new quota.  
4. Synchronize block lists with different hosts by informing Agents to 
update their block lists.  
The Figure 3.12 shows the user based access control process with the 
help of the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism. 
 
Figure 3.12 User based access control process 
The user based access control process in Figure 3.12 is described as fol-
lows: 
1. When a user’s IP packet passes through the Agent, the Agent inter-
cepts this IP packet. 
2. The Agent checks the block list to verify if this user is allowed to ac-
cess the network. The block list is stored in the measured host. Usu-
ally the block list is downloaded from the Access Control component 
when an Agent is started. The Access Control component keeps all 
block lists of the managed hosts.  
The block list in the Agent will be updated in time by the Access 
Control component when the corresponding host’s block list stored in 
the Access Control component happens to be changed. In the follow-
ing situations, the block list will be modified and the synchronization 
of the block lists in Agents and the Access Control component will be 
started accordingly:  
l A user just runs out of her quota 
Check block list 
Users’ quota calculation 
Block list update 
User based IP traffic ac-
counting information proc-
essing 
Allow access / perform accounting 
Agent Access Control Meter 
Request network access 
User 
Deny network access 
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l A user is just allocated new quota, which makes this user be re-
moved from the block list.  
3. When the user of the IP packet is in the block list, the IP packet will 
be discarded by the Agent. 
4. When the user of the IP packet is not in the block list, the IP packet 
will be forwarded by the Agent to its destination and a corresponding 
user based IP traffic accounting operation will be performed. 
5. The Meter collects the user based IP traffic accounting information to 
provide user based network resource consumption statistic informa-
tion for the Access Control component. 
6. The Access Control component keeps checking the user based IP traf-
fic accounting information to calculate different users’ quota. 
7. When a user’s quota is used up, the Access Control component up-
dates the corresponding block list and informs the user related access 
device to block this user. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter analyses the flaw of the traditional IP traffic accounting 
mechanisms in providing finer granular accounting information in multi-
user hosts. After surveying some related work concerning IP traffic ac-
counting, we can conclude that most of the existing IP traffic solutions are 
IP address based. Even though there were a few works concerning user 
based IP traffic accounting, they were imperfect and concerned only some 
part of the user based IP traffic accounting technique. The IP address based 
accounting mechanism of traditional IP traffic accounting cannot meet the 
requirement of finer granular accounting in multi-user hosts. Therefore an 
innovative traffic accounting mechanism, the user based IP traffic account-
ing concept, is suggested in this dissertation.  
This chapter introduces the principle of user based IP traffic accounting. 
The key component of user based IP traffic accounting is the Accounting 
Agent. It is responsible for identifying the users of IP traffic, recoding and 
storing the user IP traffic relationship, and transferring the information to 
the Mediation Layer. The Accounting Agent must be located in the meas-
ured host. Otherwise, the user information of IP traffic cannot be gathered. 
There are four possible implementation positions for integrating Account-
ing Agent into the measured host. These positions have different advan-
tages and disadvantages. Integrating the Accounting Agent in which posi-
tion is a trade-off among performance, efficiency and the difficulty of 
implementation. The user identification of IP traffic can be either IP pack-
ets based, IP traffic flow based, or even TCP connection based. IP traffic 
flow based user identification may be the best solution, but sometimes IP 
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packets based user identification is a supplementary to the IP traffic flow 
based user identification. With the help of user based IP traffic accounting, 
more accurate user based access control can also be achieved. This re-
quires the user based IP traffic accounting information be calculated and 
the Accounting Agent is used to control the network access on the basis of 
users. 
This chapter introduces only the general concept of user based IP traffic 
accounting. In the next three chapters, three different user based IP traffic 
accounting schemes will be explained in detail. These three schemes util-
ize different mechanisms to identify users of IP traffic, and to store and 
transfer the user traffic relationship information.  
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Chapter 4 In-band scheme 
In this chapter, the in-band scheme for user based IP traffic accounting 
is introduced. The in-band scheme utilizes IP packets themselves to con-
vey their corresponding user information. With this mechanism not only 
the accounting required statistic attributes such as sent bytes, received 
bytes but also the TO information can be extracted directly from IP pack-
ets.  
This chapter is organized as follows: at first the principle of the in -band 
scheme is explained, then the User Information option format is defined 
and described, after that several possible locations for integrating the User 
Information option in an IP packet are discussed and compared, then secu-
rity considerations are made in detail, and in the end several issues con-
cerning implementation are analyzed. 
4.1 Principle of the in-band scheme 
According to the user model defined in chapter 3, the aim of user based 
IP traffic accounting is to identify the corresponding user of IP traffic with 
TO, i.e. IP address and User ID. From analysing IP packets we can find 
that not only the IP traffic accounting required statistic attributes, such as 
received bytes, sent bytes, etc., but also a part of the identification attrib-
utes for user based IP traffic accounting, i.e. IP address, are available in IP 
packets. For traditional IP address based IP accounting, all required ac-
counting information can be obtained from the IP packet. Only the user in-
formation cannot be extracted from IP packets directly.  
The idea of the in-band scheme is to integrate user information into the 
IP headers of corresponding IP packets. Through that, user based IP traffic 
accounting required accounting attributes can all be extracted from IP 
packets directly. With the in-band scheme, user information can be stored 
and transferred by IP packets. No local storage in the measured host is re-
quired.  
The principle of the in-band scheme, which utilizes IP headers for stor-
ing and transferring user information to achieve user based IP traffic ac-
counting, can be described as follows: 
l For outbound IP traffic, the Accounting Agent identifies users of IP 
packets and then integrates user information into IP headers of the cor-
responding IP packets. After that, the IP packets are forwarded to their 
destinations. A meter located in key position intercepts the IP packets 
tagged with user information and extracts this information directly 
from IP packets for the purpose of user based IP traffic accounting. 
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l For inbound IP traffic, when an inbound IP packet passes through the 
Agent, it intercepts the inbound IP packet and identifies its correspon d-
ing user. Then the Agent forwards the IP packet to its receiving appli-
cation on the one hand, and integrates user information into a copy of 
the IP packet and redirects the copy of the inbound IP packet tagged 
with user information to the meter.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the principle of in-band scheme.  
 
Figure 4.1 Principle of in-band scheme 
4.1.1 Components in the in-band scheme  
As shown in Figure 4.1, the following components exist in the in-band 
scheme: 
l Measured host 
The measured host can be either a single user system or a multi-user 
system which requires the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism to 
be applied.  
For multi-user systems, it is obvious that user based IP traffic account-
ing is necessary for distinguishing different users’ network usage as dis-
cussed in chapter 3. For single user systems, if different users’ network us-
ages are also required to be distinguished, with the in-band scheme user 
based IP traffic accounting can also simplify the accounting process, since 
user information and other accounting attributes can be directly extracted 
from IP packets. Consequently, log information about different users’ 
login in single user systems does not need to be collected for correlating 
RDRs with corresponding users. 
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l Accounting Agent 
An Accounting Agent is integrated into the measured host to fulfil the 
following functions: 
n Identify IP packets with corresponding users 
n Insert user information into IP packets 
n Forward IP packets tagged with user information to the meter 
n Maintain the dynamic user traffic flow relationship table 
(DUTRT) and keep synchronization with the DUTRT in the me-
ter 
n If security mechanisms should be applied to the in-band scheme, 
the Agent is responsible for negotiating security parameters, en-
crypting and decrypting user information in the User Information 
option7. 
n Perform access control 
l Meter 
In the in-band scheme, a meter can work similarly as in traditional IP 
accounting to extract all required accounting attributes from IP packets. 
For the in-band scheme, the meter has to fulfil the following extra func-
tions: 
n Extract both user information and traffic information from IP 
packets. 
n For secure user information transmission between Agent and me-
ter, it must negotiate security parameters with Agents and must 
encrypt and decrypt user information.  
n Maintain the dynamic user traffic flow relationship table 
(DUTRT) and keep synchron ization with the DUTRT in the Ac-
counting Agent. 
n Identify users of IP packets without user information with the 
help of DUTRT. Query the Agent for user identifiers of unrecog-
nized IP packets. 
With the in-band scheme, all required accounting attributes can be ex-
tracted from the IP packet directly. Therefore, meters can still be located in 
the key place of the network to collect the IP traffic information as in the 
traditional IP traffic accounting architecture. Usually meters are located in 
the network boundary to measure IP traffic into or out of the administra-
tive domain.  
4.1.2 User identification 
User identification is the process of finding the users of IP traffic and in-
tegrating user information into the corresponding IP traffic. 
                                              
7 Please refer to chapter 5.2 about the User Information option format 
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In the in-band scheme, the Agent is responsible for identifying only the 
users in the measured host in which the Agent resides. This means that the 
Agent cares only about the local user of the two peers involved in a com-
munication. For outbound IP traffic, the Agent is responsible for identify-
ing the users who send the IP packets. In this case, the TO is identified by 
the 2-tuple <Source IP, User ID>. For inbound traffic , the Agent is re-
sponsible for identifying the users who receive the IP packets. In this case, 
the TO is identified by the 2-tuple <Destination IP, User ID>. 
User identification can be IP packet based, IP traffic flow based or hy-
brid: 
l With the IP packet based user identification method, user information 
is inserted in every outbound and inbound IP packet.  
l With the IP traffic flow based user identification method, user infor-
mation is only inserted in the first IP packet of an IP traffic flow. A 
new entry about this flow and its user will be added in a DUTRT 
when this IP packet arrives into the meter. The successive IP packets 
of the same flow can be identified with their corresponding user by 
searching the DUTRT.  
l With the hybrid user identification method, user information is in-
serted in every outbound IP packet. But for inbound IP packets, only 
the first IP packet of a flow is integrated with user information and is 
redirected to the meter by the Agent. 
4.1.3 User identification for outbound IP traffic 
After being identified with the corresponding users, outbound traffic and 
inbound traffic will be forwarded by the Agent in different directions: the 
outbound traffic will be sent to the remote host, whereas the inbound traf-
fic will be forwarded to the receipt application in the measured host and 
also to the meter if necessary. Considering the different forwarding charac-
teristics for outbound traffic and inbound traffic, the Agent should treat 
these two types of IP traffic differently.   
How IP traffic is processed to carry user information with the in-band 
scheme depends on different user identification methods. Therefore the 
user identification of outbound IP traffic is discussed according to the IP 
packet based method, the IP traffic flow based method and the hybrid 
method, respectively.  
4.1.3.1 IP packet based user identification method 
With the IP packet based user identification method, the user based IP 
traffic accounting process for outbound IP traffic can be described as fol-
lows: 
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1. When an outbound IP packet passes through the Agent, the Agent 
finds out the corresponding user information of this IP packet from 
the system.  
2. The Agent inserts the user information into this IP packet. How user 
information is formatted and how user information is integrated into 
the IP packet are discussed in 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
3. The Agent forwards this IP packet tagged with user information to the 
meter. 
4. When the meter receives an IP packet tagged with user information 
from the measured host, it extracts the user information and the traffic 
information from the IP packet, which is similar as in traditional IP 
accounting. 
5. The meter forwards this IP packet to its destination. But before this IP 
packet is forwarded to its destination, the meter may delete the user 
information from the IP packet. This can prevent user information 
from being transported to the outside and reduce the extra traffic 
caused by user information. 
4.1.3.2 IP traffic flow based user identification method 
With the IP traffic flow based user identification method, the user based 
IP traffic accounting process for outbound IP traffic can be described as 
follows: 
1. When an outbound IP packet passes through the Agent, the Agent 
finds out the corresponding user information of this IP packet from the 
system. 
2. For IP traffic flow based user identification, the Agent checks the 
DUTRT in the measured host to verify if this IP packet belongs to an 
existing IP traffic flow. If there is no corresponding entry in the table, 
it means that this IP packet is the first IP packet of an IP traffic flow, 
therefore a new entry about this new flow and its corresponding user is 
created and added into the DUTRT. Then the Agent inserts the user in-
formation into the IP packet. If there is already an entry corresponding 
to the IP packet in the table, it means that the IP packet is not the first 
IP packet of the corresponding flow and the user information of this 
flow has been already sent to the meter in the first IP packet. There-
fore,  the user information does not need to be inserted into this IP 
packet. 
3. Then the Agent forwards the IP packet to the meter. 
When an IP packet tagged with user information comes into the me-
ter, at first, the meter extracts the user information and the traffic in-
formation from the IP packet, and then a new entry will be added into 
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the DUTRT of the meter to identify this flow and its corresponding 
user by the meter. 
If an IP packet without user information comes from a measured 
host into the meter, at first, the meter extracts traffic information from 
the IP packet, and then the meter searches its DUTRT to check if this 
IP packet belongs to an existing flow. If there is an entry in the 
DUTRT, the statistic attributes value in this IP packet will be calc u-
lated with the statistic attributes value of the same flow in the DUTRT. 
Otherwise, this IP packet will not be forwarded to its destination. In 
this case, in order to improve the dependability, the meter should send 
back this IP packet to the Agent asking for the user information of an 
unrecognized flow. When the Agent receives this feedback query mes-
sage, it finds out the user of this IP packet and forwards it with its user 
information to the meter again. Detailed explanation about the depen d-
able DUTRT synchronization mechanism is described in 4.1.6. If no 
user information of this IP packet can be found, this IP packet will be 
discarded by the Agent. 
4. The meter forwards the IP packet to its destination. 
4.1.3.3 Hybrid user identification method 
The user based IP traffic accounting process for outbound IP traffic with 
hybrid user identification method is the same as the IP packet based user 
identification.  
4.1.4 User identification for inbound IP traffic 
For the inbound IP traffic processing, things become a little more com-
plex. When an IP packet from outside the administrative domain and des-
tined to a measured host in the administrative domain comes into a meter, 
no user information about the receiver of the IP packet can be found in this 
IP packet. The receiving user of this IP packet can be identified only when 
this IP packet arrives in the Accounting Agent. But when this IP packet ar-
rives in the destination host, because this host, in which the Agent resides, 
is the last hop of the IP packet, the IP packet does not need to be further 
forwarded outside the host. This means that, despite the fact that the IP 
packet can be identified with the corresponding user by the Agent, it s user 
information cannot reach the meter outside the host actively. Therefore, af-
ter the Agent intercepts the IP packet and identifies the corresponding user, 
it should perform two operations: one is to hand this IP packet further on 
to the corresponding receiving instance in the host system, and the other 
operation is to forward the IP packet tagged with user information to the 
meter outside the host.  
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Just like the outbound IP traffic, how inbound IP traffic is processed 
with the in-band scheme also depends on different user identification 
methods. Below we explain them separately.  
4.1.4.1 IP packet based user identification method 
With the IP packet based user identification method, the user based IP 
traffic accounting process for inbound IP traffic can be described as fol-
lows: 
1. When an IP packet destined to a measured host comes into a meter, 
the meter just forwards this IP packet to its destination. In this 
method, the user based IP traffic accounting meter is triggered only 
when IP packets from the measured hosts come in.  
2. When an inbound IP packet comes into the measured host, the Agent 
intercepts the IP packet and finds out the corresponding user informa-
tion of this IP packet from the system. Then it makes a copy of the IP 
packet. 
3. The Agent forwards the IP packet to the receiving application in the 
measured host. 
4. The Agent builds a User Information option which contains not only 
the user ID of the IP packet but also the original source IP address. 
Then it inserts the User Information option into the IP packet copy. 
After that, it modifies the source IP address to the IP address of the 
measured host and the destination IP address to the IP address of the 
meter. In the end, the Agent sends the modified IP packet copy to the 
meter. 
5. When the meter receives an IP  packet tagged with user information 
destined to it, it means that this IP packet is a redirected inbound IP 
packet. The meter extracts the user information and the traffic infor-
mation from the received IP packet for further user based IP traffic 
accounting processing.  
4.1.4.2 IP traffic flow based user identification method 
With the IP traffic flow based user identification method, the user based 
IP traffic accounting process for inbound IP traffic can be described as fol-
lows: 
1. When an IP packet destined to a measured host comes into a meter, 
the meter extracts traffic information from this IP packet. Then the 
meter searches the DUTRT to check if this IP packet belongs to an 
existing flow. If an entry in the table can be found, the user of this IP 
packet can be identified and the statistic attributes of this flow are re-
calculated.  
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If there is no entry in the table, it means that this IP packet is the 
first IP packet of a new inbound flow and the user of the flow is not 
identified by the Agent. In this case,  the meter inserts a Query User 
Information message into the IP packet (about the format of Query 
User Information message please refer to 4.2.2). 
2. The meter forwards this IP packet to the destination host. 
3. When an IP packet comes into the measured host, the Agent intercepts 
the IP packet and finds out the corresponding user information of this 
IP packet from the system. Then the Agent searches its DUTRT to 
check if this IP packet belongs to one of this user’s flows.  
4. If an entry is found in the DUTRT indicating that this IP packet be-
longs to one of this user’s flows and the inbound IP packet contains 
no Query User Information message, the Agent forwards the IP 
packet to the receiving application in the host.  
5. If an entry is found in the DUTRT and the inbound IP packet contains 
a Query User Information message, the Agent performs two opera-
tions. One is to delete the Query User Information message from the 
IP packet and forward it to the receiving application in the host; the 
other is to insert the user information into a copy of the IP packet and 
redirect the new IP packet tagged with user information to the meter.  
6. If no entry can be found in the DUTRT, or a flow is found in the 
DUTRT but it belongs to a different user, it means this is the first IP 
packet of an inbound flow, consequently a new entry is added into the 
DUTRT with the new flow information and its corresponding user in-
formation. After that, the Agent hands this IP packet on to the receiv-
ing application in the host. Then the Agent inserts the user informa-
tion of this IP packet into its copy and redirects this new IP packet to 
the meter.  
7. When the meter receives an IP packet tagged with user information 
destined to it, t means that this IP packet is a redirected inbound IP 
packet. The meter extracts the user information and the traffic infor-
mation from the received IP packet and adds a new entry into the 
DUTRT with the new flow information and its corresponding user in-
formation. The corresponding statistic calculation will also be made 
according to this IP packet.  
4.1.4.3 Hybrid user identification method 
The user based IP traffic accounting process for inbound IP traffic with 
hybrid user identification method is similar to the IP traffic flow based 
user identification except that the flow in DUTRT is uni-directional, i.e. 
only inbound flows will be recorded in the DUTRT. The DUTRT can be 
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regarded as a user inbound IP traffic flow relationship table. A new entry 
is added into the DUTRT only when the meter receives a redirected IP 
packet tagged with user information.  
4.1.5 Different user identification methods comparison 
With the IP packet based user identification method, every outbound IP 
packet carries its user information and every inbound IP packet is redi-
rected to the meter with added user informat ion. Therefore, the user infor-
mation integrated in each IP packet produces extra IP traffic in the net-
work, and the inbound IP traffic volume of measured hosts is doubled. The 
advantage of this method is its simplicity and low processing burden onto 
both Agent and meter, since no DUTRT needs to be maintained by the 
Agent or the meter. 
With the IP traffic flow based user identification method, only the first 
IP packet of a flow must be integrated with user information. Other IP 
packets of the same flow do not need to carry user information and not all 
inbound IP packets must be redirected to the meter. This can significantly 
reduce the extra IP traffic caused by user information transmission. Less 
processing overhead will result by integrating and extracting the User In-
formation option. However, the method will result in more processing 
overhead on both Agent and meter for maintaining the DUTRT and 
searching IP packets’ users in the DUTRT. In addition, the synchroniza-
tion of DUTRTs in both Agent and meter should be carefully designed. 
By analyzing the IP packet based user identification method we can find 
that most of the extra traffic generated by this method is due to inbound IP 
packets redirection. Te processing overhead of the IP traffic flow based 
user identification method lies in searching the corresponding user and 
flow information in the DUTRT for every IP packet. With the hybrid 
method, all outbound IP packets are integrated with their corresponding 
user information, whereas for inbound IP packets only  the first IP packet 
of an inbound flow must be redirected to the meter. The hybrid method 
will cause less processing overhead than the IP traffic flow based method, 
since all outbound IP packets are equipped with user information and there 
is no need to search the DUTRT for these IP packets. In addition, the hy-
brid method will produce less extra IP traffic than the IP packet based user 
identification method, since only some of the inbound IP packets are re-
quired to be redirected to the meter. 
Below is a comparison table of these three user identification methods 
according to above analysis: 
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 IP packet based 
method 




packet tagged with 
user information 
Every IP packet  First IP packet of 
every bi-
directional flow 
Every IP packet  
Inbound IP packet 
redirection with 
user information 
Every IP packet  First IP packet of 
every bi-
directional flow 





Large Small Small 
Processing over-
head 
Low  High Medium  
Table 4.1 Comparison of different user identification methods. 
The three user identification methods have different advantages and dis-
advantages. Which method should be chosen for in-band scheme depends 
on the application environments and the trade-off between performance 
and extra traffic volume. Although the IP traffic flow based method and 
the hybrid method produce less traffic burden, in some situations the IP 
packet based method may be the best choice. For example, if IPSec is ap-
plied and the payloads of IP packets are encrypted, flow information can-
not be extracted directly from the IP packet. In this case, the flow based 
user identification mechanism cannot be applied and the IP packet based 
user identification method is the only choice.  
4.1.6 Dynamic user IP traffic relationship table (DUTRT) 
In the in-band scheme, the dynamic user IP traffic relationship table 
(DUTRT) records IP traffic and its corresponding user for keeping history 
records of user IP traffic relationships to avoid integrating user information 
into all IP packets of the same flow.  
In the in-band scheme, the IP packet based user identification method 
does not require a DUTRT. The DUTRT records user and IP traffic flow 
relationship information. A traffic flow is defined as a sequence of packets 
between given source and destination endpoints during a period of time 
[RFC2724, RFC3917]. Flows may be bi-directional or uni-directional and 
have different granularities (see 2.2.3.2). The direction and granularity of 
flows are usually decided by accounting policies.  
According to the user model, several attributes in an IP traffic flow and 
the corresponding user information should be collected by the Accounting 
Agent to construct a record about this flow into the DUTRT. Whenever the 
first IP packet of an IP traffic flow is captured by the Agent, the identific a-
tion attributes of the flow and its corresponding user information are col-
lected, and the Agent creates a new entry into the table.  
116      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
The in-band scheme should define flows with application-to-application 
level granularity, since end-to-end level granularity cannot distinguish be-
tween different users in multi-user systems. Hence, 7-tuple <Source IP 
Address, Destination IP Address, Source Port Number, Destination 
Port Number, Protocol number, Start Time, End Time> is suitable to 
define a flow for DUTRT. Usually an entry in DUTRT may have the fol-
lowing attributes: <User ID, Source IP Address, Destination IP Ad-
dress, Source Port Number, Destination Port Number, Protocol num-
ber, Start Time, End Time>. 
A record in the DUTRT may include two kinds of attributes: 
l Traffic-Originator attribute: it is used to uniquely identify a TO that is 
related to the traffic. As for the above example, a TO attribute in-
cludes these items: <UserID, Source IP> for outbound IP traffic flow 
or <UserID, Destination IP> for inbound IP traffic flow. 
l Identification attribute: identification attributes are the information 
that can be used to identify an IP packet or an IP traffic flow  uniquely. 
The identification attributes can be directly extracted from IP packets. 
The Agent extracts them from IP packets to generate user IP traffic 
flow relationship records. 
Since the identification attributes in IP traffic can also be extracted 
from IP traffic by meters to generate RDRs, the identification attrib-
utes are used as a key to associate DUTRT records with correspond-
ing RDRs for the purpose of mapping RDRs to the corresponding us-
ers. [RFC2924] has defined the attributes and formats of RDRs. As 
for the above example, correlation attributes include these items: 
<Source IP, Source Port Number, Destination IP, Destination 
Port Number, Protocol number, Start Time, End Time>. These at-
tributes uniquely identify an IP traffic flow. 
In order to control the size of the DUTRT, inactive flow s should be de-
leted from the table regularly. Through that, memory can be recycled and 
the searching performance can be improved. After an inactive flow’s entry 
is deleted from DUTRT, when an IP packet belonging to this deleted flow 
appears, a new entry can be created into the table for this IP traffic flow. 
Since both Agent and meter maintain their own DUTRT, these two 
DUTRT should be kept synchronized. Otherwise, the users of flows cannot 
be correctly identified.  
Below we discuss DUTRTs synchronization mechanisms between 
Agent and meter according to outbound IP traffic flow and inbound IP 
traffic flow, respectively.  
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4.1.6.1 DUTRT synchronization with outbound IP traffic flow 
If a flow is initiated by the measured host, the Agent finds out its user 
and creates a new entry into the DUTRT. Then the Agent sends the IP 
packet tagged with user information to the meter. The meter updates its 
DUTRT with this new flow and its user. This is a standard DUTRT syn-
chronization process with outbound IP traffic flow. After  that, all succes-
sive IP packets of the same flow will not be tagged with user information. 
Maybe in some situations, the first IP packet tagged with user inform a-
tion of a flow is lost during its way to the meter. This may happen, for ex-
ample, due to network failure or congestion. In this case, the DUTRT in 
the meter will not be updated. However, the successive IP packets of this 
flow may arrive in the meter without carrying user information, since the 
Agent supposes that the first IP packet of this flow has been received by 
the meter. In this case, the meter cannot find the user from its DUTRT. 
The worst case is, when there exists an old flow in the meter’s DUTRT 
with the same flow characteristics as the new flow (for example, the same 
source and destinatio n IP addresses, the same source and destination ports 
and the same protocol, except that the old flow belongs to another user), 
the meter will use this old flow from DUTRT to identify the user of the in-
bound IP packet. In this case, this inbound IP packet of the new flow is in-
correctly treated as the old flow and the user of the new flow is also incor-
rectly identified with the user of the old flow. 
In order to avoid the synchronization problems described above, the fol-
lowing acknowledgement mechanisms should be adopted: 
l The Agent continues to insert user information of a flow in its succes-
sive IP packets until it receives a User Information Acknowledgement 
message from the meter. The acknowledgement message can be either 
in-band or out-of-band. With the in-band acknowledgement, the meter 
continues to insert the acknowledgement message in the inbound IP 
packets of the same flow until the Agent does not insert user inform a-
tion in the outbound IP packets of the flow. With the out-of-band 
method, the meter sends an acknowledgement message to the Agent 
through a special channel between Agent and meter. In order to avoid 
unnecessary acknowledgements and reduce extra traffic, the meter can 
choose to respond only to large volume flows. For example, meter re-
sponds acknowledgements to the Agent only when it receives more 
than five IP packets tagged with user information of the same flow.  
Figure 4.2 illustrates the information exchange processes for syn-
chronizing DUTRTs between the Agent and the meter according to 
the mechanism described above: 
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Figure 4.2 DUTRT synchronization with outbound IP traffic flow 
l The mechanism described above can be improved to decrease unnec-
essary traffic. When a new flow is initiated, if the Agent can find out 
an old flow with the same flow characteristics as the new flow from 
the DUTRT, but the old flow and the new flow belong to different us-
ers. Only in this case, the Agent will continue to insert user informa-
tion in successive IP packets of this new flow until an acknowledge-
ment message from the meter is received.  
If there is not a flow with the same flow characteristics belonging 
to a different user, the Agent integrates the user information only in 
the first IP packet of the flow. After the first IP packet tagged with 
user information of the flow arrives in the meter without problem, the 
successive IP packets of the flow can be identified with the corre-
sponding user.  
If the meter receives an outbound IP packet without user informa-
tion, it will not forward this IP packet. The meter inserts a Query User 
Information message into this meter and sends it back to the Agent. 
When the Agent receives an IP packet with a Query User Information 
message, it finds out the user of this IP packet. Then it inserts the user 
IP packet (O1) + User Information 
Agent Meter 
IP packet (O2) + User Information 
IP packet (On) + User Information 
…
…  
IP packet (I1) + User Information Acknowledgement 
IP packet (On+1) 
…
…  
IP packet (Ij) + User Information Acknowledgement 
…
…  
IP packet (Ij+1) 
…
…  
O1, O2, …: the 1st, 2nd,… outbound IP packets of a flow 
I1, I2, …:    the 1st, 2nd,… inbound IP packets of a flow 
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information into this IP packet and sends this IP packet to its destina-
tion again.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates this improved DUTRT synchronization 
mechanism in case no transmission failure happens to the first IP 
packet of a flow. Figure 4.4 illustrates this improved DUTRT syn-
chronization mechanism in case the first IP packet of a flow is lost: 
 
Figure 4.3 Improved DUTRT synchronization mechanism with out-
bound IP traffic flow in case that the first IP packet tagged with user in-
formation arrives in the meter 
 
Figure 4.4 Improved DUTRT synchronization mechanism with out-
bound IP traffic flow in case that the first IP packet tagged with user in-
formation is lost 
IP packet (O1) + User Information 
Agent Meter 
IP packet (O3)  
IP packet (O2) + User Information 
IP packet (O2) + Query User Information 
… …  
IP packet (I1) 
… …  
IP packet (O2)  
IP packet  (O1) + User Information 
Agent Meter 
IP packet (O2) 
… …  
IP packet (I1) 
… …  
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4.1.6.2 DUTRT synchronization with inbound IP traffic flow 
If a flow is initiated by a remote endpoint, when its first IP packet ar-
rives in the meter, the meter searches its DUTRT to check if this IP packet 
belongs to an existing flow.  
If no entry is found in the DUTRT, the meter forwards this IP packet 
with a Query User Information message to the measured host.  
If an entry can be found from the DUTRT, the meter forwards this IP 
packet without any change to the measured host. In this case, the found 
flow may be an old flow with the same flow characteristics belonging to a 
different user. However, the meter cannot distinguish that. Therefore the 
user of the new flow may be incorrectly identified with the user of the old 
flow. The correct user information of this new flow can be obtained only 
after the Accounting Agent redirects this IP packet tagged with user infor-
mation to the meter. In order to prevent this kind of error, a rollback 
mechanism should be applied to recover the statistic calculation on the 
wrong user. 
When an inbound IP packet arrives in the measured host, the Agent in-
tercepts this IP packet and finds out the user information of this IP packet. 
If this IP packet carries a Query User Information message, the Agent in-
serts its user information into this IP packet and redirects the new IP 
packet to the meter. If this IP packet carries no User Information option, 
the Agent searches its DUTRT to verify if it belongs to an existing flow 
with the same user. If no entry can be found, or a flow is found but the user 
is not the same, the Agent inserts user information into this IP packet and 
redirects the new IP packet to the meter. The IP packet will not be redi-
rected only when both flow and user information of a found entry match 
the packet. 
When the meter receives the redirected IP packet tagged with user in-
formation, it checks if this user information is a response to a Query User 
Information message. If so, a new entry with this new flow information 
and its user information will be added into the DUTRT. If it is not a re-
sponse to a Query User Information message, it means that the user of this 
IP packet was incorrectly identified and a rollback operation has to be 
made. At the same time, a new entry describing this new flow and its user 
is created into the DUTRT. In order to inform the Agent that the DUTRT 
is updated for this new flow, the meter should insert the new user informa-
tion into the first successive inbound IP packet of this flow after updating 
DUTRT. When the Agent receives IP packets with correct user informa-
tion, it knows that the DUTRT has been updated for this new flow, and the 
successive inbound IP packets of this flow without user information will 
not be redirected to the meter. 
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Figure 4.5 illustrates the information exchange processes for synchro-
nizing DUTRTs in the Agent and in the meter when the flow is initiated by 
a remote host: 
 
Figure 4.5 Message exchange for DUTRT synchronization with inbound 
IP traffic flow in case no entry is found in DUTRT for the inbound IP 
packets of a new flow 
4.2 User Information option format 
An IP packet consists of an IP header and a payload. The IP header con-
tains information explaining the characteristics of the IP packet, how it 
should be routed, how it should be processed, etc. The payload contains 
the upper layer datagram. In order to utilize IP packets to carry user infor-
mation, the IP header should be extended to accommodate the user infor-
mation. When the IP header is extended for the purpose of user based IP 
traffic accounting, the following requirements should be met: 
1. The IP header extension must be able to accommodate the required 
User Information option; 
2. The IP header extension should support both IP packet based user 
identification and IP traffic flow based user identification; 
3. The security and privacy of the user information should be taken into 
consideration.  
IP packet (In+1) + User Information Acknowledgement 
Agent Meter 
IP packet  (O1) + User Information 
… …  
IP packet (In) + Query user Information 
… …  
IP packet  (I1) + User Information 
IP packet  (In) + User Information 
… …  
IP packet (I1) + Query user Information 
…
…  
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For user based IP traffic accounting, a new option called User Informa-
tion option is defined to be integrated into IP packets for the purpose of 
carrying user information. Figure 4.6 illustrates the general format of the 
User Information option. 
0          7 8                       15 31 
Type Length Flags 
Message 
Figure 4.6 General format of User Information option 
The fields in the general format of User Information option are: 
l Type is a one byte field specifying the type of the option, like in 
other options. The value of this field depends on where the User 
Information option is positioned and what kind of option is this 
User Information option. For example, if the User Information 
option is defined as a type of IPv4 Options, the value of this field 
should be assigned by IANA [IANA1]. The Type of User Infor-
mation option must not conflict with the now existing types. 
l Length is an 8 bits field that indicates the length of this User In-
formation option in bytes.  
l Flags is a 16 bits field indicating the type of information in the 
following Message field, and how this information is organized 
in the Message field. Detailed definitions about this field are dis-
cussed in subsequent sections. The following types of flags are 
defined in this dissertation: User Information, Query User Infor-
mation, User Information Acknowledgement. 
l Message is a variable field that contains user information and 
control messages. Which kind of message is integrated in this 
field depends on the Flags field. A detailed description about this 
field is explained in subsequent sections. 
4.2.1 User Information message  
The User Information message is used to carry user information of cor-
responding IP packets. Figure 4.7 illustrates the format of the User Infor-
mation message. 
The Type and Length field in this format are the same as described in 
4.2, the meanings of other fields are: 
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Source IP Address 
User ID 
Figure 4.7 Format of the User Information message 
 
l E is a one bit field indicating whether an encryption mechanism 
is applied to the User ID field. E=0 means that the user informa-
tion stored in this option is not encrypted, whereas E=1 means 
that the user information stored in this option is encrypted. The 
encryption mechanism is explained in 4.4. 
l R is a one bit field indicating whether this IP packet tagged with 
User Information option is a redirected inbound IP packet. R=0 
means that this is not a redirected inbound IP packet, and the 
Source IP Address field does not exist. This type of user inform a-
tion is inserted into the outbound IP packets. R=1 means that this 
is a redirected inbound IP packet, and the Source IP Address field 
exists. 
l Message Type is a 12 bits field indicating the type of message 
contained in the User Information option. For the User Inform a-
tion message, the Message Type is 1. 
l Source IP Address is a 4 bytes field in IPv4 packets or 16 bytes 
field in IPv6 packet indicating the IP address of the sender. This 
field exists only in the redirected inbound IP packets. In this case, 
the R bit in the Flags field is set to 1. In other cases, the Source 
IP Address does not exist in the User Information option and the 
R bit in Flags field is set to 0.  
The redirected inbound IP packet, as explained in section 4.1, 
is generated like this:  when an inbound IP packet arrives in the 
Agent and it cannot be identified with its user by the meter, the 
Agent finds out its user and inserts user information into the in-
bound IP packet to build a new redirected IP packet, then this 
new IP packet is redirected to the meter to inform it about the 
user of this IP packet.  
When the new redirected IP packet is built, the destination IP 
address of the inbound packet must be changed to the IP address 
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of the meter, because the meter is the receiver of the redirected IP 
packet. And the source IP address of this inbound IP packet is 
changed to the IP address of the measured host. After the modifi-
cation of the source and destination IP addresses, the original 
source IP address of the inbound IP packet cannot be found from 
the new redirected IP packet. Considering that the original source 
IP address is necessary for metering, the Source IP Address field 
is defined in the User Information option. With that, the meter 
can recover the original inbound IP packet from the redirected IP 
packet. 
l User ID is a variable length field which contains User ID infor-
mation of this IP packet. When the E flag is set to 0, the User ID 
is not encrypted. In this case, the length of User ID field can be 
32 bits. And when the E flag is set to 1, the User ID is encrypted. 
If the User ID is encrypted, the length of this field depends on the 
encryption mechanism.  
In this User Information option format, the User ID field can 
be either encrypted or not. Since encryption is a complex and 
CPU burden operation, this will cause performance decline in 
both Agent and meter by encryption and decryption. Without en-
cryption, the user identification process can be speeded and less 
effect on performance will result in the Agent and the meter. 
Without encryption, this mechanism can only be applied in safe 
environments in which attacks are rare, or accounting informa-
tion is collected for research purposes such as trend analysis, de-
cision support, etc., which may not attract attacks. However, if 
the accounting information will be collected for the purpose of 
charging, billing, access controlling, etc., attacks must be taken 
into consideration. Therefore, a security mechanism must be in-
tegrated into the in-band scheme. The encryption of User ID field 
is designed for this purpose. The security mechanism applied in 
the in-band scheme is discussed in detail in 4.4. 
4.2.2 Query User Information message  
The Query User Information message is used by the meter to ask the 
Agent to identify the user of the IP packet which carries this message. The 
Query User Information message is inserted in the IP packet by the meter 
and is forwarded to the Agent. Figure 4.8 illustrate the format of the Query 
User Information message. 
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0       7 8                   15 31 
TYPE LENGTH D Message Type 
Destination IP Address 
Figure 4.8 Format of the Query User Information message 
The Type and Length fields in this format are the same as described in 
4.2, the meanings of other fields are: 
l D is a one bit field indicating whether this IP packet tagged with 
User Information option is an inbound IP packet or an outbound 
IP packet. D=0 means  that this is an inbound IP packet, and the 
Destination IP Address field does not exist. D=1 means that this 
is an outbound IP packet, and the Destination IP Address field 
exists.  
l Message Type is a 12 bits field indicating the type of message 
contained in the User Information option. For the Query User In-
formation message, the Message Type is 2. 
l Destination IP Address is a 4 bytes field in IPv4 packets or a 16 
bytes field in IPv6 packets indicating the IP address of the desti-
nation. This field exists only in the redirected outbound IP packet 
which cannot be identified with the corresponding user  by the 
meter. In this case, the D bit in the Flags field is set to 1. In other 
cases, the Destination IP Address does not exist in the Query 
User Information option and the D bit in the Flags field is set to 
0.  
4.2.3 User Information Acknowledgement message  
The User Information Acknowledgement message is used by the meter 
to acknowledge to the Agent that it has received the User Information of a 
flow. This message is inserted into the inbound IP packets by the meter. 
When an Agent receives this message, it verifies if the flow information 
and the user information in this IP packet match an entry in the DUTRT. If 
the verification succeeds, the Agent will not insert any user information 
into the successive IP packet of the same flow. The format of the User In-
formation Acknowledgement message is illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
The Type and Length fields in this format are the same as described in 
4.2, the meanings of the other fields are: 
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User ID 
Figure 4.9 Format of the User Information Acknowledgement message 
 
l E is a one bit field indicating whether an encryption mechanism 
is applied to the User ID field. E=0 means that the user informa-
tion stored in this option is not encrypted, whereas E=1 means 
that the user information stored in this option is encrypted.  
l Message Type is a 12 bits field indicating the type of message 
contained in the User Information option. For the User Informa-
tion Acknowledgement message, the Message Type is 3.  
l User ID field is a variable length field which contains User ID 
information of this IP packet. When the E flag is set to 0, the 
User ID is not encrypted. In this case, the length of the User ID 
field can be 32 bits. And when the E flag is set to 1, the User ID 
is encrypted. If the User ID is encrypted, the length of this field 
depends on the encryption mechanism.  
4.3 User Information option location  
This section discusses where and how the User Information option can 
be integrated into the IP packet. Considering the different formats and 
characteristics of IPv4 and IPv6 protocols, locating the User Information 
option in IPv4 packets and IPv6 packets are discussed separately. 
4.3.1 Integrating User Information option in IPv4 packet 
An IPv4 packet contains an IPv4 header and a payload. The IPv4 header 
consists of a fix 20 bytes length part and a variable length optional part. 
Figure 4.10 depicts the IPv4 packet format.  
By checking the IPv4 packet format, we can find:  
l The fix part of the IPv4 header is not extendable for inserting the User 
Information option;  
l The Options field is extendable and may be chosen for carrying the 
User Information option;  
l The User Information option may also be inserted into the position 
between IPv4 Options (if the Options field does not exist, then IPv4 
header) and upper layer PDU.  
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l The payload with the upper layer PDU is not suitable for carrying the 
User Information option. If the transport layer datagram is  utilized to 
carry user information, the TCP, UDP protocols must be extended 
correspondingly. However, the UDP header is very simple and not ex-
tendable. Another disadvantage is that inserting user information in 
the transport layer datagram will increase the overhead. Therefore, the 
transport layer datagram is not suitable for carrying user information.  
0   31 
Version 
Header 
Length Type of Service Total Length 
Identification Flag Fragment Offset 





Figure 4.10 IPv4 packet format 
Two possible User Information locations in IPv4 packets, i.e. in the 
IPv4 Options field or between IPv4 Options and upper layer PDU, are dis-
cussed below. 
4.3.1.1 Positioning User Information option in IPv4 Options 
field  
The IPv4 Options field was designed for possible  reinforcement to the 
original design, or experimenting new ideas. Originally, five IPv4 options 
were defined accompanied with the publication of IPv4 standard 
[RFC791]. The five options are security, record route, strict source routing, 
loose source routing, and timestamp. The Options field can be chosen to be 
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extended for storing the User Information option to identify the user of the 
corresponding IP packet.  
The positioning of the User Information option in an IPv4 packet’s Op-
tions field is illustrated in Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11 integrating User Information option in Options field of IPv4 
packet 
When the User Information option is integrated into an IPv4 Options 
field, the type value in the Type field should not conflict with the now ex-
isting type values.  
Since the IPv4 options are required to be processed by all intermediate 
nodes, meters can be placed in routers in the key position of networks, as 
in the traditional IP accounting system, to intercept IP packets tagged with 
user information and extract user and traffic information.   
In order to be able to handle this User Information option, routers with 
meter functions should be configured to support processing this User In-
formation option. If a router without meter functions or having no interest 
in this option receives an IP packet tagged with user information, it should 
ignore this field and continue processing the IP packet according to the 
“Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers” standard [RFC1812].  
Another issue that should be taken into consideration is that the User In-
formation option integrated in the IPv4 Options field must take part in the 
calculation of the header checksum. If the User Information option is in-
serted into an IPv4 packet after the IPv4 packet construction, or accurately, 
after the header checksum is calculated, then the header checksum does 
not include the User Information option and therefore it must be recalc u-
lated. If the User Information option is inserted into an IPv4 packet before 
the IPv4 header checksum calculation, there is no need to care about the 
header checksum calculation. Whether the IPv4 header checksum should 
be recalculated or not depends on the Accounting Agent implementation. 














IPv4 packet after integrating User Information option 
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4.3.1.2 Positioning User Information option between IPv4 
header and upper layer PDU 
The IPv4 Options field is designed to be a part of IPv4 header and its 
size is limited to 40 bytes. Due to the limited space for IPv4 Options and 
its inflexibility, IPv4 options are rarely used [Hage02]. Some new IPv4 op-
tions have been suggested after the publication of the IPv4 protocol 
[IANA1], but none of them is applied as a standard. IPv4 options are not 
supported by all hosts and routers.  
Considering the limited space in the IPv4 Options field, integrating the 
User Information option into this field may make things worse. For exam-
ple, if a Loose Source Router option is inserted into an IP packet with 9 IP 
addresses, the space occupied by this option reaches 39 bytes, and only 
one byte is left for the User Information option, which makes it impossible 
to integrate the User Information option into the IPv4 Options field.  
Positioning the User Information option after the IPv4 header and the 
Options field but before the upper layer PDU, though, will not be limited 
by space. When the User Information option is positioned in this place, no 
conflict with IPv4 Options will appear. Figure 4.12 depicts positioning the 
User Information option between IPv4 the header and the upper layer 
PDU. 
 
Figure 4.12 positioning User Information between IPv4 header and up-
per layer header  
If the User Information option is positioned in this location, the Type 
field in the User Information option is used to identify the type of the next 
payload after the User Information option. The value of this Type field is 
chosen from the set of protocol numbers defined in [IANA2]. For example, 
if a TCP header follows the User Information option, the Type field will 
contain the value 6 which indicates the protocol number of TCP protocol. 
When the User Information option is positioned after the IP header, the 
















IPv4 packet after integrating User Information option 
130      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
of the User Information option. Ther efore, a protocol number must also be 
assigned to the User Information option. In order to avoid the protocol 
number assigned to the User Information option conflicting with an exist-
ing protocol number, the new protocol number for the User Information 
option must be assigned by IANA.  
Since only the IPv4 header and options will be processed by all inter-
mediate nodes, a User Information option positioned between the IPv4 
header and the upper layer PDU will not be checked by any intermediate 
nodes. In order to trigger meters to check the User Information option for 
outbound IP packets, every measured host with the Agent must register to 
a meter before the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism with the in-
band scheme is applied. After a measured host is reg istered to a meter, 
when the IP packets related to this measured host pass through the meter, 
the User Information options in the IP packets will be checked by the me-
ter.  
Although the User Information option positioned after the IPv4 header 
and Options will not be processed by intermediate routers, when the IP 
packets arrive in destinations, the User Information option may cause trou-
ble. This is because the User Information option cannot be recognized by 
receivers at the destinations. In order to avoid the confusion, the meter 
must remove the User Information options from the IP packets before they 
are forwarded to their destinations. This can limit the extension to the IP 
protocol only between the Agent and the meter. Through that, the modifi-
cation to the IP packets is transparent to both the sender and the receiver. 
This will also result in less overhead to the network.  
4.3.2 Integrating User Information option in IPv6 packets  
IPv4 has been applied as Internet standard for a long time. With the ex-
ponential growth of the Internet, IPv4 addresses are becoming scarce. 32 
bits IPv4 address cannot provide enough IP address space for the increas-
ing requirements. This is the main reason why IPv6 was proposed. With 
IPv6 protocol, not only a huge IP address space can be supplied but also 
the Internet performance can be improved, and new features will be sup-
plemented.   
As IPv4 already exists for a long time, many IPv4 products have been 
developed and deployed. Extending the IPv4 Options field for user based 
IP traffic accounting may cause modifications to these existing implemen-
tations and products. Compared with IPv4, IPv6 is a new Internet standard 
that is still under development. Moreover, it is also not widely applied. It is 
expected that there will be less difficulties when the user based IP traffic 
accounting issues are considered in the IPv6 standard. 
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By analyzing the IPv6 protocol, we find that the IPv6 extension header 
can be utilized as the suitable place for integrating the User Information 
option.  
The IPv6 protocol provides extension headers instead of the Options 
field in IPv4 header. This can improve the efficiency of forwarding IP 
packets by the routers. With the extension headers, IPv6 can also be exten-
sible beyond a limited Options field. The size of the IPv6 extension header 
is not limited to 40 bytes like the IPv4 Options field.  
Some extension headers have already been defined in IPv6. These ex-
tension headers, except the Hop by Hop Options header, are designed to be 
processed only by destination nodes  [RFC2460] due to the consideration 
of the IP packet forwarding efficiency. Considering this characteristic of 
the IPv6 extension headers, if User Information option is integrated in an 
IPv6 packet as an extension header, it might be neglected by the router 
with meter function, which is located between source and destination end-
points. Due to the fact that the router is only an intermediate node along 
the path of the packet, the router will ignore all extension headers except 
the Hop by Hop Options header, the Routing Option header and the Desti-
nation Options header.  
The Hop by Hop Option  header can be utilized for carrying the User In-
formation option. Since this type of extension header in an IP packet must 
be processed by all nodes along this IP packet’s path to its destination, the 
meter located in the path can be activated to extract user information from 
the Hop by Hop Option header. However, considering the fact that user in-
formation is required to be processed only by interested routers, i.e. routers 
with meter functions, the Hop by Hop Option header is not a good choice 
for integrating the User Information option, because it will cause every 
node in the path of an IP packet from source to destination to process this 
extension header. Even though most of the intermediate routers have no in-
terest in the user information in this IPv6 packet, they have to process the 
Hop by Hop Option header. Therefore, integrating the User Information 
option into the Hop by Hop Option will increase the processing overhead 
to the intermediate routers. Moreover, it does not conform to the design 
principle of the IPv6 extension header.  
The Destination Options header was designed to deliver parameters for 
destinations. The destinations can be either the final destination of an IP 
packet or intemediate destinations specified in the Routing Option header. 
The Destination Options header is identified by the value of 60 in the 
previous header's Next Header field. A typical application of the 
Destination Options header is the Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775].  
The Routing Option  header contains a list of intermediate nodes that 
must be visited on the packet’s path to its destination. [RFC2460] defines 
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only the Type Zero Routing Option header which corresponds to the Loose 
Source Routing option in IPv4. This header is identified by the value of 43 
in the previous header's Next Header field. 
Whether a Destination Options header is required or not to be processed 
by intermediate destinations is decided by the existence of the Routing 
Option header  on the one hand, and also by the appearance order of the 
Destination Options header and the Routing Options header in the IPv6 
packet on the other hand.  
If a Routing Option header is presented after the Destination Options 
header, the Destination Options header should be processed not only by 
the final destination but also by the intermediate destinations specified in 
the Routing Options header. Otherwise, if no Routing Option header exists 
or a Destination Options header occurs after the Routing Option header, 
the Destination Options header will be processed only by the final 
destination, and all intermediate nodes will ignore this header.  
The analysis on the characteristics of the Routing Option header and the 
Destination Options header shows that, the Routing Options header can be 
used to designate the meters as the intermediate nodes in the Routing 
Options header, and the Destination Options header is suitable for carrying 
the User Information option which can be extracted by meters specified in 
the Routing Options header. 
In order to integrate the User Information option into IPv6 packets, the 
User Information option should be designed as a type of Destination 
Options. The Type field of the User Information option should be assigned 
a unique value for this User Information option, and the IP addresses 
defined in different messages of User Information option must all be 128 
bits IPv6 addresses. 
According to the IPv6 specification, winthin the Option Type field of 
any option in Destination Options header, the two highest-order bits 
specify how the option should be handled when the option type cannot be 
recognized by a processing node. Actions should be taken according to 
different values in the two highest-order bits: 
l 00 - Skip the option and continue processing the header 
l 01 - Silently discard the packet  
l 10 - Discard the packet and send an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem 
message to the packet’s source address no matter  the Destination 
Address field in the IPv6 header is a unicast or multicast address  
l 11 - Discard the packet and send an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem 
message to the packet’s source address only if the Destination 
Address field in the IPv6 header is not a multicast address  
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The third-highest-order bit of the Option Type specifies whether the 
option data may be changed (= 1) or not (= 0) along the way to the 
packet’s final destination.   
For the User Information option, when an IPv6 node cannot recognize 
this option, it must skip it and continue to process the rest part of the 
header. And this User Information option may also be changed along the 
way to the packet’s final destination. Consequently, the three highest-order 
bits of the Type field in the User Information option must be set to 001. 
The other five bits of the Type field of the User Information opt ion should 
be assigned a value that does not conflict with the other existing 
Destination Options types. 
As mentioned above, through the cooperation between the Routing 
Option header and the Destination Options header, an IPv6 packet with a 
Destination Options header can traverse the pre-arranged nodes which can 
handle the information in the Destination Options header. Hence the User 
Information option in the Destination Options header should cooperate 
with a Routing Option header for the purpose of deliver ing the user 
information to the designated meters.  
For an inbound IP packet, the User Information option may be inserted 
into the Destination Options header by the meter before this IP packet 
arrives in the measured host. In this case, the final destination is the 
measured host. Therefore no Routing Options header is required. When a 
Routing Options header already exists in this IP packet, the User 
Information option must be inserted after the Routing Options header. 
Otherwise the nodes specifed in the Routing Options header will try to 
process the User Information option, which is unnecessary for the User 
Information option. Figure 4.13 illustrates the position of the User 
Information option in an inbound IPv6 packet. 
 
Figure 4.13 integrating User Information in inbound IPv6 packet 
For an outbound IP packet, User Information option may be inserted 
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sent to its destination. If this IP packet is a redirected IP packet, its final 
destination must be the meter. In this case, the Routing Options header is 
not necessary, since the User Information option is required to be 
processed by the final destination node, i.e. the meter. But if this IP packet 
is a normal outbound IP packet, the meter should be an intermediate node 
along the way to this packet’s final destination. In this case, a Routing 
Options header is required to specify the meter’s IP address in it. With 
that, the routers with meter function will be triggered to process the user 
information in the Destination Options header. Figure 4.14 illustrates the 
position of User Information option in an outbound IPv6 packet. 
 
Figure 4.14 integrating User Information in outbound IPv6 packet 
Below we use an example to illustrate how the User Information option 
is integrated into an IPv6 packet as a type of Destination Options and how 
user information in an IPv6 packet is collected by a meter. In this example 
an IPv6 packet is sent by an application in a measured host with IP address 
S to the destination D. In order to perform user based IP traffic accounting, 
a meter with IP address M is located between the source S and the 
destination D. In order to make things simple, it is assumed that no other 
intermediate node exists along the IP packet’s path to destination. If the 
User Information option is designed as a type of Destination Options, the 
process of user based IP traffic accounting is: 
1. At first, the measured host is equipped with the accounting Agent 
which can intercept inbound and outbound IPv6 packets.  
2. When an IPv6 packet sent by an application passes through the 
Agent, the Agent retrieves the corresponding user information of 
the IPv6 packet from the system. Then the Agent builds a User 
Information option. The Message Type field in the User Informa-
tion option is set to User Information message type. The E bit is 
set to 0 indicating no encryption. The R bit is set to 0 indicating 
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exists in the User Information option. And the user information is 
placed in the User ID field. After that, the User Information op-
tion is encapsulated into a Destination Options header. The 
length of the Destination Options header must be updated accord-
ingly.  
3. In this example,  there is no other intermediate node except the 
meter in the path of this IP packet from source to destination. In 
order to guarantee that this IP packet passes through the meter, a 
Routing Option header must be created. The Agent adds the IP 
address of the meter into a Routing Option header. The Routing 
Type field should be set to 0 indicating loose source routing. If 
there are other intermediate nodes defined in the route list, and if 
the meter is the first intermediate node that this IPv6 packet must 
access, then the IP address of the meter is placed in the destin a-
tion IP address field of the IPv6 packet. Otherwise, the IP address 
of the meter should be inserted into the route list in a suitable 
place. And the Segments Left field is correspondingly incre-
mented by 1. In this example, the destination IP address field of 
the IPv6 packet is set to the IP address of the meter and the final 
destination IP address is moved into the route list in the Routing 
Option header. Then the Segments Left field is set to 1 indicating 
that there is one intermediate node left to be accessed.  
4. According to the IPv6 extension header place order rule 
[RFC2460], the Routing Option header must be placed after the 
Destination Options header. Through that, the meter as an inter-
mediate destination node will be activated to process the Destin a-
tion Options header. 
5. The Agent forwards the IPv6 packet with the User Information 
option in the Destination Options extension header to its destina-
tion. 
6. When the IPv6 packet with User Information option reaches the 
meter M, which is an intermediate destination of the IPv6 packet, 
the meter extracts user information from the User Information 
option in the Destination Options header as well as traffic infor-
mation, e.g. source IP, packet length, etc. from the IPv6 header.  
Traffic information combined with the corresponding user infor-
mation can be used by the meter to generate user based RDRs. 
7. The meter finds out the next destination from the route list in the 
Routing Option header according to the Segments Left pointer. 
Then it places the final destination IP address D into the destina-
tion IP address field of the IPv6 packet. At the same time, the 
current intermediate destination IP address, i.e. the meter’s IP 
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address M, is placed into the position of the final destination D in 
the route list. At last, the Segments Left field is decremented with 
1. 
In order to keep users’ privacy, or avoid the User Information 
option to be processed by the final destination, the User Informa-
tion option should be deleted from the IPv6 packet after being 
processed by the meter. 
8. After processing the User Information option, the meter forwards 
the IPv6 packet to its final destination D. 
Table 4.2 records the changes in the IPv6 packet according to the above 
described process. In order to make things simple, it is assumed that no 
other extension header exists in this example. 





instance to Agent 
Source IP  = S 
Destination IP = D 
  
From Agent to 
meter 
Source IP = S 
Destination IP = M 
E = 0 
R = 0 
Message Type = User 
Information message 
User ID = Sender 
Segment Left 1 
Address (1) = D 
From meter to 
destination 
Source IP = S 
Destination IP = D 
 Segment Left 0 
Address (1) = M 
Table 4.2 Changes in an IPv6 packet during the user based IP traffic 
accounting process 
4.4 Security mechanism of in-band scheme  overview 
Accounting systems are always the targets of attackers. One of the most 
important reasons is that accounting information is usually related with 
charging and billing, in other words it always concerns money. In order to 
prevent this information from attacks such as cheating, modification, forg-
ing or even erasing, security measures must be applied when accounting 
information is processed.  
With the in-band scheme, the user information in IP packets may be un-
der attacks such as modification, deletion, spoof and masquerade. For ex-
ample, users who do not want to pay for their network resource consump-
tion may try to replace their user information in the IP packets with other 
people’s user information or even delete it. Therefore, keeping confidenti-
ality and integrity of the user information to prevent from these attacks is 
critical for the in-band scheme. In the in-band scheme, a security mecha-
nism is introduced to guarantee that the user information in IP packets is 
transferred securely.  
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The security mechanism of the in-band scheme consists of two phases: 
1. Negotiation between Accounting Agent and meter to prepare for se-
cure user information transmission. In this phase, the Agent and the 
meter authenticate each other and exchange security parameters re-
quired for the subsequent user information transmission. 
  
2. User information encryption and decryption. In this phase, the user in-
formation is encrypted and decrypted according to the security mecha-
nism negotiated in the first phase. With encryption and decryption 
mechanisms, the user information can be transferred securely to 
achieve confidentiality. The integrity validation mechanism in this 
phase can also prevent from spoof and masquerade attacks with the 
help of encryption.  
4.4.1 Negotiation between Accounting Agent and meter for 
secure user information transmission 
Before an Accounting Agent is configured to transfer the encrypted user 
information, at first it must contact with the meter to authenticate each 
other and then negotiate parameters about secure user information trans-
mission. The negotiation process for secure communication in in-band 
scheme simulates the SSL protocol handshak e [FrKK96]. Figure 4.15 de-
picts the message exchange process between Agent and meter for negotia t-
ing secure information transmission.  
Below the secure communication handshake negotiation process is ex-
plain ed in detail: 
1) The Accounting Agent sends an Agent Hello message to the meter. 
Before the Agent sends this message, the meter should be listening 
on the predefined port waiting for incoming user based IP traffic ac-
counting requests from Accounting Agents. This message includes a 
list of supported encryption algorithms and corresponding key sizes, 
a random number, and a session ID. The encryption algorithms in 
the list relate to this handshake process. The cryptographic algo-
rithm for user information encryption will be decided in step 7). The 
random number will be used to seed the cryptographic calculations. 
The session ID identifies this handshake of secure communication. 
It can be reused by the same Agent to facilitate speeding up the fu-
ture handshake process with this meter. In addition, it can also be 
used to speed up future shared secret update.  
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Figure 4.15 Negotiation for secure transmission of user information 
between Agent and meter 
2) When the meter receives the Agent Hello message, it feeds back a 
Meter Hello message to the Agent. In this Meter Hello message a 
random number, supported cipher suite and the session ID are in-
cluded. The new random number, along with the random number 
that the Agent creates, provides the seed for critical cryptographic 
calculations. The meter chooses a cipher suite, which it can sup-
port from the cipher algorithms list provided by the Agent. If no 
cipher suite in the list provided by Agent can be supported by the 
meter, the handshake negotiation fails. If the Agent and the meter 
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Hello message, the meter returns the Agent’s session ID value in 
the Meter Hello message. If not, the meter responds with a differ-
ent, meter-generated random number that indicates a new session. 
3) Then the certificate of the meter is sent to the Agent. This certif i-
cate is used to authenticate the meter’s identity. It includes the 
public key of the meter. After receiving the meter’s certificate, the 
Agent verifies the meter’s certificate through validating the signa-
ture, checking the validity period, making sure the certificate was 
signed by one of the CAs the Agent trusts. 
4) The meter sends a Meter Hello Done message to the Agent to in-
form the Agent to start the next phase.  
5) After receiving the Meter Hello Done message, the Agent sends its 
certificate to the meter. This certificate includes the public key of 
the Agent. The meter also needs to verify the certificate of the 
Agent. 
6) Then the Agent generates a pre-master secret value and encrypts it 
with the public key from the meter’s certificate. This encrypted 
pre-master secret will be encapsulated into an Agent Key Ex-
change message which will then be sent to the meter. Both Agent 
and meter convert the pre-master secret into the master secret by 
computing a series of hashes using the pre-master secret, the ran-
dom number in Agent Hello message and the random number in 
the Meter Hello message. The generated master secret is then used 
to derive keys for encrypting user information. 
7) The Agent sends a Change Cipher Spec message to the meter to 
inform it to activate just negotiated read cipher suite. And the 
write cipher suite of the Agent is also activated. In this step the en-
cryption algorithm of the Agent and decryption algorithm of the 
meter are settled. 
8) The Agent sends a Finish message to the meter. The Finished mes-
sages allow both systems to verify that the negotiation has been 
successful and that security has not been compromised. 
9) The meter sends also Change Cipher Spec message to the Agent to 
inform it to activate its just negotiated read cipher suite. And the 
write cipher suite of the meter is also activated. In this step the en-
cryption algorithm of meter and decryption algorithm of the Agent 
are settled. 
10)  At last, the meter also sends a Finish message to the Agent. 
Through the negotiation process, the Accounting Agent and the me-
ter are authenticated with each other. The shared session key for en-
crypting and decrypting user information in IP packets is generated by 
the Accounting Agent and the meter. The cryptographic algorithm is 
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also agreed upon by both parties. After that, the User Information op-
tion can be transferred between Accounting Agent and meter accord-
ing to the negotiated secure communication mechanisms. 
4.4.2 Encrypting user information  
The encryption algorithm and the key applied for encrypting user infor-
mation are determined by means of the secure communication handshake 
negotiation. In the in-band scheme, a symmetric encryption algorithm 
[MeOV96] is chosen for encrypting user information, since symmetric en-
cryption produces less computational overhead than asymmetric encryp-
tion [Thom00]. 
The user information is usually presented in string form or ID number 
form. For example, user information about Alice may have the form of a 
string like “Alice” or ID number form like “12345”. Formally, let u stand 
for user information without encryption. E is the encryption algorithm, D 
is the decryption algorithm, c is the ciphertext of u after encryption,  and k 
is the session key. Let us consider the following situations: 
1) If there is no security mechanism applied to the user information, all 
IP packets related to the same user contain the same content in the 
User Information option. That means, all the IP packets related to the 
same user will include the same u in their User Information option 
which is not encrypted. It is easy to be attacked by replacing this u 
with another user’s information u .´ And the privacy of this user can 
also be simply peeped from the unencrypted user information.  
2) Now let us encrypt the user informat ion simply with the session key 
generated in the secure communication negotiation, i.e. c=E(u , k). The 
ciphertext c is then inserted into the User Information option of user 
u’s IP packets. The meter can decrypt the ciphertext with the session 
key to recover the user information: u=D(c, k).  
It seems that user information could be protected against attacks 
with this simple encryption mechanism. However, this simple encryp-
tion is almost as insecure as without encryption. It is impossible to ob-
tain user information such as user name or user ID from the encrypted 
user information in the IP packets. Even so, attackers can classify IP 
packets according to the ciphertext of the encrypted user information 
to identify one user’s network activities without knowing exactly the 
content of user information. This is because the encryption result of 
one user’s user information u  is always the same ciphertext c. In this 
case, privacy protection is as weak as without encryption. Further-
more, the possible spoof and masquerade attacks still can be achieved. 
Although the user information is not readable due to encryption, an at-
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tacker can achieve spoof and masquerade without knowing about u. 
An attacker can use another user’s encrypted user information c  ´to re-
place the c in the User Information option. The c´  is the encrypted user 
information of u  ´ (c =´E(u ,´  k)), which can be obtained from sniffing 
other user’s IP packets. After the meter decrypts c´ , user u related IP 
packets will be falsely regarded as user u  ´related IP packets. One rea-
son for this security leak is due to the fact that the encryption of user 
information is not variable, so the relationship between the ciphertext 
and user can be easily guessed. Another reason is that this simple en-
cryption cannot provide an integrity mechanism protecting user infor-
mation from being modified.  
According to the above discussion, simple encryption cannot meet the 
requirements for security. Therefore,  a different security mechanism must 
be introduced. This security mechanism should meet the following re-
quirements: 
l It can prevent user information from being leaked, i.e. providing con-
fidentiality to protect privacy.  
l It can protect user information against spoof and masquerade attacks. 
In other words, it can provide integrity validation mechanism. 
l It should be simple and efficient. This security mechanism should not 
result in too much overhead. The overhead lies in two aspects: one is 
that the encryption should not cause too big performance decline on 
the measured host in which the Agent resides; the second is that the 
encryption result, i.e. the ciphertext, should not take too much space 
for storing it in the IP packet. 
4.4.2.1 Principle of encrypting user information 
In the in-band scheme, a symmetric encryption algorithm is employed to 
encrypt user information combined with a Digest, which is the fingerprint 
of an IP packet. With an IP packet related Digest, the integrity validation 
can be achieved. The symmetric encryption algorithm can provide more 
efficient encryption function than asymmetric algorithms. The principle of 
user information encryption mechanism is illustrated in Figure 4.16. 
The user information encryption mechanism consists of five compo-
nents: 
l User information (u) is the User ID of a user in the measured host. 
The size of user information must be fixed.  
l Digest (d) is the fingerprint of an IP packet. It may be hash value 
of the payload of the IP packet, or some selected data from the 
payload. The length of the Digest combined with user information 
(u) must be compatible with the encryption algorithm. 
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l Session Key (k) is the key used to encrypt u  and d. It is generated 
during the process of secure communication handshake negotia-
tion.  
l The encryption algorithm (E) is settled during the negotiation 
phase between Accounting Age nt and meter.  
l Ciphertext (c) is the encryption result after encrypting u  and d with 
Session Key k. The ciphertext is inserted into the User ID field of 
the User Information option and transferred to the meter which 
will then decrypt the ciphertext to extract the user identifier and to 
verify the integrity. 
 
Figure 4.16 user information encryption mechanism 
4.4.2.2 Accounting ID 
The Agent provides the user information u  of the IP packet. The user in-
formation u  may be a user name in string form or a user ID in number 
form which is used in the measured host. However, user names or user IDs 
can be easily obtained by attackers, since this information is open in the 
measured host.  
In order to prevent the user identifier from being eas ily guessed, a spe-
cial string or random number, called Accounting ID, can be assigned to 
every user. Therefore,  Accounting ID, instead of user name or user ID, 
will be used as user identifier to be encrypted and inserted into the User In-
formation option. Since the Accounting ID is generated for accounting 
purpose and only the Agent and the meter know the relationship between 
Accounting ID and user, it is hard for attackers to guess the Accounting 
ID. 
Hash or random number generation mechanisms can be used to generate 
Accounting IDs. The special Accounting ID is only used for the account-
IP packet IP Header                                                  Data 
User information ( u ) 
Encryption E(u, d, k) Session key ( k ) 
Digest ( d ) 
Ciphertext ( c ) 
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ing purpose and is generated by the Accounting Agent when it is started. 
An Accounting ID – User Mapping table should be transferred from the 
Accounting Agent to the meter during the secure communication hand-
shake negotiation process. This table will be used by the meter after de-
crypting the encrypted Accounting ID to identify the corresponding user.  
The length of the Accounting ID depends not only on the encryption al-
gorithm but also on the strategy for the Digest d from the IP packet. For 
example, the block encryption algorithm DES uses 64 bits (8 bytes) plain-
text as an input block, therefore the length of the User Information plus the 
Digest should take this factor into consideration. It is suggested that the 
length of the user information part and the Digest part are fixed, which can 
make the meter separate these two parts from the decrypted text easily and 
quickly. 
4.4.2.3 Digest 
As discussed in 4.4.2, simple encryption on user information cannot 
meet security requirements for the in -band scheme. This can be improved 
by combining the variable text with user information to generate variable 
ciphertext for the same user’s different IP packets. This variable text is 
called Digest. The Digest is the fingerprint of an IP packet. Here the fin-
gerprint means that it represents the unique characteristic of an IP packet. 
The corresponding bytes in an IP packet chosen for generating Digest must 
be immutable along the path from source to destination. Otherwise, the in-
tegrity validation will fail.  
Here we propose two possible Digest generation mechanisms: 
1. The first Digest generation mechanism is to take advantage of the 
similar integrity mechanism used in IPSec. At first, the Integrity Check 
Value (ICV) is calculated on the basis of the whole IP packet except 
the mutable fields. Then the first several bytes of the ICV are chosen 
as Digest combined with user information for the purpose of encry p-
tion. By decryption, the ICV of the IP packet will be recalculated to 
verify whether the decrypted Digest matches the recalculated ICV. 
This mechanism can provide a stronger integrity validation mecha-
nism. However, the overhead of this mechanism is very high due to the 
ICV calculation and recalculation.  
2. The second Digest generation mechanism is to select some bytes from 
the payload of an IP packet randomly to construct the Digest. The in-
formation about which bytes are selected must be a part of the plain-
text. In this case, the structure of the plaintext for encryption is like 
Figure 4.17. In this structure,  the “References” field lists all positions 
of selected bytes for constructing Digest. After decryption, the position 
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information in the “References” field is used to gather the bytes in the 
payload of the IP packet to compare with the decrypted Digest. Since 
this mechanism does not need to calculate Digest, the overhead for 
generating Digest by this mechanism is lower than the first mecha-
nism. Since the Digest is randomly constructed, even the same payload 
may have different References. This mechanism can provide enhanced 




Figure 4.17 Structure of the user information for encryption 
Which mechanism for constructing Digest should be applied may be a 
trade-off between performance and security. The information about the 
strategy of constructing Digest should also be exchanged between the Ac-
counting Agent and the meter during the secure communication negotia-
tion process. If the Digest pluses user information cannot reach the size re-
quirement for encryption, e.g. 64 bits for DES, the rest part should be 
padded with padding data. 
Digest is a part of the IP packet and it corresponds to a part of the IP 
packet. The meter side requires this Digest to verify the integrity of the en-
crypted User Information. The verification is accomplished by comparing 
decrypted Digest with corresponding bytes in the IP packet. If the cipher-
text is changed along the way between measured host and meter, the Di-
gest cannot match its corresponding bytes in the IP packet and the verific a-
tion will fail. In other case, if the corresponding bytes of Digest are 
changed during the transmission, despite the fact that the ciphertext con-
tains the User Information and the Digest is not changed, the integrity 
validation will also fail.  
The possible situations of changing IP packets along their way to desti-
nations may be attack related or protocol related.  
For attack related modification on the IP packets8, if the integrity verifi-
cation on an IP packet fails, this packet can be discarded. If the modifica-
tion is not on the bytes corresponding to Digest, the integrity verification 
will succeed. In the later case, it only means that the User Information is 
not modified during transmission, but that does not mean that the integrity 
of the whole IP packet is verified. The IP packet will still be forwarded. If 
the whole IP packet should be protected from attacks, security mechanisms 
such as IPSec, SSL/TLS, HTTPS, etc. should be applied to different layers 
of TCP/IP protocol stack. The security mechanism of the in -band scheme 
cares only about the security of the User Information option.  
                                              
8 Here those attacks on User Information option are not included.  
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Another possible modification on IP packets is protocol related. Exam-
ples are, IPSec, NAT, transition between IPv4 and IPv6, VoIP Signalling 
conversion [SiSc00, RFC3372, ZhHM05], Mobile IP [RFC3344, 
RFC3775], etc. Figure 4.18 illustrates the possible positions where modif i-
cation on an IP packet may happen. 
 
Figure 4.18 Possible positions where IP packets may be modified 
The modification made on IP packets in position 1 will not affect the in-
tegrity verification of User Information. IP packets can enter Accounting 
Agent from two directions: one direction is from the kernel of the meas-
ured host as outbound IP packets; the other direction is from outside the 
measured host as inbound IP packets. No matter how the outbound IP 
packets were modified in upper layer modules, e.g. HTTPS, IPSec, etc., in 
the kernel before they enter the Accounting Agent, obviously these modi-
fications will not result in the Digest bytes being modified after the en-
cryption of User Information. What should be noticed is that when the Ac-
counting Agent is integrated into the system kernel, it should be placed in 
the last position of IP packets modification chain for outbound IP packets 
and also the first position of IP packets modification chain for inbound IP 
packets. For example, for outbound IP packets IPSec module should proc-
ess the IP packets before the Agent module. Otherwise, after being proc-
essed by Accounting Agent the IP packets will be modified by IPSec mod-
ule, which may cause the integrity verification of User Information option 
failure.  
The modification made on IP packets between the Accounting Agents 
and the meter may cause Digest related bytes in IP packets inconsistent 
with the Digest. For example, integrating IPSec related header into an IP 
packet will bring change to the payload of the IP packet. Modifications on 
payload may cause User Information integrity verification failure. In order 
to avoid this problem, the Agent and the meter should be located in the 
place before the IP packets modification happens. When necessary, the 
Agent must be implemented in the last position of the modification chain 
on IP packets and the meter may need to be located directly next to the 
multi-user system as the first intermediate node. Through that, no modif i-
cation will be made on IP packets between Accounting Agent and meter. 
The modification made on IP packets in position 3 will not affect the in-
tegrity verification mechanism of User Information option, since the IP 
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By encrypting User Information and Digest, the User Information car-
ried in IP packets cannot be peeped by attackers, and the spoof and mas-
querade attacks can also be prevented. The Digest can help keeping the in-
tegrity of the encrypted user information. 
4.4.3 Decrypting User Information  
When a meter receives an IP packet with encrypted User Information 
option, it performs the following operations to decrypt it: 
1. Session key is used to decrypt the ciphertext to recover the User In-
formation and the Digest, i.e. (u, d) = D(c, k).  
2. The meter rebuilds the Digest according to the received IP packet. 
Then it compares the newly built Digest with the decrypted Digest to 
verify whether they are identical.  
3. If they are not identical, this means that either the Digest related bytes 
in the IP packet or the encrypted User Information option is changed 
during the trans it of the IP packet. Therefore, this IP packet should be 
discarded.  This verification error information should be recorded into a 
security log. 
4. If they are identical, the meter extracts the user based IP traffic ac-
counting required information such as User  Information, source IP, 
destination IP, bytes, etc. from IP packet to generate a RDR. Then me-
ter forwards this IP packet to its destination. 
The above described user information decryption process is depicted in 
Figure 4.19.  
 








Extracting user information 
and traffic attributes from IP 
packet to generate RDR. 
Recording event in security 
log. Discarding the IP packet. 
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4.5 Implementation considerations  
In order to realize user based IP traffic accounting with the in-band 
scheme, the Accounting Agent must be implemented in the measured host. 
The traditional meter should also be extended to support the protocol de-
fined in the in-band scheme. Before user based IP traffic accounting with 
the in-band scheme can be implemented, there are some issues must be 
taken into consideration: 
l Where should the Accounting Agent be implemented? 
l How to handle fragmentation.  
l How does the in-band scheme coexist with IPSec? 
l Performance issues. 
l Dependability issues. 
4.5.1 Where should the Accounting Agent be implemented 
The Accounting Agent must have the ability of intercepting IP packets, 
collecting user information and integrating User Information options into 
IP packets. Therefore, the Agent must be implemented in the position 
where all IP packets and their corresponding user information can be ob-
tained. According to the four theory positions discussed in 4.5.2, consider-
ing the characteristics of user based IP traffic accounting with the in-band 
scheme, the following two positions are possible for implementing the 
Agent for the in-band scheme: 
l Realizing the Agent in the native IP protocol implementation. This 
position requires the source code of the native IP protocol implemen-
tation to be modified.  
l Realizing the Agent below the native IP protocol implementation, be-
tween the native IP protocol implementation and network drivers, i.e. 
"Bump-in-the-stack" (BITS) [RFC2401]. This position does not re-
quire source code of the native IP protocol implementation to be ac-
cessed. 
It may be difficult for the Agent to insert User Information options into 
IP packets when the Agent is implemented above the native IP protocol 
implementation, since in this position IP packets are not completely con-
structed. 
4.5.2 Fragmentation 
In the in-band scheme of user based IP traffic accounting, two fragmen-
tation related issues should be taken into consideration: 
l One issue is that inserting User Information option into an IP packet 
may cause the size of this IP packet to exceed the MTU of the trans-
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mission path. In this case, the IP packet must be fragmented after User 
Information option is integrated into IP packets. 
l Another issue is that, if an IP packet tagged with user information 
must be fragmented on the way to destination, how should the User 
Information option be processed during packet fragmentation? 
Fragmentation of IP packets may be affected by different factors. It can 
take place in different positions: in the measured host, in intermediate 
nodes between the measured host and the meter, in the meter, and in in-
termediate nodes which locate between the meter and the remote endpoint. 
Different user identification methods also play important roles in the IP 
packet fragmentation. IPv4 and IPv6 packets should be treated differently 
in fragmentation. Inbound IP packets fragmentation and outbound IP 
packets fragmentation may have different character istics. 
4.5.2.1 Fragmentation in measured host 
Because the data link layer normally has a limitation on the size of the 
frame that can be transmitted,  the IP layer must fragment IP packets into 
suitable sizes according to the MTU of the network interface. When an IP 
packet is to be sent, the size of this IP packet and the MTU will be com-
pared. Then fragmentation will be made in the IP layer when the size of 
this IP packet is larger than the MTU.  
In IPv6, fragmentation only occurs on the source host sending the 
packet. The destination host handles reassembly. The Path MTU discovery 
mechanism [RFC1191] is used by source host to determine the maximum 
packet size that can be used on the way to destination. If an IP packet’s 
size is larger than the MTU, it will be fragmented in the source host before 
being sent to the destination. A Fragmentation extension header will be 
added into every fragmented IPv6 packet. Unlike IPv4, IPv6 packets will 
not be fragmented along the path to destinations. 
If the Accounting Agent function is integrated in the native IP protocol 
implementation, the User Information option will be built into IP packets 
when IP packets are constructed. When an IP packet tagged with user in-
formation must be fragmented before being sent, the User Information op-
tion should be processed according to different user identification meth-
ods: 
l When the IP packet based user identification method is adopted, the 
User Information option must be integrated into every fragmented IP 
packet. 
l When flow based user identification method is adopted, if the frag-
mented IP packet is the first IP packet of an IP traffic flow, the User 
Information option must be integrated into the first fragmented IP 
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packet. Otherwise, no User Information option is required to be inte-
grated into the fragmented IP packets. 
If the Accounting Agent is realized underneath the native IP protocol 
implementation, when an IP packet sent by the IP layer comes into the 
Agent, the fragmentation operation should be made by the Agent. The 
Agent calculates the size of this IP packet together combining with User 
Information option and then compares it with the MTU.  
l If the size of this IP packet combined with the User Information op-
tion does not exceed the MTU, no fragmentation will be made.  
l If the size of this IP packet combined with the User Information op-
tion exceeds the MTU, and the IP packet is not a fragmented IP 
packet, then the Agent fragments this IP packet and inserts User In-
formation into the fragmented IP packets according to different user 
identification methods. In IPv4 environment, the fragmentation flag is 
set. In IPv6 environment, the Fragmentation extension header is inte-
grated into the fragmented IP packets. 
l If the size of this IP packet combining with the User Information op-
tion exceeds the MTU, and the IP packet is a piece of a fragmented IP 
packet, the Agent reassembles all pieces of the original IP packet to-
gether. After that, the Agent fragments the reassembled original IP 
packet again so that the sizes of new fragmented IP packets combined 
with the User Information option will not exceed the MTU. Finally, 
the Agent inserts User Information options into new fragmented IP 
packets according to different user identification methods. A new 
fragmentation flag or Fragmentation extension header must be inte-
grated into the fragmented IP packets. 
4.5.2.2 Fragmentation between measured host and meter 
Fragmentation between the measured host and the meter may take place 
in intermediate nodes such as routers. As mentioned above, this kind of 
fragmentation can only be applied to IPv4 packets, since IPv6 fragmenta-
tion is recommended to be made only in source hosts. The IP packet can be 
either an inbound or an outbound packet. 
When an IP packet must be fragmented by an intermediate router, the 
issue concerning the in-band scheme is how to process the User Inform a-
tion option in this IP packet. The solution depends not only on the user 
identification methods but also on the position of User Information options 
in IP packets. 
l For IP packet based user identification, the User Information option is 
assumed to be attached to every IP packet. Therefore, the same User 
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Information option should be copied to all fragmented IP packets dur-
ing the IP packet fragmentation process.  
If the User Information option is positioned in the IPv4 Options 
field as an option, it will be automatically copied to all fragmented IP 
packets during IP packet fragmentation process.  
However, if the User Information option is positioned between 
IPv4 header and upper layer PDU, usually it will not be copied to all 
fragmented IP packets. This User Information option will be treated 
as normal IP packet payload and is probably inserted into the first 
fragmented IP packet. Other fragmented IP packets will carry the rest 
part of the payload. In order to handle this problem, the Agent or the 
meter can aggregate fragmented IP packets together according to the 
value in the Identification field of IPv4 header and then identifies the 
user of these fragmented IP packets with the User Information option 
in the first fragmented IP packet. 
l For IP traffic flow based user identification method, the User Infor-
mation option exists only in the first IP packet of a traffic flow. When 
the first IP packet of a traffic flow needs to be fragmented by the in-
termediate router, let’s consider two different positions of User In-
formation option: 
If the User Information option is positioned in the IPv4 Options 
field, it will be copied to all fragmented IP packets. Therefore, the 
meter and the Agent should have the ability of handling redundant oc-
currence of the User Information option correctly and efficiently  
If the User Information option is positioned between the IPv4 
header and the upper layer PDU, by fragmentation,  it will be inte-
grated into the first fragmented IP packet and the other fragmented IP 
packets will contain no User Information option. In this case, it still 
conforms to the requirement for IP traffic flow based identification 
method, i.e. the first IP packet conveys the User Information option. 
Therefore, no other extra operation should be performed in meter or 
Agent. 
l For hybrid user identification method, all outbound IP packets are at-
tached with User Information option. For inbound IP packets, only 
those IP packets that are the first IP packets of IP traffic flows will be 
redirected to meter. The principle discussed in IP packet based user 
identification is suitable for outbound IP packets fragmentation, 
whereas the principle discussed in IP traffic flow based user identifi-
cation can be applied to the redirected IP packets. 
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4.5.2.3 Fragmentation in the meter 
Fragmentation may take place in the meter when a User Information op-
tion must be inserted into an inbound IP packet. This may happen only 
when the IP traffic flow based user identification method is applied. In IP 
packet based user identification, User Information options are integrated 
into outbound IP packets or redirected IP packets only by the Agent. 
In the meter, User Information options should be integrated into IP 
packets in two situations:  
l When an inbound IP packet without User Information option comes 
into the meter and it cannot be identified with the corresponding user 
by the meter through searching DUTRT, the meter encapsulates a 
Query User Information message into the IP packet and sends it to the 
Agent.  
l When an Agent continues sending IP packets tagged with user infor-
mation of the same flow to the meter, the meter may send the User In-
formation Acknowledge message to inform the Agent about its receipt 
of this User Information option of the flow. 
Therefore, when an IP packet should be integrated with User Inform a-
tion option in the above situations, the size of this IP packet with inte-
grated User Information option may be larger than the MTU, and conse-
quently the meter has to fragment the new IP packet. 
For an IPv4 packet which is not a fragmented IP packet, the meter frag-
ments it into different pieces and inserts a User Information option into the 
first fragmented IP packet. Then the meter sends them to the Agent. 
For an IPv4 packet which is a fragmented IP packet, the meter should at 
first aggregate all fragmented IP packets to reconstruct the original non-
fragmented IP packet. Then the meter fragments the new IP packet into 
different pieces and inserts a User Information option into the first frag-
mented IP packet. After that, the meter sends these fragmented IP packets 
to the Agent. 
For IPv6 packets, since fragmentation is not allowed by intermediate 
nodes, the following measures can be taken: 
l The meter inserts a User Information option into an IP packet and 
sends it to the Agent. If the new IP packet is larger than MTU, an 
ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message will be sent back to the source en d-
point. Since meter is usually located in the key place where all traffic 
will pass through, the meter can capture the ICMP message. Figure 
4.20 shows the structure of ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message.  
In the Packet Too Big message, the Type field is set to 2 and the 
Code field is set to 0. The 32-bit MTU field stores the link MTU of 
the interface over which the IP packet was forwarded. The Data field 
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contains the leading portion of the discarded packet. The size of this 
field is variable. As much as possible leading portion of the discarded 
packet can be contained in the Data field, if the ICMPv6 message is 
no larger than the Path MTU. Considering that the size of IPv6 header 
is fixed to 40 bytes, the maximum size of the Data field can be 
calculated as follows in case the minimum IPv6 MTU is applied and 
no IPv6 extension header is included: 
0 
              
7 8                     15 31 
TYPE CODE Checksum 
MTU 
Data 
Figure 4.20 structure of ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message 
[RFC2463] 
 
Data field size = Minimum MTU – IPV6 header size – TYPE size – 
CODE size – Checksum size – MTU size = 1280 – 40 – 1 – 1 – 2 – 4 
= 1232 (bytes) 
The User Information option is designed as a type of Destination 
Extension header which is located in the front part of the IPv6 packet. 
Considering the size of Data field is at least 1232 bytes, the User In-
formation option will be included in the Data field of the ICMPv6 
packet as the leading portion of the discarded packets. When an 
ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message as an outbound IP packet comes 
into the meter, the meter checks if the User Information option field 
exists in the Data field. If so, this means that the Packet Too Big er ror 
is caused by the integrated User Information option. In this case, the 
meter should calculate a new MTU. The new MTU is the value in the 
MTU field minus the size of the User Information option. Then the 
meter inserts the new MTU in the MTU field of the ICMPv6 Packet 
Too Big message and then forwards it to its destination. After the 
ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message is received, the source host will 
adjust its sent IP packets’ size according to the new MTU.  
l Another method is to fragment IPv6 packets in the meter, if neces-
sary. Although fragmentation is not recommended by intermediate 
nodes in IPv6 considering the forwarding performance of routers, 
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fragmentation may still be made in intermediate nodes if necessary. 
Example is the IPv6 to IPv4 translator [RFC2460]. 
When the size of an IPv6 packet plus the size of a User Information 
option is larger than the PMTU from the meter to the Agent, the new 
IP packet tagged with user information must be fragmented. If the IP 
packet is not a fragmented IP packet, the meter should construct a 
new Fragmentation extension header for each fragment. If the IP 
packet is a fragmented IP packet, the meter reassembles all fragments 
together and inserts User Information into new fragments. The Frag-
mentation extension header should also be modified according to the 
new fragmentation.  
l Sending back User Information option to Agent with out-of-band 
mechanism may be also a choice, i.e. the Acknowledge or Query User 
Information message is sent to Agent in a dedicated communication 
channel between Agent and meter rather than utilizing IP packets to 
convey their User Information option.  
4.5.2.4 Fragmentation between meter and remote endpoint 
If fragmentation is made between the meter and the remote endpoint, it 
is irrelevant to the in-band scheme.  
4.5.3 Coexistence with IPSec 
IPSec is a security framework designed to provide cryptographically 
based security for IPv4 and IPv6 [RFC2401, RFC2402, RFC2406]. Two 
traffic security protocols are applied in IPSec to achieve IP level security: 
the Authentication Header (AH) and the Encapsulating Security Payload 
(ESP). The AH Protocol provides connectionless integrity, data origin au-
thentication, and an anti-replay protection service. However, AH does not 
provide any confidential services: it does not encrypt the packets it pro-
tects, whereas the ESP protocol provides data confidentiality and limited 
traffic flow confidentiality. Data origin authentication, connectionless in-
tegrity and anti-replay service are also provided by the ESP protocol. Since 
in AH and ESP protocols relevant portions of the IP packet must be taken 
into consideration in integrity, authentication, encryption, etc. process, 
how User Information option coexists with IPSec should be carefully ana-
lyzed before user based IP traffic accounting in-band scheme is imple-
mented. 
When User Information options are integrated into IP traffic for which 
the IPSec mechanism is applied, two possible issues may arise: 
l One issue is that the appearance and transformation of User Informa-
tion options in IP packets may affect the integrity verification and au-
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thentication of IPSec. For example, if a User Information option is in-
serted into an IP packet after the AH header is integrated into the IP 
packet, the integrity verification of IPSec may fail in the destination 
due to the absence of User Information option when the AH header 
was built. 
l Another issue is that the encryption of the ESP protocol may affect 
the operation of the in-band scheme. For example, if the User Infor-
mation option in an IP packet is encrypted by ESP, the meter will not 
be able to extract it from the IP packet due to the end to end encryp-
tion characteristic of IPSec. 
4.5.3.1 Conforming to IPSec integrity  
In order to avoid the in-band scheme influencing the integrity and au-
thentication ab ility of IPSec, user based IP traffic accounting mechanism 
should be implemented conforming to IPSec integrity requirements. The 
principle of in-band scheme coexisting with IPSec is to avoid User Infor-
mation option being taken into consideration in calculating the ICV (Integ-
rity Check Value).  
For IPSec transport mode, the implementation position of the Account-
ing Agent in a host may be the same as IPSec, i.e. they may all be inte-
grated in the native IP implementation or underneath an existing imple-
mentation of the IP protocol stack (“Bump-in-the stack”)  [RFC2401]. No 
matter in which position, the Agent must be implemented underneath the 
IPSec implementation. Agent and meter should remove User Information 
option from IP packets before they are forwarded to the IPSec endpoints. 
With that, the operations, such as integration, deletion, etc., on User In-
formation options in IP packets are transparent to IPSec integrity and au-
thentication mechanisms, since the transformation on IP packets for the 
purpose of user based IP traffic accounting happens only between the two 
IPSec communication endpoints. Figure 4.21 shows the relative positions 
between IPSec and in-band scheme implementations. 
 
Figure 4.21 Relative positions between IPSec and in-band scheme im-
plementations for transport mode 
For IPSec tunnel mode, the meter is not allowed to be placed between 
two security gateways, i.e. there is no security gateway between the Agent 
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and the meter. Otherwise, the User Information option may become a part 
of the inner IP packet for outbound traffic, which makes it difficult for the 
meter to find it. Integrating User Information option in IP traffic by the 
meter for inbound traffic may result in the integrity check failing in secu-
rity gateway.  
4.5.3.2 In -band scheme and ESP encryption  
The ESP protocol provides traffic flow confidentiality using an encryp-
tion mechanism. In transport mode, only the upper layer PDUs of IP pac k-
ets are encrypted. In tunnel mode, IP packets are encrypted and encaps u-
lated into new IP packets as inner IP packets. The principle of the in-band 
scheme coexisting with ESP encryption is to avoid the User Information 
option from being encrypted by ESP implementation.  
For ESP transport mode, if the implementation position of the Account-
ing Agent is underneath IPSec in a host, integration of User Information 
options in IP packets happens after ESP encryption. Therefore, the User 
Information option will not be encrypted by ESP. In this case, User Infor-
mation options are required to be removed from IP packets by the meter or 
the Agent before they are forwarded to destinations for decryption. If the 
implementation position of the Accounting Agent is above IPSec, the User 
Information option inserted between IPv4 header and upper layer PDU 
will be encrypted. Because of this, the User Information option cannot be 
encrypted by the meter. Hence, implementing the Agent underneath IPSec 
is the right choice in the case of ESP encryption.  
For ESP tunnel mode, in order to avoid the User Information option 
from being encrypted by the security gateway, the only choice is to place 
the meter in the position nearer to the Agent than to the security gateway. 
With this strategy, IP traffic between Agent and meter will not be dis-
turbed by the IPSec mechanism.  
Summarizing the above discussed principles, the location of IPSec and 
the Agent of the in-band scheme implementation is illustrated in Figure 
4.22.  
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The meter location strategy for IPSec tunnel mode can also be applied to 
other tunnel situations such as IPv6-to-IPv4 tunnels. In all these tunnel 
cases, original IP packets are encapsulated in new IP packets as inner IP 
packets. Therefore, the inner IP packets are treated as payload of IP pack-
ets by the meter. The User Information option in inner IP packets may 
usually be neglected by the meter as normal IP packet payload. Otherwise, 
the meter must check the protocol field in the IP header of every IP packet 
to find out the User Information option in inner IP packet. This will cer-
tainly increase the overhead for user based IP traffic accounting. Hence lo-
cating the meter in the place between the Agent and the tunnel server, as 
showed in Figure 5.24, is a good solution to avoid the problems described 
above.  
4.5.4 Performance issues  
The usage of the Accounting Agent imposes computational performance 
overhead on the measured host. If the meter is implemented in a router, it 
affects the performance of the router. Possible overhead related to the in-
band scheme may include extra CPU burden caused by per-packet han-
dling for the User Information option in the measured host and the meter, 
memory occupation for the DUTRT, and extra bandwidth consumption for 
User Information option transmission. 
With the in-band scheme every IP packet must be intercepted for vali-
dating the corresponding user information, inserting or extracting user in-
formation, encrypting or decrypting user information (if necessary). The 
per-packet computational costs will be manifested by increased latency 
and, possibly, reduced throughput. Especially the encryption and decryp-
tion computation may delay TCP connection establishment. Flow based 
user identification can improve the performance in reduced handling costs 
and less bandwidth consumption. However, maintaining DUTRT requires 
extra memory, whereas searching information in DUTRT also results in 
extra CPU burden. 
The application of the in-band scheme imposes bandwidth consumption 
costs on transmission due to the increased packet size resulting from the 
addition of User Information options. The packet based user identification 
method may consume more extra bandwidth compared with the flow based 
or the hybrid user identification method.  
4.5.5 Dependability considerations 
Dependability is an important issue that must be taken into considera-
tion in designing accounting systems. In user based IP traffic accounting 
systems realized with the in-band scheme, the reliability of the Agent and 
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the meter  is critical for dependability. The dependability related issues in 
the in-band scheme are: when the Agent or the meter is down, how to de-
tect it, how to handle user based IP traffic accounting in this case; and 
when the Agent or the meter lives again, how  to recover the user based IP 
traffic accounting process.  
After an Agent is started, it should be registered to a meter for the pur-
pose of user based IP traffic accounting with the in-band scheme. From 
that on, the Agent and the meter should communicate with each other by 
sending keep-alive messages to monitor the state of each other.  
If an Agent detects that the meter is down, it should stop sending and 
receiving IP packets which must be accounted according to the accounting 
policy. The Agent should record the detection of meter crash into an error 
log and should also prompt information to the system administrator about 
it. The Agent should keep sending the Agent Hello message (see 5.4.1) 
regularly to register it again to the meter after the detection of meter crash. 
When the meter is newly started, Agent can try to use the previous ly nego-
tiated session ID to resume predefined secure setting. If these settings are 
still available in the meter, it can resume previous secure configuration. 
Otherwise, a new secure handshake must be made.   
If a meter finds that an Agent is down, it should stop forwarding any IP 
traffic from or to the corresponding measured host on the one hand, and it 
should also stop recording accounting information related to all users in 
the corresponding measured host on the other hand. Through that, free 
network resource usage can be prevented when the accounting system 
crashes. Moreover, this can also discourage some attackers from trying to 
attack meter  using Denial of Service (DoS) to achieve illegal network re-
source consumption.   
4.9 Summary 
In this chapter, the user based IP traffic accounting in-band scheme is 
discussed in detail. With the in-band scheme, IP packets are utilized for 
storing and transferring their user information. Through that, a meter can 
directly extract user information, IP address and other traffic information 
from IP packets for the purpose of user based IP traffic accounting.  
In the in-band scheme, the Agent is a key component in identifying us-
ers of IP packets, integrating User Information options in IP packets, and 
negotiating a secure communication channel with the meter. In order to 
achieve user based IP traffic accounting, the meter should also be adapt-
able to the user information in the IP packets. In the in-band scheme, three 
user identification methods, IP packet based method, IP traffic flow based 
method and hybrid method, are suggested and analyzed. The user based IP 
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traffic accounting process and mechanism are explained on the basis of 
these user identif ication methods. If the flow based user identification 
method should be applied, DUTRT in the Agent and the meter should be 
maintained to be synchronized. These three methods have different advan-
tages and disadvantages. They can be applied in different app lication envi-
ronments.  
A User Information option is proposed for the purpose of carrying user 
information and other user based IP traffic accounting related control in-
formation. This User Information option may be integrated in different po-
sitions of IPv4 and IPv6 packets. In IPv4, the User Information option can 
be defined as a type of Options to be integrated into the Options field. 
Considering the limited space in the IPv4 Options field, positioning the 
User Information option between IPv4 header and upper layer PDU may 
be a better choice. In IPv6, designing the User Information option as an 
option in the Destination Options extension header is a suitable choice. In 
order to trigger the meter to check the User Information option in the Des-
tination Options extension header, the Routing Options header is also re-
quired to direct IP packets passing through designated meter. 
In order to protect the in-band scheme from potential attacks and to keep 
privacy, security mechanisms should be applied in the in-band scheme. 
This chapter suggests building a secure communication mechanism be-
tween the Agent and the meter. User Information can be encrypted for 
transmission. The security mechanism for the in-band scheme is explained 
comprehensively. With this security mechanism, the in-band scheme can 
be protected from potential attacks such as spoofing, masquerade, man in 
the middle, etc. The encryption mechanism can also help to keep privacy 
through hiding user information.   
Figure 4.23 depicts how user based IP traffic accounting is achieved 
with the in-band scheme: 
In Figure 4.23 we can find that, although different users in the multi-
user system generate IP traffic with the same IP address (192.168.0.100), 
the IP traffic can be differentiated by user information in the IP packets. 
Therefore, the RDRs generated by the meter are identified with the corre-
sponding user information. The correlation module in the Mediation Layer 
utilizes a TO & User Map Table instead of an IP address & User Map Ta-
ble, which is used in traditional IP accounting systems, to translate <IP ad-
dress, User ID> into the corresponding user. With the help of the 2-tuple 
TO, the correlation module can generate URs of different users in the 
multi-user system without any ambiguity.  
This method can facilitate gathering user traffic relationship information 
outside the measured hosts by the meter. Another advantage is that no 
temporary user traffic relationship information needs to be stored in the 
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measured hosts. Since user information is combined with traffic inform a-
tion, real-time user based IP traffic accounting can be easily achieved.  
 
Figure 4.23 User Information processing with in-band scheme 
In realizing the in-band scheme,  several issues should be taken into con-
sideration: how fragmentation should be handled after integrating User In-
formation option into IP packets, how in -band scheme coexists with the 
IPSec protocol, how the Agent and the meter affect the system perform-
ance and how dependability is achieved in in-band scheme. The discus-
sions in this chapter provide some suggestions about ways of solving these 
problems. 
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Chapter 5 Out-of-band scheme 
The in-band scheme utilizes the IP header to convey the user informa-
tion of corresponding IP traffic. Through that, the meter can intercept IP 
packets and extract both user information and traffic information directly 
from them. However, this scheme requires the IP protocol to be extended 
to accommodate the user information. In this chapter, a different user in-
formation transmission scheme is introduced. This scheme is called out-of-
band scheme. Here the concept of out-of-band is a contrast to the concept 
of in-band. Out-of-band means that the user information is transferred 
through a dedicated channel which is different from the channels for nor-
mal IP packets transmission. With the out-of-band scheme, the user infor-
mation is not transferred with the corresponding IP packet synchronously. 
The IP traffic and its corresponding user information are transferred sepa-
rately and asynchronously. 
In this chapter, three different mechanisms for implementing the out-of-
band scheme are introduced: IP packet based user identification mecha-
nism, IP traffic flow based user identification mechanism, standalone me-
ter mechanism. The first two mechanisms are similar to that in the in -band 
scheme except that the user information of IP packets is transferred to the 
meter independently from the transmission of the IP packet, i.e., the user 
information is not integrated in the IP packet. In the standalone meter 
mechanism, the Accounting Agent and the meter are tightly coupled as a 
standalone meter running in the measured host. Thus, the Agent can gener-
ate RDRs with user information like a meter and store the RDRs in the 
measured host temporarily. No external meter is required for monitoring IP 
traffic from this measured host for the purpose of IP traffic accounting. 
This chapter is organized as follows: at first the principle of out-of-band 
scheme is introduced, then the IP packet based user identification mecha-
nism is illustrated, after that the principle and the process of the IP traffic 
flow based user identification mechanism is explained, subsequently the 
principle of the standalone meter mechanism is analyzed, at the end some 
considerations concerning implementation, dependability, security of the 
out-of-band scheme are discussed.  
5.1 Overview of the out-of-band scheme 
In the in-band scheme when an IP packet is identified with its corre-
sponding user, the user information is accompanied with this IP packet to 
be forwarded to the meter, which can extract both user information and 
traffic information from the IP packet and generate an RDR with user in-
formation for the purpose of user based IP traffic accounting. User infor-
A model for user based IP traffic accounting     161 
mation integrated in IP packets is from where the name of the in-band 
scheme comes. However, utilizing the IP header to carry user information 
requires extension to be made on the IP protocol. This may be especially 
difficult in the IPv4 environment and legacy systems.  
The out-of-band scheme, in contrast to the in-band scheme, does not in-
tegrate user information into the IP header for the purpose of storing and 
transferring user information. With the out-of-band scheme, the user in-
formation is not transferred with the corresponding IP packet. Instead, the 
user information is transferred separately from the corresponding IP pack-
ets.  
In the out-of-band scheme, the user identification of IP traffic can be ei-
ther IP packet based or IP traffic flow based. With the IP packet based user 
identification method, every IP packet is identified with its corresponding 
user by the Agent, then the user IP packet relationship information is re-
corded and transferred to the meter without being integrated into corre-
sponding IP packet. No Dynamic User Traffic Flow Relationship Table 
(DUTRT) is required for this method to store user IP packet relationship 
information temporarily. 
With the IP traffic flow based user identification method, the first IP 
packet of a flow will result in a user IP traffic flow relationship record. 
This record will be stored in the measured host by the Agent for the pur-
pose of verifying the successive IP packets of the same flow. User and IP 
traffic flow relationship is transferred to the meter through a dedicated 
communication channel separated fr om IP traffic transmission. And this 
record will be sent to the meter for the purpose of identifying the user of IP 
packets and generating RDRs with user information. Both Agent and meter 
should maintain a DUTRT. Synchronization should be kept between these 
two DUTRTs. 
The Agent may also function as a standalone meter generating RDRs 
with user information and storing them temporarily in the measured host. 
In this case, no user IP traffic relationship information is required to be 
sent to the meter. RDRs with user information stored in measured host can 
be collected with different accounting protocols.  
5.2 Principle of the out-of-band scheme 
The principle of the out-of-band scheme is that, when IP traffic passes 
through an Agent, it is identified with its user by the Agent, and then the 
user information of the IP traffic is transferred to the meter through a dedi-
cated communication channel between Agent and meter. Instead of utiliz-
ing IP packet itself to convey its user information to the meter, user infor-
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mation is encapsulated in a special User Information message packet to be 
transferred to the meter.  
User identification in the out-of-band scheme can be defined as the 
process of finding the users of IP traffic and recording the user and IP traf-
fic relationship information. The user identification can be either IP packet 
based or IP traffic flow based. 
Considering the differences between IP packet based user identification 
method and IP traffic flow based identification method, they are discussed 
separately below. 
5.2.1 IP packet based user identification 
The principle of the IP packet based user identification method is illus-
trated in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Principle of the IP packet based user identification 
The IP packet based user identification method of out-of-band scheme is 
similar to that of the in-band scheme. However, the IP packet based user 
identification method of the out-of-band scheme is different from the IP 
packet based user identification method in the following aspects: 
l The user information is transferred in a separate channel, rather than 
in IP packets with the in-band scheme. 
l User information arrives at the meter, whereas the IP traffic does not 
need to pass through the meter.  
l The meter does not capture any outbound or inbound IP traffic of the 
measured host for gathering IP traffic accounting information. All 
A model for user based IP traffic accounting     163 
user based IP traffic accounting information is reported to the meter 
by the Agent actively.  
l Traditional accounting protocols such as SNMP, RADIUS and 
DIAMETER, transport layer protocols such as TCP and UDP can all 
be used to transfer the RDRs with user information.  
5.2.1.1 Components in IP packet based user identification  
In Figure 5.1, the following components exist for IP packet based user 
identification: Account ing Agent and meter. 
l Accounting Agent 
The Accounting Agent is integrated into the measured host to fulfil the 
following functions: 
n Identify IP packets with their corresponding users 
n Extract the IP header of every IP packet, encapsulate it with the 
corresponding user information into User Information message9 
packet, and send it to meter. 
n If a security mechanism should be applied to the out-of-band 
scheme, the Agent is responsible for negotiating security parame-
ters and encrypting User Information messages. 
n Perform access control. 
l Meter 
In IP packet based user identification, the meter is simply responsi-
ble for extracting user information and IP traffic information from the 
User Information messages to generate RDRs with user information. 
It does not need to be located in the place where IP traffic passes 
through.  
5.2.1.2 Process of IP packet based user identification  
In IP packet based user identification, the Agent identifies users of IP 
packets and extracts IP headers from IP packets. Then it generates User In-
formation messages by combining IP packets’ user information with IP 
headers. After that, the Agent sends the User Information messages to the 
meter.  
The process of IP packet based user identification is: 
1. When an outbound or inbound IP packet passes through the Agent, the 
Agent finds out the corresponding user information of this IP packet 
from the system. 
                                              
9 About the format of the User Information message please refer to 6.2.3.1 
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2. The Agent extracts the IP header from the IP packet. Then the Agent 
uses the IP header with user information to construct a User Informa-
tion message packet.  
3. The Agent sends the User Information message packet to the meter. 
4. The Agent forwards the outbound IP packet to its destination or the in-
bound IP packet to the receiving application in the measured host, re-
spectively.  
5.2.2 IP traffic flow based user identification 
The IP packet based user identification produces extra IP traffic, since 
every IP packet will result in a RDR to be sent to the meter. IP traffic flow 
based user information transmission requires only the first IP packet’s user 
information of an IP traffic flow to be transferred to the meter. After that, 
the successive IP packets of the same flow can be identified with the corre-
sponding user through finding out the flow’s user information from the 
DUTRT. Therefore the user IP traffic flow relationship information will be 
generated and transferred only once for the first IP packet of every flow. 
Consequently, less extra IP traffic may result. For flow based user identifi-
cation, DUTRT is required to record the user IP traffic relationship inf or-
mation. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the principle of IP traffic flow based user identifi-
cation.  
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5.2.2.1 Components in IP traffic flow based user identifica-
tion 
The following components exist for the purpose of the IP traffic flow 
based user identification:  
l Accounting Agent 
The Accounting Agent is integrated into the measured host to fulfil the 
following functions: 
n Find new IP traffic flows by checking IP packets and their corre-
sponding users. 
n Gather accounting information and user information of every 
new IP traffic flow to generate a user IP traffic flow relationship 
record. The user IP traffic flow relationship record is stored in the 
DUTRT temporarily. 
n Encapsulate the newly generated DUTRT record into a User In-
formation message packet and send it to the meter. 
n Maintain DUTRT synchronization between Agent and meter. 
n Answer the Query User Information messages10 from the meter to 
find out the users of the queried IP packets.  
n If a security mechanism should be applied to the out-of-band 
scheme, the Agent is responsible for negotiating security parame-
ters and encrypting the User Information messages. 
n Perform access control. 
l Meter 
The meter is required to be located in the key position of the net-
work to measure IP traffic flow. Its main functions include: 
n Intercept IP packets related to measured hosts. 
n Identify users of IP packets by searching the DUTRT. When an 
IP packet’s user cannot be found in the DUTRT, a Query User 
Information message will be sent by the meter to the Agent. 
n Generate flow based RDRs with user information by combining 
IP traffic flows’ accounting information and their user informa-
tion. 
n Accept user IP traffic flow relationship records from the Agent. 
n Maintain DUTRT synchronization between Agent and meter. 
The IP traffic flow based user identification method is different from the 
IP packet based user identification method in the following aspects: 
l A DUTRT is required to record user and IP traffic flow relationship. 
Both Agent and meter must maintain a DUTRT. 
                                              
10 About the format of Query User Information message please refer to 6.2.3.2 
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l The meter is required to intercept IP packets related to measured hosts 
for the purpose of generating flow based RDRs with user information.  
5.2.2.3 Process of IP traffic flow based user identification  
Considering the different characteristics of inbound and outbound IP 
traffic flow based user identification, the process of IP traffic flow based 
user identification is explained according to outbound and inbound IP traf-
fic flows, respectively.  
The process of IP traffic flow based user identification with outbound IP 
traffic is: 
1. When an outbound IP packet passes through the Agent, the Agent 
finds out the corresponding user information of this IP packet from the 
system. 
2. The Agent extracts identification attributes from the IP header of the 
IP packet. Then the Agent checks the DUTRT in the measured host 
with both user information and identification attributes to verify if this 
IP packet belongs to an existing IP traffic flow. If there is no corre-
sponding entry in the table, it means that this IP packet is the first IP 
packet of an IP traffic flow. Hence, the Agent generates a user IP traf-
fic relationship record through combining user information and identi-
fication attributes of the flow. Then the new record about this new 
flow and its corresponding user is created into the DUTRT. After that, 
the Agent encapsulates the user IP traffic relationship record in a User 
Information message packet and sends it to the meter. 
If there is already an entry corresponding to the IP packet in the ta-
ble, it means that the IP packet is not the first IP packet of the corre-
sponding flow and the user information of this flow has already been 
sent to the meter. Therefore, the user information of this IP packet 
does not need to be sent to the meter. 
3. The Agent forwards the IP packet to its destination.  
4. When the meter captures an outbound IP packet, it extracts identific a-
tion attributes and statistic attributes from the IP packet. 
The meter also maintains a DUTRT which is updated when User In-
formation message packets are received. The identification attributes 
of the IP packet will be used by the meter to search the DUTRT to 
check if this IP packet belongs to an existing flow. If this IP packet be-
longs to an existing flow, the user information of the flow found in the 
DUTRT will be used to generate a RDR with user information.  
If this IP packet does not belong to an existing flow, the IP packet 
should be moved into a waiting queue. After a short time, the user in-
formation of this packet should arrive.  Otherwise, the meter should 
A model for user based IP traffic accounting     167 
send a Query User Information message to the Agent in the measured 
host querying information about the user of the flow. The IP header of 
the IP packet is inserted into the Query User Information message.  
5. When the Agent receives the Query User Information message, at first 
it finds out the user of the queried IP packet, and then generates a User 
Information message through combining the user information with the 
identification attributes of this flow. The ‘A’ bit of the User Inform a-
tion message should be set to 1 indicating that this is a response to the 
Query User Information message. After that, the Agent sends the User 
Information message to the meter. And at the same time,  the Agent 
updates the DUTRT if the information about this queried IP packet re-
lated flow and its user is not recorded in the DUTRT.  
If no user can be found for the queried IP packet, the User ID field 
of the User Information message must be set to “NULL” indicating 
that no user can be found. 
6. When a meter receives a User Information message, the user IP traffic 
flow relationship information in the message is used to create a record 
in the DUTRT. If the ‘A’ bit of the User Information message is set to 
1, then the identification attributes of the flow in the message are used 
to compare with all IP packets in the waiting queue for the purpose of 
finding out IP packets belonging to the same flow. The matched IP 
packets will be used to generate RDRs with user information. If the 
User ID field of the User Information message is “NULL”, the 
matched IP packet will be discarded. Otherwise, the matched IP pack-
ets will be sent to their destinations. IP packets in the waiting queue 
will be deleted when they stay in the queue over the time limitation. 
The process of IP traffic flow based user identification with inbound IP 
traffic is: 
1. When a meter captures an inbound IP packet destined to a measured 
host, it searches its DUTRT to check if this IP packet belongs to an ex-
isting IP traffic flow. 
If the IP packet does not belong to an existing flow, it means that 
this IP packet is the first IP packet of a new flow. Therefore, the meter 
sends a Query User Information message to the Agent to inquire the 
user of the IP packet. At the same time, the IP packet will be moved to 
a waiting queue.  
If the IP packet belongs to an existing flow, the statistic attributes  of 
the RDR of this flow are calculated with the statistic value of the IP 
packet. Then the IP packet is forwarded to the measured host. 
When the Agent receives the Query User Information message, at 
first it finds out the user of the queried IP packet, and then generates a 
User Information message through combining the user information 
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with the identification attributes of this flow. If no user can be found 
for the queried IP packet, the User ID field of the User Information 
message must be set to “NULL” indicating that no user can be found. 
The ‘A’ bit of the User Information message must be set to 1 indicat-
ing that this is a response to the Query User Information message. Af-
ter that, the Agent sends the User Information message to the meter. 
And at the same time, the Agent updates its DUTRT if the information 
about this queried IP packet related flow and its user is not recorded in 
the DUTRT.  
2. When an inbound IP packet passes through the Agent, the Agent finds 
out the corresponding user information of this IP packet from the sys-
tem. 
The Agent extracts identification attributes from the IP packet. Then 
the Agent checks the DUTRT in the measured host to verify if this IP 
packet belongs to an existing IP traffic flow.  
If there is already a record with the same user information and the 
same identification attributes of the IP packet in the table, it means that 
the IP packet is not the first IP packet of the corresponding flow and 
the user information of this flow has already been sent to the meter.  
If there is a record with the same identification attributes of the IP 
packet but with different user information, this means that this IP 
packet was incorrectly identified with another user by the meter. In 
this case, the Agent generates a new user IP traffic relationship record 
through combining user information and identification attributes of 
this IP packet. Then the new record about this new flow and its corre-
sponding user is added into the DUTRT. After that, the Agent encap-
sulates the user IP traffic relationship record in a User Information 
message packet and sends it to the meter.  
3. The Agent forwards the IP packet to the receiving application in the 
measured host. 
4. When the meter receives a User Information message with the ‘A’ bit 
set to 1, it extracts the user IP traffic flow relationship record from the 
message and inserts the record into the DUTRT. Then the meter uses 
the identification attributes in the message to match the IP packets in 
the waiting queue. If the IP packets of the flow can be found in the 
waiting queue, a RDR with user information for this IP traffic flow is 
generated and the statistic attributes of the matched IP packets will be 
calculated into this flow’s RDR. If the User ID field of the User In-
formation message is “NULL”, the matched IP packets should be dis-
carded. Otherwise, these matched IP packets will be forwarded to the 
measured host. 
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When the meter receives a User Information message with t he iden-
tification attributes of an inbound IP packet, it means that this IP 
packet was incorrectly identified by an old flow’s user. Therefore, the 
user IP traffic relationship record in the message is added into the 
DUTRT for the purpose of identifying the new flow and its user. A 
new RDR with user information for this flow will be generated. Ac-
cordingly, rollback operations should be performed to recover the sta-
tistic calculation on the old flow. In order to avoid incoming IP traffic 
being incorrectly identified, the DUTRT records should be updated as 
soon as possible. Maybe it is better that the Agent can inform the me-
ter to delete the closed flows through monitoring the status of the 
flows. 
5.2.3 Format of messages exchanged between Agent and 
meter 
In IP traffic flow based user identification, two types of messages may 
be exchanged between Agent and meter for the purpose of identifying us-
ers of flows. These two types of messages are: User Information message, 
Query User Information message. For IP packet based user identification 
only the User Information message is required.  
The differences between the format of User Information message in the 
out-of-band scheme and the User Information option in the in-band 
scheme are: 
1. Since in out-of-band scheme the User Information messages can be 
transferred by accounting protocols or transport protocols, the existed 
security mechanisms such as IPSec, SSL, TLS etc. can be applied for 
transmission. Therefore, the encryption mechanism is not required to 
be applied into the User Information message. 
2. An ‘H’ field is used in the format of User Information message to 
identify the attached attributes of IP traffic in the message. The ‘D’ 
field and ‘R’ field in the in-band scheme are not necessary in the out-
of-band scheme.  
5.2.3.1 User Information message 
The User Information message is used to carry user and IP traffic rela-
tionship information. The format of User Information message is illus-
trated in Figure 5.3. 
The meanings of the fields in User Information message are:  
l Type is a one byte field. It is reserved here to be compatible with 
the format of User Information option defined in in-band scheme.  
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l Length is an 8 bits field that indicates the length of this User In-
formation option in bytes. 
 
0      7 8                     15 31 
TYPE LENGTH   A H Message Type  
User ID 
Attributes of IP traffic  
Figure 5.3 Format of User Information message 
l A is a one bit field indicating whether this IP packet tagged with 
user information is a response to the Query User Information 
message. A=0 means that this is not a response to the Query User 
Information message. A=1 means that this is a response to the 
Query User Information message. 
l H is a one bit field indicating whether the “Attributes of IP traf-
fic” field contains an IP header or attributes of an IP packet or a 
flow in TLV format. H=0 means that the corresponding field 
contains attributes of IP packet or flow with TLV format. H=1 
means that the corresponding field contains IP header. 
l Message Type is a 12 bits field indicating the type of message 
contained in the User Information option. For the User Informa-
tion message, the Message Type is 1. 
l User ID field is a 32 bits field which contains User ID informa-
tion of the IP traffic.  
l Attributes of IP traffic is a variable length field. If H=1, then it 
contains an IP header. If H=0, then it contains attributes of an IP 
packet or a flow. The attributes  include identification attributes 
such as source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port, 
etc. Statistic attributes such as sent bytes, received bytes, etc. 
may also be included in this field. Every attribute may have the 
Figure 5.4 depicted TLV format. 
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16 
Type Length Value …  
Figure 5.4 TLV format of attributes  
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The Type filed indicates the type of the attribute, Length field 
indicates the length of the Value field, and the Value field stores 
the value of the attribute.  
5.2.3.2 Query User Information message 
The Query User Information message is used by the meter to ask the 
Agent to identify the user of an IP packet. The IP header of this IP packet 
is carried by this message. The format of a Query User Information mes-
sage is illustrated in Figure 5.5.  
0       7 
 
8                15 31 
TYPE LENGTH Message Type 
IP header of an IP packet 
Figure 5.5 Format of Query User Information message 
The Type and Length field in this format are the same as described in 
the User Information message, the meanings of the other fields are: 
l Message Type is a 12 bits field indicating the type of message 
contained in the User Information option. For the Query User In-
formation message, the Message Type is 2. 
l IP header of an IP packet is a variable length field. It contains 
an IP header of an IPv4 or IPv6 packet which is required to be 
identified with the corresponding user. 
5.2.4 Dynamic user IP traffic relationship table (DUTRT) 
In the out-of-band scheme, the Dynamic User Traffic Relationship Ta-
ble (DUTRT) is also used for the purpose of recording the user and IP traf-
fic flow relationship information as in the in-band scheme. It is generated 
only in the IP traffic flow based user identification process. 
The DUTRT is generated and maintained by the Accounting Agent. The 
meter maintains also a DUTRT which is updated by the Agent contin u-
ously. It is used by meter to identify the user of every IP traffic flow for 
the purpose of generating flow based RDRs with user information.  
The format of the DUTRT records is the same as that described in the 
in-band scheme. A DUTRT record contains two types of attributes: Traf-
fic-Originator (TO) attribute and identification attribute.  
Since in the out-of-band scheme the user IP traffic flow relationship re-
cord is transferred separately from the IP packet, the DUTRTs’ synchroni-
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zation mechanism in the out-of-band scheme is not the same as that in the 
in-band scheme.  
The DUTRT in the meter can be updated by the Agent either actively or 
passively. The active updating is that the meter sends a Query User Infor-
mation message to the Agent to inquire for unknown IP packets, and the 
Agent sends a User Information message to the meter as a response. This 
happens usually when the first IP packet of an inbound IP traffic flow 
comes into the meter, or when the User Information message of a new 
flow is lost during its way to the meter, or when a User Information mes-
sage carrying a user IP traffic flow relationship record of a flow comes 
later as the IP packets of the flow into the meter. The passive updating is 
that the Agent sends a User Information message about a new flow ac-
tively. This happens usually when the Agent identifies a new flow. Before 
an IP packet can be identified with its corresponding user, meter should 
not forward the IP packet. The IP packet should be kept in a waiting queue 
until it can be identified by its user, or time out is reached. Other synchro-
nization problems in the out-of-band scheme can be solved by similar 
mechanisms as the ones described in the in-band scheme. 
5.2.5 Comparisons between IP packet based user identifica-
tion and IP traffic flow based user identification  
The advantage of IP packet based user identification mechanism is its 
simplicity. It does not store any user IP traffic relationship information in 
the measured host, and it does not require maintaining a DUTRT. The dis-
advantage of this mechanism is that it produces very much traffic, since 
every IP packet will cause a User Information message to be sent to the 
meter. 
The advantage of IP traffic flow based user identification is that it pro-
duces less network traffic in transporting user in formation and it is effi-
cient. However, it has to maintain a DUTRT. The synchronization of 
DUTRT between Agent and meter is complicated. Another disadvantage is 
that in some cases flow identification is difficult to be achieved. An exam-
ple is the encrypted flows. Identification attributes of encrypted flows may 
be difficult or even impossible to be gathered from IP packets. 
5.3 The Accounting Agent as standalone meter 
The Accounting Agent described above plays only the role of gathering 
and transferring user and IP traffic relationship information. In IP traffic 
flow based user identification, the Agent records user information and IP 
traffic’s identification attributes in the DUTRT. RDRs are generated by the 
meter, whereas user mapping is performed by the correlation module.  
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When an Agent identifies users of IP traffic, it can also record the statis-
tic information such as sent bytes, received bytes, etc. in the DUTRT. In 
this case, the Agent can be regarded as a standalone meter. And DUTRT 
records are RDRs with user information.  
When an Agent works as a standalone meter, TO information and statis-
tic attributes must be recorded in RDRs. Whether or not other identific a-
tion attributes should be recorded in RDRs depends on the accounting po l-
icy. If detailed accounting information should be recorded to provide flow 
based or even IP packet based network usage information to the user, then 
other identification attributes should be recorded in RDRs. However, this 
excessive detailed accounting information offering may result in extra 
overhead to the measured host in which the Agent resides. Therefore, the 
metrics of RDRs generated by the Agent should be a trade-off between 
performance and the granularity of detail. For example, the simplest met-
rics of a RDR for user based IP traffic accounting may look like this: 
<User ID, Measured Host IP, Sent bytes, Received bytes>.  
As a standalone meter, the Agent intercepts inbound and outbound IP 
packets, identifies the users of IP packets, extracts statistic attributes from 
IP packets, calculates the users’ corresponding statistic attribute value, 
generates RDRs and stores them temporarily in the measured host. This 
process of generating RDRs with user information by the Agent is illus-
trated in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6 RDRs generation process when the Agent functions 
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The RDRs with TO information and statistic information are gathered 
by the collector in the Mediation Layer with accounting protocols such as 
RADIUS, DIAMETER, SNMP, etc. or transport protocols. RDRs gener-
ated by the Agent may be collected in batch. This can improve the trans-
mission efficiency and reduce the effect on performance caused by the 
Agent. The RDRs may also be compressed before being collected, which 
can save bandwidth in transporting RDRs. In the correlation module, these 
RDRs are mapped to corresponding users directly with TO & User Map-
ping Table. In this case, an external meter outside the measured host is not 
required to generate RDRs related to IP traffic from this measured host. 
Compared with the IP traffic flow based user identification mechanism, 
the advantage of the standalone meter mechanism is its simplicity. No 
DUTRT synchronization is required. Compared with the IP packet based 
user identification mechanism which generates RDR for each IP packet, 
the standalone meter mechanism can transfer compressed RDRs in batch. 
The processing efficiency and bandwidth utilization rate can be improved. 
The disadvantage of the standalone meter mechanism is the performance 
decline on the measured host when performing user based IP traffic ac-
counting operations by the Agent. Extra storage space is required for stor-
ing RDRs. According to the experiences of implementing user based IP 
traffic accounting prototype system with standalone meter mechanism, if 
the Agent is carefully designed and the CPU power of the measured host is 
strong enough, low performance decline will result in the measured host 
[ZhRM05]. 
5.4 Security considerations in the out-of-band scheme  
An IP traffic accounting system, especially when it is used for the pur-
pose of charging network resource consumption, will be potentially under 
attacks. Considering the characteristics of storing and transferring user in-
formation with the out-of-band scheme, potential attacks may happen in 
two positions: one is in the measured host and the meter in which DUTRTs 
are stored; the other is during the transmission of user information mes-
sages between the measured host and the meter.  
For IP traffic flow based user identif ication, in the measured host poten-
tial attacks may include tampering the user IP traffic relationship records 
or even deleting them. Therefore, authentication and authorization mecha-
nisms should be applied on accessing and modifying the DUTRT. Another 
issue that should be taken into consideration is privacy. If detailed user IP 
traffic relationship information is stored in the DUTRT, users’ network ac-
cess activities can be concluded from these DUTRT records. This informa-
tion may reveal users’ private information. Therefore, the DUTRT should 
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be protected from unauthorized access. And the information in the DUTRT 
should be used only for the purpose of validating users’ network access ac-
tivities.  
The transmission of User Information message between the measured 
host and the meter over the insecure network can also be attacked easily. 
The main potential attacks may include information modification, deletion, 
and masquerade. Attackers may intercept in-transit User Information mes-
sages and Query User Information messages, alter the content and forward 
them to the destinations. Attackers may even send fake User Information 
messages to the meter on behalf of the Agent. The privacy related attack 
might be passive eavesdropping.  
Therefore, for IP packet based user identification and IP traffic flow 
based user identification mechanisms, the messages exchanged between 
Agent and meter should be transferred through a secure communication 
channel. The following security mechanisms can be applied to prevent the 
attacks described above: 
l Authentication between Agent and meter to prevent from unauthor-
ized entities and masquerade.  
l Utilize IPSec, SSL, or TLS mechanisms to secure the DUTRT records 
transmission, and apply confidentiality and integrity validation 
mechanisms. Since in the out-of-band scheme the user information is 
transferred in special packets, now existing security mechanisms can 
be directly applied on these user information packets to provide con-
fidentiality, integrity and consequently to protect user information 
transmission from attacks such as masquerade, user information 
modification, passive eavesdropping, etc. 
For an Agent functioning as standalone meter, the RDRs stored in the 
measured host should be protected from unauthorized access. The security 
mechanisms defined in the accounting protocols should also be applied to 
facilitate the RDRs to be sent to meter securely.  
5.5 Dependability considerations 
Trustability of the user information is an issue concerning the depend-
ability of the out-of-band scheme. The user information of IP traffic gath-
ered by the Agent should be trustable. Fake user information must be de-
tected by the Agent. The user information sent to the meter should also be 
trustable. The security mechanisms applied in the out-of-band scheme can 
help to provide the trustability of the user information.  
For IP packet based user identification, reliability should also be taken 
into consideration to guarantee that the User Information message of every 
IP packet arrives in the meter. For this sake, the reliable transport protocol 
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TCP is suitable for transferring User Information messages. Otherwise, 
application level reliability mechanisms must be applied to guarantee the 
security of User Information messages by the meter. For example, every 
User Information message contains a sequence number. Through that, the 
meter can detect how many and which User Information messages were 
lost. Agents should then resend these messages according to the meter’s 
requests. 
For an Agent as standalone meter, RDRs are stored in the measured host 
at first, and then they will be sent to meter or collector. Considering that 
the space for storing RDRs may be limited in the measured host, RDRs 
should be deleted regularly. Before RDRs are deleted, they must have been 
collected by a meter or a collector. If these RDRs cannot be collected in 
time, other dependability mechanisms should be applied. For example, 
these RDRs should be archived for future collection, or the granularity of 
accounting information should be adjusted to coarser level to reduce the 
size of RDRs, or the RDRs should not be deleted but the network access of 
the measured host should be stopped when no space is available for storing 
RDRs. Which dependability mechanism should be taken depends on the 
applied dependability policies. Without the dependability mechanisms, 
network resource usage of the measured host may be out of control. 
The fault tolerance of the Agent or the meter is also an important factor 
in the out-of-band scheme. A similar mechanism as the one in the in-band 
scheme can be applied. Network access must be stopped when either the 
Agent or the meter collapses. Keep alive messages should be sent between 
Agent and meter to monitor each other’s status. However, the keep-alive 
message may be different. For an Agent as standalone meter, when the 
Agent or the collector crashes, RDRs, which are not collected by the col-
lector, should be protected from being deleted so that the RDRs collection 
can be recovered from the right position after the Agent or the meter is re-
started again.   
5.6 Implementation issues 
According to the principle of the out-of-band scheme, the key for im-
plementing user based IP traffic accounting is the realization of the Agent, 
which can gather user information of IP traffic. In order to collect the cor-
responding TO information of IP traffic, the Agent must be located in the 
measured host. Outside the measured host no mechanism can obtain the 
TO information of the IP traffic alone. 
Because the Agent must have the ability of obtaining the TO informa-
tion of the IP traffic from the measured host, usually the realization is OS 
dependent, in other words it is OS kernel dependent. For example, usually 
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the TCP/IP drivers are implemented in kernel mode. Here we consider two 
realization methods: 
1.  Kernel modification method 
The principle of this method is: modifying the TCP/IP driver directly 
and inserting the Agent function of the user oriented IP accounting into the 
driver. By this means, the built-in user based IP traffic accounting Agent 
can generate the DUTRT. Because the Agent is located in the TCP/IP 
driver, it can check all IP traffic and obtain the corresponding TO informa-
tion. This method is depicted in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4 Principle of kernel modification method 
This method is based on this precondition: the OS source code can be 
obtained and modified. It is suitable for OS producers to make this modif i-
cation, or for open source code OS (e.g. Linux).  
2.  Kernel patch method 
The principle of this method is, intercepting the network requests to the 
TCP/IP driver and redirecting them to the Accounting Agent. This method 
does not need to modify the system kernel. The Agent can be realized as a 
kernel patch. Figure 5.5 illustrates the principle of this method. 
With the redirection technique, the network function requests to the 
original network function are redirected to the newly defined network sys-
tem call, in which the Accounting Agent function is integrated to extract IP 
traffic information and record the traffic and corresponding TO informa-
tion into the DUTRT. This method is suitable for the non-OS producers, 
who cannot get the OS source code. 
Comparing the two above described user based IP traffic accounting re-
alization methods with each other, the kernel modification method might 
be a better solution. Because in this method the Agent works in the TCP/IP 
driver, all the IP traffic related operations can be traced and recorded. 
However, for the kernel patch method, since it works above the TCP/IP 
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cannot be recorded. For example, the three-way handshake of the TCP 
connection is completed in the TCP/IP driver, the kernel patch method 
cannot capture the packages related to this process. The kernel patch 
method can meter most of the IP traffic . In addition,  it is a simple method 
that does not require modifying the kernel code. 
 
Figure 5.5 Network system call redirection 
The collection and transmission of the TO information of IP traffic by 
Agent will cause overhead to the measured host and the network. There are 
some ways to reduce the performance decline: 
1. Utilizing IP traffic flow based user identification instead of IP 
packet based user identification. This can reduce the netw ork vol-
ume in transporting User Information message. 
2. For an Agent as standalone meter, RDRs should be compressed be-
fore transmission, and it is better to collect RDRs in batch.  
3. User based IP traffic accounting may be configured as an optional 
function for the measured hosts. If this function is not needed, or an 
IP address can be regarded as user, the User based IP traffic ac-
counting Agent needs not be started. 
5.7 Summary 
The out-of-band scheme is different from the in-band scheme mainly in 
the processes of storage and transmission of user IP traffic relationship in-
formation. The out-of-band scheme transfers user information through a 
special channel which is separated from the normal IP packets transmis-
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sion. This mechanism does not require the IP packet to be exploited for the 
purpose of conveying its user information. Therefore,  the IP protocol is not 
necessary to be extended.  
In the out-of-band scheme, three different mechanisms are introduced. 
With the IP packet based user identification mechanism, a User Inform a-
tion message carrying IP header and user information is sent for every IP 
packet. The IP traffic flow based user identification mechanism requires 
the Agent to send the user IP traffic flow relationship information to the 
meter when the first IP packet of a flow is detected by the Agent or the 
meter. With the DUTRT records, the meter can identify the user of succes-
sive IP packets of the same flow. The Agent can also function as a stand-
alone meter. It gathers user information and accounting information of IP 
traffic to generate RDRs with user information in the measured host.  
The three different mechanisms of out-of-band scheme have different 
advantages and disadvantages. Which mechanism should be selected for 
user based IP traffic accounting is based on issues such as performance, 
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Chapter 6 Multi-IP scheme 
According to the analysis in chapter 3, the reason why the traditional IP 
address based accounting mechanism cannot be applied to multi-user sys-
tems is that the number of users in a multi-user system is more than the 
number of available IP addresses of the multi-user system. Hence, these IP 
addresses are shared by different users. No user owns a unique IP address 
in a multi-user system. The idea of the Multi-IP scheme is to allocate every 
user a unique IP address in a multi-user system. Through that, the tradi-
tional IP address based accounting mechanism can still be applied in multi-
user systems. 
In this chapter, the Multi-IP scheme for user based IP traffic accounting 
is introduced. At first the principle of Multi-IP scheme is explained. Then 
the IP address allocation mechanism in Multi-IP scheme is illustrated. Af-
ter that, some issues concerning Multi-IP scheme are discussed. At the 
end, a comparison among three different user based IP traffic accounting 
schemes are made. 
6.1 Overview of the Multi-IP scheme  
User based IP traffic accounting is developed to improve the measure-
ment granularity and accuracy of the traditional IP traffic accounting 
mechanism. User based IP traffic accounting can be regarded as a com-
plementary mechanism to the traditional IP traffic accounting. The tradi-
tional IP traffic accounting mechanism can still work in providing user 
based IP traffic accounting for single user systems. IP traffic generated by 
different users in a single user system can be identified with corresponding 
users with the help of users’ login information. Therefore, in single user 
systems, the traditional IP address based accounting mechanism is enough 
to achieve user based IP traffic accounting. In multi-user environment, 
however, the user based IP traffic accounting ability of the traditional IP 
address based accounting must be enhanced. In a network environment 
with single user systems and multi-user systems, the traditional IP address 
based accounting mechanism and the user based IP traffic accounting 
mechanism can work together to realize user based IP traffic accounting in 
single user systems and multi-user systems, respectively. The improve-
ment of user based IP traffic accounting focuses mainly on the Meter 
Layer, in which the users of corresponding IP traffic are identified. In the 
Mediation Layer, only the correlation module needs to be modified to 
process user information.  
The reason why traditional IP address based mechanism cannot be ap-
plied to multi-user systems lies in the fact that one or several IP addresses 
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of a multi-user system are shared by different users at the same time. User 
information of the IP traffic cannot be extracted from IP headers of IP traf-
fic directly. For a single user system with many accounts for different us-
ers, the users cannot share the computer, or more precisely the IP address 
of the computer, at the same time. The relationship between a user and the 
IP address of this computer is 1:1 or 1:n during a period of time. This 
means that the IP address of the single user system belongs to only one 
user during this period of time. Therefore, the users of this computer can 
be distinguished by dif ferent login time, which can be obtained from the 
system log information of the computer.  
In a multi-user system, the relationship between users and IP addresses 
can be described as n:m, where n>1, m>=1.  
If m<n, it means that the number of IP addresses allocated to the multi-
user host is less than the number of users using this multi-user system. 
This is the usual case of multi-user systems. The aforementioned in-band 
or out-of-band scheme can provide user based IP traffic accounting solu-
tion in this environment. These two schemes achieve user based IP traffic 
accounting though providing additional user information to identify corre-
sponding IP traffic. 
If m>=n, it means that the number of IP addresses allocated to a multi-
user system is larger than the number of users using this multi-user system. 
In this case, if every user can be allocated a unique IP address in this 
multi-user system, then an IP address is equal to a user. And an IP address 
can be used to represent a user uniquely. Under this condition, a multi-user 
system can be viewed as a group of single user systems. Therefore, in this 
situation, the traditional IP address based mechanism can be applied for 
the purpose of user based IP traffic accounting. This is where the idea of 
Multi-IP scheme comes from. The Multi-IP scheme allocates each user a 
unique IP address in a multi-user system. Figure 6.1 depicts the view of 
Multi-IP scheme on a multi-user system. 
With the Multi-IP scheme, the meter can identify the user of every IP 
packet through mapping an IP address to the corresponding user directly. 
In order to achieve user based IP traffic accounting with the Multi-IP 
scheme, the following issues should be taken into consideration: 
l How to allocate IP addresses to different users? 
l How can the meter correlate IP addresses to corresponding users? 
l How to protect this scheme from attacks? 
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Figure 6.1 A multi-user system with the Multi-IP scheme can be re-
garded as a group of single user systems 
6.2 User based IP traffic accounting architecture with multi-
IP scheme  
The Multi-IP scheme requires enough IP addresses to be allocated to 
every user in multi-user systems. Since IP addresses resource supplies are 
different in the IPv4 and IPv6 world, the Multi-IP scheme is discussed be-
low under two different situations respectively:  
l IP addresses are enough to equip every user with a unique IP address 
in a multi-user system as in IPv6 world 
l IP addresses are scarce resource as in IPv4 world 
6.2.1 Multi-IP scheme with public IP address pool 
Let’s at first consider an ideal situation in which IP addresses are 
enough so that every user in a multi-user system can obtain a unique IP 
address. Here IP addresses are public IP addresses, not private IP addresses 
[RFC1918]. For IPv4 it might be practically impossible to allocate every 
user in the multi-user system a unique public IP address, especially in the 
IP address scarce areas, e.g. Asia. However, this would be a reality in the 
IPv6 world from the current point of view11. Under this condition, every  
user can be allocated a public IP address which can be used to identify this 
user uniquely. If every user can be distinguished by the IP address, the tra-
ditional IP address based traffic accounting mechanism can meet the re-
quirements of user based IP traffic accounting in multi-user systems with-
out any modification. Figure 6.2 shows how a multi-user system is directly 
                                              
11 An interesting calculation [Davi03] indicates that 128 bits IPv6 address space 













Multi-user system with IP address pool 
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integrated into a traditional IP address based accounting architecture to 
achieve user based IP traffic accounting with the help of allocating a 
unique public IP address to every user. 
 
Figure 6.2 Realizing user based IP traffic accounting with the IP address 
based accounting mechanism through allocating every user with a unique 
public IP address 
From Figure 6.2 we can see that, USER1, USER2, …, USERn are allo-
cated different public IP addresses IP1, IP2, …, IPn, respectively, from the 
multi-user system’s IP address pool for the purpose of accessing the Inter-
net. IP packets related with these users contain their own IP addresses 
which belong to different users without ambiguity. The metering process 
for multi-user system related IP traffic is the same as that for single user 
system related IP traffic. Therefore, when IP packets related to the multi-
user system pass through the meter, it extracts IP traffic accounting infor-
mation from the IP headers to generate RDRs. The correlation module can 
then use IP addresses, for example, IP1, IP2, … , IPn, etc. in the RDRs to 
find the corresponding users: USER1, USER2, …, USERn. IP packets re-
lated to different users have different identification attributes, i.e. IP ad-
dresses of different users. The IP addresses are the key of identifying users 
of IP traffic by the traditional IP traffic accounting meter. Under this con-
dition, all hosts, no matter multi-user hosts or single user hosts, are treated 
as single user systems by the meter. User based IP traffic accounting can 
be achieved through mapping IP addresses to users without any ambiguity.  
6.2.2 Multi-IP scheme with private IP address pool 
Since IP addresses are scarce nowadays in the IPv4 world, it is almost 
unpractical to allocate all users in a multi-user system with different public 
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IP addresses. However, private IP addresses can be utilized for this pur-
pose.  
According to [RFC1918], private IP addresses are reserved IP addresses 
which can be used by any organizations inside their LANs. The private IP 
address space is designed to be used for intranet usage, for example in the 
LAN of an organization. These IP addresses have no global meaning. IP 
traffic with private IP addresses is constrained to the intranet and cannot be 
forwarded to the Internet by routers. Routing information about private 
networks will not be propagated on links outside the intranet. This means 
private IP addresses are valid only when they are used inside the organiza-
tions. There are three reserved IPv4 address ranges for private IP ad-
dresses: 
10.0.0.0       - 10.255.255.255   (10/8 prefix)                         (>16 million 
hosts) 
172.16.0.0   - 172.31.255.255   (172.16/12 prefix)                (>1 million 
hosts) 
192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255 (192.168/16 prefix)              (> 65 thou-
sand hosts) 
The private IP address mechanism provides a possibility to reuse IP ad-
dress space, although it is usually regarded as a good but short-term solu-
tion to IP address shortage. Due to the localization constraint of the private 
IP addresses, hosts with private IP addresses cannot connect to the Internet 
directly. In order to facilitate the hosts in the intranet with private IP ad-
dresses to access the Internet without allocating them public IP addresses, 
a Network Address Translation (NAT) [RFC3022] mechanism is intro-
duced to solve the problem. NAT server translates a private IP address to a 
public IP address for outbound IP packets and vice versa for inbound IP 
packets. With the NAT mechanism, hosts within an intranet can communi-
cate with other hosts outside the private network transparently. Figure 6.3 
illustrates the principle of the NAT mechanism. 
In the company’s LAN depicted in Figure 6.3, every host owns a unique 
private IP address in the form of 10.0.2.x. Within the LAN, hosts can 
communicate with each other using private IP addresses. A NAT server is 
located at the edge of the LAN with a private IP address 10.0.2.1 connect-
ing LAN and a public IP address 131.246.123.45 connecting the Internet. 
When a host sends an IP packet to the Internet with the source IP address 
10.0.2.123 and the transport layer port number 2345, this IP packet is for-
warded to the NAT server. The NAT server translates the private source IP 
address into the public IP address of the NAT server, i.e. 131.246.123.45. 
And then it finds a free transport layer port 7890 to replace the original 
port number 2345. After that, this IP packet with the modified source IP 
address and port is forwarded to the Internet. At the same time, the private 
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IP address, the public IP address and port mapping information is recorded 
in the NAT server. When the NAT server receives an inbound IP packet 
using 131.246.123.45:7890 as destination endpoint reference, it changes 
the IP address and port in the IP packet into 10.0.2.123:2345 according to 
the mapping record. Then this IP packet is forwarded to the host in the 
intranet. 
 
Figure 6.3 NAT mechanism 
In order to achieve user based IP traffic accounting in multi-user sys-
tems, a private IP address pool, which is a group of private IP addresses, 
can be allocated to the multi-user system. In this situation, a NAT server is 
necessary to provide IP address translation support to the multi-user sys-
tem for accessing the Internet. With the introduction of the NAT server, 
which is located between the multi-user system and the Internet, the meter 
must be placed between the multi-user system and the NAT server. Accu-
rately, the meter must work before IP address translation for outbound IP 
packets and after IP address translation for inbound IP packets. All IP traf-
fic between the multi-user system and the NAT server contains the private 
IP addresses to identify the senders or receivers in the multi-user system, 
whereas IP traffic between the NAT server and the Internet contains only 
the public IP address of the NAT server. Therefore, if the meter is not lo-
cated between the multi-user system and the NAT server, different users’ 
private IP addresses cannot be extracted from IP headers. And this means 
that the related users of IP traffic cannot be identified. Figure 6.4 illustrates 
the user based IP traffic accounting system architecture with multi-IP 
scheme using NAT mechanism. 
In this architecture, the multi-user system owns a private IP address 
pool. The multi-user system may be located in an intranet or the multi-user 
system with private IP address pool can be regarded as a LAN containing 
only single user systems. Every user of this multi-user system uses its own 
private IP address to access network. The meter locates between the multi-
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server. Outbound IP packets are monitored by the meter to extract account-
ing information before they are processed by the NAT server, whereas in-
bound IP packets are processed by the NAT server at first to translate pub-
lic IP address and port into corresponding private IP address and port 
before they are processed by the meter. This way, users in the multi-user 
system can access the Internet and different users’ network resource usage 
can be measured according to the private IP addresses without ambiguity. 
 
Figure 6.4 Multi-IP scheme using NAT mechanism 
From the implementation point of view, the meter can either be imple-
mented as a standalone system or be integrated into the NAT server. The 
advantage of the standalone method is that the meter functions will not af-
fect the performance of the NAT server, but the disadvantage is that extra 
hardware is needed. The advantage of integrating meter functions into 
NAT server is that no extra hardware is needed, but the disadvantage is 
that it will cause performance decline in the NAT server. 
If user based IP traffic accounting with Multi-IP scheme should be ap-
plied for an organization, every multi-user system must be allocated an IP 
address pool, and each multi-user system must have a NAT server respon-
sible for its Internet access. In order to reduce hardware investment for 
NAT servers, all multi-user systems or several multi-user systems in an 
organization can be grouped into an intranet with a private IP address pool. 
Therefore, only one NAT server may be required to serve all multi-user 
systems.  
After the meter collects IP traffic accounting information with the 
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mechanism can be directly applied to the generated RDRs without any 
change to achieve the goal of user based IP traffic accounting. 
An example below explains how user based IP traffic accounting is 
achieved with the Multi-IP scheme. 
 
Figure 6.5 User identification process with Multi-IP scheme in multi-
user system 
From figure 6.5 we can find that, despite the fact that USER1, USER2, 
… , USERn share the same multi-user system, they do not share any IP ad-
dress. Every user in the multi-user system uses its own IP address to access 
the network. These IP addresses can be either public or private IP address 
according to the IP address resource supply. In this situation, one IP ad-
dress is equal to one user in the multi-user system, which is the same as in 
single user systems. Therefore, by simply checking the IP address attribute 
in a RDR, the user of IP traffic  can be identified. And with the IP address 
& User Mapping Table which is updated by the Accounting Agent, the IP 
address attribute in RDRs can be correlated to the corresponding users in 
the multi-user system without ambiguity. 
6.2.3 IP address & User Map table 
The IP address & User Map table records the relationship between users 
and their IP addresses. When an IP address is allocated to a user, an entry 
is generated in the table to record the new created relationship. When an IP 
address is revoked from a user, the corresponding entry in the IP address & 
User Map table is deleted. This table is updated by the Accounting Agent. 
The meter and the correlation module should also keep the same table. 
Therefore, the IP address & User Map table in the Accounting Agent, the 
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meter and the correlation module must be kept synchronized. Every time 
when the table is updated, the Accounting Agent notifies the meter and the 
correlation module to update corresponding entries.  
6.2.4 Accounting Agent in Multi-IP scheme  
In the Multi-IP scheme, the Accounting Agent plays the role of allocat-
ing and validating IP addresses. The main functions of the Accounting 
Agent the in Multi-IP scheme include: 
l Manage IP address allocation. Information about users’ IP addresses 
allocation needs to be recorded.  
l Report IP address and user relationship information to the meter and 
the correlation module.  
l The Accounting Agent should provide a security mechanism to guar-
antee that the IP addresses in IP packets match their corresponding 
users. The Accounting Agent should verify the relationship between 
IP addresses and users. IP packets with IP addresses that cannot match 
the corresponding users must be discarded.  
The Accounting Agent can be implemented as a part of OS kernel. It 
can allocate different users’ IP packets with dif ferent IP addresses. An-
other implementation method is that the Agent is realized as a patch. The 
original network system allocates the single IP address of the host to all IP 
packets. The Agent intercepts the IP packets and changes the IP addresses 
of the IP packets to the corresponding users’ IP addresses.  
6.3 Static versus dynamic IP address allocation 
With the help of private IP addresses or IPv6 addresses, it might be 
enough to allocate each user in a multi-user system a unique IP address. IP 
addresses  can be allocated to users in a multi-user system through two dif-
ferent ways: one is static IP address binding, which allocates a permanent 
IP address to a user when her account is first created; another method is 
dynamic IP address binding which allocates  an IP address to a user only 
when she logs in. After the user logs out, her allocated IP address will be 
recycled and it will be allocated to other users again.  
The advantage of the static IP address allocation method is its simplicity 
in IP address management. A user obtains her IP address when she regis-
ters to a multi-user system and her account is created. Consequently, the IP 
address & User Map Table in the accounting system needs to be updated 
for newcomers. The allocated IP address will be taken back only when its 
corresponding user’s account is deleted from the multi-user system. At this 
point, the IP address & User Map Table in the accounting system needs to 
be updated again. Except a user’s account being created or deleted, user’s 
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login or logout will not cause any change to the IP address & User Map 
Table.  
The disadvantage of the static IP address allocation method is that the IP 
addresses are not used efficiently. An IP address cannot be allocated to 
other users even if its owner does not log into the multi-user system for a 
long time. This will certainly cause waste of IP address resource. Consid-
ering that private IP address space can provide more than 16 million IP ad-
dresses for users, this kind of “waste” is not a big problem. For public IP 
addresses, however, money may have to be paid for ownership of public IP 
addresses. Therefore, this method may cause a “waste” of money for the 
rarely used IP addresses.  
Dynamic IP address allocation, on the contrary to static IP address allo-
cation, can utilize IP address resource reasonably. Users acquire IP ad-
dresses only when they log into the multi-user system and release the allo-
cated IP addresses when they log out the system. With dynamic IP address 
allocation, IP addresses are not allocated to users permanently. Hence, IP 
addresses can be reused. Therefore, the actually required IP address space 
for the multi-IP scheme can be reduced. This may still make sense in the 
IPv6 environment.  
The advantage of the dynamic IP address allocation method is that IP 
addresses can be used efficiently. But the disadvantage of this method is 
the cost for managing the IP address allocation and recycling. Another side 
effect of this method is its effect on the IP address & User Map Table. 
Every time a user logs into the multi-user system, a new entry must be 
added to the table. And when the user logs out, this entry should be deleted 
from the table. All these information should also be reported to the meter 
or the Mediation Layer regularly, or even in real time. This will certainly 
increase the complexity of the correlation process and the performance of 
multi-user system will also be affected. 
If IP address resources are not a problem or IP address space is enough 
for all possible users in multi-user systems, the static IP address allocation 
method can be chosen because of its simplicity. Otherwise, the dynamic IP 
address allocation method should be chosen. 
The IP address & User Mapping Table in the correlation module should 
be updated by the Accounting Agent according to the change of the rela-
tionship between users and IP addresses. As the aforementioned static and 
dynamic IP address allocation strategies, the relationship between user and 
IP address is changed when a user’s account is created or when a user logs 
in. This change should be reported to the correlation module in time. The 
report can be made in different ways: regularly, in real time, or according 
to the request from the correlation module. If IP traffic accounting should 
be made in real time, the change in the relationship between user and IP 
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address must be reported to the correlation module at once. Otherwise, the 
Accounting Agent can send the new status of the relationship between user 
and IP address to the correlation module at a fixed interval or when the 
correlation module requests for it. 
6.4 Considerations on user based IP traffic accounting with 
the Multi-IP scheme  
In order to realize user based IP traffic accounting with the Multi-IP 
scheme, the following operations should be performed: 
1. Allocating multi-user systems with IP address pools. These IP address 
pools can be either public IP addresses or private IP addresses. 
2. Multi-user systems should be modified to integrate the Accounting 
Agent for IP address allocation management and for User IP address 
relationship table update. 
3. The IP address allocation policy can be either static or dynamic. If the 
static IP address allocation policy is applied, when a new user account 
is created, she is allocated with a unique IP address which will not be 
changed until her account is deleted. The IP address & User Mapping 
Table needs to be changed only when a user’s account is created or de-
leted. If a dynamic policy is applied, when a user logs into the multi-
user system, she is allocated with a unique IP address which will not 
be changed until she logs out. The IP address & User Map table needs 
to be changed when a user logs in or logs out. 
4. For private IP address pools, a NAT server must be installed and me-
ters must be placed between the multi-user systems and the NAT 
server. 
The Multi-IP scheme is an elegant solution for realizing user based IP 
traffic accounting with traditional IP accounting mechanisms. Every user 
in a multi-user system acquires a unique IP address which can be used as 
User Identifier to identify the user without ambiguity. Therewith, a multi-
user system can be viewed as a cluster of single user systems. Therefore, 
the traditional IP address based IP accounting mechanism can be applied 
for user based IP traffic accounting.  
Despite of the simplicity of the Multi-IP scheme, several issues should 
be taken into consideration when this scheme is chosen for user based IP 
traffic accounting: 
l This scheme requires the multi-user systems to be modified to support 
IP address allocation and IP address pool management. Usually the 
system kernel needs to be modified to accommodate these functions. 
This may require help from OS producers for non-open source OSs. 
However, how to modify legacy systems to integrate Multi-IP scheme 
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is still a challenge. The Accounting Agent can also be implemented as 
patch. In this case, the OS needs not be modified. 
l Reserving an IP address pool for a multi-user system may be difficult 
even in the IPv6 world, since public IP address allocation is usually 
managed by some management organizations, e.g. ICANN [ICANN]. 
Owning more public IP addresses may also mean that more money 
has to be paid. 
l Since IPv6 is still not widely applied for normal Internet usage, most 
multi-user systems are connected to the IPv4 network. Therefore, the 
above described private IP address pool might be used for the Multi-
IP scheme, and consequently the NAT servers must be installed. Al-
though the NAT mechanism provides a solution for reusing private IP 
address space, it has some limitations. All traffic between the multi-
user systems and the Internet must be processed by NAT servers. 
Hence, NAT servers may become application and performance bo t-
tlenecks. NAT servers work best for reusing the private address space 
for client computers. But most server computers still need unambigu-
ous public addresses, since some applications cannot work properly 
behind the NAT servers. A server behind a NAT may require the 
NAT to be configured manually with a static translation table entry to 
translate the inbound connection request packets to the server's private 
address and port. In peer-to-peer communications, peers separated by 
NATs might not operate correctly and must be modified for NAT 
awareness. NAT can also not be applied for translating encrypted 
packets. For IPSec packets, address and port translation invalidates 
the packet's integrity. These shortcomings of the NAT mechanism 
may limit the application of Multi-IP scheme.  
6.5 Security consideration on the Multi-IP scheme 
Using the Multi-IP mechanism, a multi-user system can be logically re-
garded as a group of single user systems. In this case, the user based IP 
traffic accounting mechanisms applied to the multi-user system are the 
same as the traditional IP traffic accounting mechanisms to a group of 
normal single user systems. Therefore, the security considerations and so-
lutions for traditional IP accounting can also be applied to the user based 
IP traffic accounting for multi-user systems. 
Despite the logical similarity between multi-user system with the Multi-
IP scheme and single user system, some new issues concerning security 
must be taken into consideration in the Multi-IP scheme:  
1. One of the probable attacks against the Multi-IP scheme is spoof or 
masquerade. A user who does not want her network resource usage to 
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be measured may try to use another user’s IP address instead of her 
own IP address for communication. Since the multi-user system pos-
sesses an IP address pool, the spoofer may choose any IP address ex-
cept her IP address from the IP address pool for accessing the Internet. 
If there is no measure taken to prevent from this spoof attack, there is 
no problem for the attacker to send and receive IP packets with other 
user’s IP address. 
In order to prevent from spoof or masquerade attacks, a validation 
mechanism must be introduced into the Accounting Agent to check 
whether the local related IP addresses in the sent IP packets match 
their corresponding user s’ IP address or not. Inbound IP packets with 
fake destination IP addresses will be rejected by the measured host. 
The spoof attacks with the “man-in-the-middle” method can be pre-
vented by the IPSec mechanism. Here the Accounting Agent concen-
trates only on the attacks made in the measured host. Figure 6.6 ex-
plains the algorithm of the validation mechanism for outbound IP 
packets. 
 
Figure 6.6 IP address validation algorithm for outbound IP packets 
Whenever an IP packet is sent by an application, the anti-spoof 
mechanism checks whether the source IP address of the IP packet is 
the same as that bound to the user of the application. If the validation 
succeeds, the IP packet will be sent, otherwise this IP packet will be 
rejected to be sent or the source IP address in the IP packet will be re-
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out. And this spoof attack must be recorded in the security log. This 
mechanism can prevent the spoof attack from happening in the multi-
user system. 
2. Another issue is privacy. For a single user system, its IP address can 
leak the user information because the IP address is always bound to 
one user during a period of time. For example, a peeper can sniff IP 
packets related to one single user system and analyze the IP packets 
according to the IP address of the single user system to peep the pri-
vacy of the us er who uses the single user system. Usually it is difficult 
for this kind of peeper to peep the privacy of users in multi-user sys-
tem because its IP address is not bound to only one user and it is hard 
to ascertain which user owns this IP packet. But with the introduction 
of the Multi-IP mechanism, every user in a multi-user system is bound 
to a unique IP address. Therefore, it can become as easy for a prier  to 
peek the privacy of users in a multi-user system as it is in a single user 
system.  
For the aforementioned static and dynamic IP address binding 
strategies in the Multi-IP scheme, the dynamic IP address binding 
strategy works somewhat better than static ones in against privacy 
leaking. However, both of them are not secure against the peepers. 
Therefore in order to avoid privacy to be leaked by the bound IP ad-
dress, it is reasonable for users in this kind of multi-user systems to 
communicate with security measures such as IPSec, SSL, etc. as in 
single user systems to prevent their important private information from 
being peeped. 
6.6 Comparison of user based IP traffic accounting schemes 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 illustrate three different schemes of user based IP traffic 
accounting. These schemes have different advantages and disadvantages, 
and they are suitable for implementation and application under different 
conditions. This section makes some comparisons among these three 
schemes. 
Table 6.1 below summarizes the comparison results among the three 
above described user based IP traffic accounting schemes.  
In these three schemes, only the in-band scheme takes advantage of IP 
packets to convey their own user information. Therefore, IP protocol must 
be extended to accommodate the User Information option.  
The Accounting Agent plays a key role in user based IP traffic account-
ing mechanism. It must be integrated into the measured host to handle user 
information related issues. Hence, these three schemes require Operation 
Systems (OS) of the measured hosts to be modified to integrate the Ac-
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counting Agent. Although OS modification can be realized either with 
kernel modification method or with kernel patch method, these two types 
of realization methods should be regarded as modification to the OS. 
For flow based user identification, control messages such as Query User 
Information, Query User Information Acknowledgement must be trans-
ferred between Accounting Agent and meter for the purpose of DUTRT 
synchronization. Hence, the meter of traditional IP accounting system 
needs to be improved to support the control message exchange and main-
tain the DUTRT. For packet based user identification in in-band scheme, 
since user information is in corresponding IP packets, the traditional meter 
needs to be improved to support extracting user information from IP pack-
ets. But for packet based user identification in the out-of-band scheme, the 
traditional meter can still be applied without any change to achieve user 
based IP traffic accounting. If the Accounting Agent is realized as a stand-
alone meter, it might be required to be tightly coupled with the meter. For 
the Multi-IP scheme, user information is still implicit in the IP address. 
Therefore the traditional meter needs not be modified. 
















extension Yes Yes No No No No No 
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High Low High Low Moderate No No 
Impact on 
router Maybe Maybe Maybe Maybe No Maybe Maybe 
Additional 
hardware 
No No No No No No Yes 
Realization 
difficulty High High Low Low Low High Moderate 
Table 6.1 Comparison of user based IP traffic accounting schemes  
Due to the fact that the Accounting Agent works in the measured host, it 
will certainly affect the performance of the measured host in which the 
Accounting Agent resides. The standalone meter mechanism in the out-of-
band scheme may cause the highest impact on the measured host’s per-
formance, since both Accounting Agent and meter functions are integrated 
in the measured host. However, this mechanism may produce less extra 
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traffic for accounting information transmission than IP packet based user 
identification mechanism, since compression and batch transmission 
mechanism can be applied for RDR transmission. The IP packet based user 
identification mechanism requires every IP packet to be processed and in-
tegrated with user information. Therefore, the processing overhead may be 
high, and the extra traffic generated by this mechanism is the highest. The 
IP traffic flow based user identification mechanism requires only the first 
IP packet of a flow to be integrated with user information. Therefore, less 
extra traffic will be generated for the user information transmission. The 
processing overhead caused by this mechanism lies in the DUTRT search 
and maintenance. The Accounting Agent in the Multi-IP scheme is usually 
responsible for assigning IP addresses to or recycling IP addresses from 
different users when users login or logout. It does not intercept IP packets 
to gather user information. Therefore, less performance impact will be 
caused by this mechanism. Since user information is contained in IP ad-
dresses implicitly, no extra traffic will be generated for accounting pur-
pose. 
In traditional IP traffic accounting, meter functions are usually inte-
grated into routers. In this case, the IP packet based user identification 
mechanism, the IP traffic flow based user identification mechanism, and 
the Multi-IP scheme will influence the performance of the router. How-
ever, if the meter is a dedicated device independent from any router, the 
performance of routers will not be affected. If an Accounting Agent is used 
as a standalone meter, no impact will be made on router. 
For the Multi-IP scheme, if the IP address pool contains only private IP 
addresses, NAT devices are required to make this scheme applicable. 
Other schemes do not require additional hardware to help achieving user 
based IP traffic accounting except the meter. 
In realizing these three different schemes, the Accounting Agent may be 
a bottleneck. Kernel modification method and kernel patch method can be 
chosen for realizing the Accounting Agent in open source OS or legacy 
systems environments, respectively. The aforementioned three schemes 
have different characteristics which may influence the realization of user 
based IP traffic accounting systems. The in -band scheme combines user in-
formation tightly with the corresponding IP packets. The meter can easily 
gather accounting information and user information from IP packets di-
rectly. Since this scheme requires the IP protocol to be extended, the diffi-
culty in realizing it may be high. Especially for IPv4 packets, if the User 
Information option is implemented as an IPv4 option, the space limitation 
of IPv4’s Options field may be an obstacle. IPv6 provides a better possibil-
ity for integrating the User Information option in IPv6 headers. Since IPv6 
is still not widely deployed, we expect that the User Information option 
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may have a chance to be defined as an option of IPv6 extension header for 
user based IP traffic accounting. However, it may take a long time before 
the User Information option becomes a part of IPv6 protocol. For the 
Multi-IP scheme, public IP addresses may be impossible to be reserved for 
user based IP traffic accounting purposes in most current environments be-
cause of scarcity of IP address resource. The private IP address pool can 
solve the problem of IP address scarcity. For private IP address pool, diffi-
culties reside in configuring the IP address pool and coordinating the NAT 
servers to support applications in the measured hosts. The out-of-band 
scheme does not require the IP protocol to be modified. One difficulty in 
realizing IP traffic flow based user identification mechanism is how to 
maintain the synchronization between DUTRTs. Sometimes, the IP packet 
based user identification may be realized as a supplementary mechanism in 
case a flow cannot be identified by extracting identification attributes from 
IP packets. Compared with the IP packet and IP traffic  flow user identifi-
cation mechanisms, the standalone meter mechanism simplifies the user 
information storage and transmission. In the NIPON project [NIPO03], 
this mechanism has been applied to realize user based IP traffic accounting 
systems in Solaris and Windows 2000 Terminal Server. In the next chapter 
the implementation of the user based IP traffic accounting prototype sys-
tem will be introduced.  
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Chapter 7 User based IP traffic accounting pro-
totype system implementation 
This chapter introduces the implementation of a user based IP traffic ac-
counting prototype system according to the out-of-band scheme. This pro-
totype system is built on the basis of NeTraMet [Netr], which is a realiza-
tion of the IETF Real-time Traffic Flow Measurement (RTFM) 
architecture [RFC2722]. The key of the implementation of user based IP 
traffic accounting with the out-of-band scheme is the realization of the Ac-
counting Agent. In order to verify the user based IP traffic accounting ar-
chitecture in legacy system, the Agent is implemented as a kernel patch in 
two typical non-open source multi-user systems: Windows 2000 Terminal 
server and Solaris. The Accounting Agent instead of the Winpcap in Win-
dows and the Libpcap in UNIX is applied to capture IP packets for provid-
ing user and flow relationship information to the meter: NeTraMet. The 
Meter, the Reader and Manager of NeTraMet are improved to accommo-
date the user based IP traffic accounting ability. A Web based display ap-
plication is also developed to provide statistical information of user based 
IP traffic accounting. Detailed implementation mechanisms are introduced 
in this chapter. In order to examine how the Accounting Agent affects the 
performance of the measured host in which it resides, the effect on per-
formance caused by the Agent on throughput and delay of the measured 
host is analyzed.  
This chapter is organized as follows: at first the system architecture of 
the prototype is introduced, and then the components of the prototype sys-
tem are explained, after that the detailed implementation mechanisms 
about the Agent, Reader and Manager are described, at the end the per-
formance analysis is made. 
7.1 Prototype system architecture  
In the “NIPON” project [NIPO00] a user based IP traffic accounting 
prototype system is implemented. The purposes of the implementation of 
the user based IP traffic accounting prototype system are: 
1. Verify the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism with the out-of-
band scheme suggested architecture 
2. Clarify the user based IP traffic accounting records format 
3. Provide a realization for analyzing the performance of the user based 
IP traffic accounting system 
The user based IP traffic accounting prototype system is developed on 
the basis of the previously suggested user based IP traffic accounting sys-
tem architecture. This IP traffic accounting system also conforms to the 
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IETF suggested IP traffic accounting architecture, and consequently this 
prototype system can be easily integrated into the now existing traditional 
IP traffic accounting system.  
In this prototype system, the Accounting Agent is implemented to col-
lect user and IP traffic flow relationship information. The meter is imple-
mented to be responsible for RDRs generation. The open source imple-
mentation of the RTFM architecture “NeTraMet” was selected and 
improved to be integrated with user based IP traffic accounting functions. 
NeTraMet has implemented a standard traditional IP traffic accounting ar-
chitecture. It follows the Internet Accounting Architecture for the traffic 
flow measurement architecture [RFC 2722] and the meter MIB standard 
[RFC 2720].  
For the implementation of the user based IP traffic accounting prototype 
system, NeTraMet is chosen for the integrat ion of user based IP traffic ac-
counting techniques into traditional IP accounting systems. There are three 
reasons to choose NeTraMet: 
l It is an open source software, and it realizes the traditional flow based 
IP traffic accounting.  
l It conforms to the IETF suggested standard, and it has implemented 
the [RFC 2722] suggested IP accounting architecture. 
l Most commercial IP accounting products use proprietary interfaces. 
However, the user based IP traffic accounting prototype system was 
expected to be independent of any existing commercial products. 
Utilizing the suggested IETF standards can help the user based IP traffic 
accounting architecture to be easily integrated into now existing account-
ing systems.  
Figure 7.1 illustrates the architecture of the prototype system. 
In this architecture, the user based IP traffic accounting prototype sys-
tem includes four components.  
l Accounting Agent: The Accounting Agent is designed for user based 
IP traffic accounting according to the out-of-band scheme. It observes 
every IP traffic flow, and collects traffic information and the corre-
sponding user information. The collected information will be stored 
into the user traffic flow relationship table. Then the information will 
be collected by the Meter. With this component, the user based IP traf-
fic accounting technique can be integrated into the traffic flow meas-
urement architecture (which belongs to the traditional IP accounting 
system architecture). 
l Meter: The Meter receives the user IP traffic flow relationship infor-
mation collected by an Accounting Agent. Then this information is  
processed to generate the raw accounting records  with user informa-
tion. These records will be stored in the MIB. The SNMP protocol 
A model for user based IP traffic accounting     199 
will be used to transfer the MIB records to the Reader. In this imple-
mentation, the aforementioned standalone meter mechanism is ap-
plied. The Accounting Agent and the Meter are tightly coupled in the 
measured host. The Meter is placed within the measured host, and its 
activities are controlled by rule sets which are downloaded from the 
Manager. 
 
Figure 7.1 Architecture of user based IP traffic accounting prototype 
system 
l Reader & Manager : This component implements all functions of the 
Reader and the Manager  in the RTFM architecture12 [RFC2722]. It re-
quests MIB records from Meter s using the SNMP protocol. The re-
cords collected from Meter s will be stored into the Accounting Infor-
mation database, which can be used for further processing. (In our 
prototype system, we simply display the accounting information). The 
Manager configures the Meters with rule sets and it can also control 
the Meters with SNMP commands. 
l Display Application: This is a server side application which organizes  
accounting information and presents it to the user who accesses the 
user based IP traffic accounting information with web browsers. 
                                              
12 Please refer to Figure 2.3 
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7.2 Implementation environment 
According to the user based IP traffic accounting architecture, the Ac-
counting Agent must be placed within the measured host, because outside 
the measured host the user and IP traffic flow relationship information 
cannot be obtained. We choose the kernel patch method to implement the 
Accounting Agent. The implementation of the Accounting Agent is operat-
ing system dependant. In our NIPON prototype system, the Meter runs  in 
the same host as the Accounting Agent. UNIX, Linux, Windows Terminal 
Server are three popular operating systems providing multi-user environ-
ment. There are many varieties of UNIX systems. Since Solaris is one of 
the typical UNIX system, and Windows 2000 Terminal Server is a differ-
ent type of OS compared with UNIX and Linux, for the NIPON prototype 
system, Solaris and Windows 2000 Terminal Server were chosen as the 
implementation platforms for the Accounting Agent and the Meter. The 
experiences and standards used in the implementation of the user based IP 
traffic accounting prototype system in these two platforms can be propa-
gated to other OSs. 
The Reader & Manager and Analysis Applications are OS independent. 
Here we choose Windows as the implementation platform for the Reader 
& Manager and Analysis Applications, since it can provide a friendly GUI 
and is widely used. 
We choose c and c++ as the implementation language. In Solaris, the 
standard c is used, and in Windows, c and Visual c++ are used together. 
Further ASP is used to implement the server side accounting information 
display application. 
  
The Reader uses Microsoft ACCESS database to store records collected 
by Meters. Other implementations may use more sophisticated databases, 
such as Oracle, SQL Server, etc. 
7.3 Accounting Agent 
According to the user based IP traffic accounting architecture, the Ac-
counting Agent is the key of the suggested architecture. The function of 
the Agent in the user based IP traffic accounting is to collect the user and 
IP traffic flow relationship information, in other words, the Agent is used 
to identify each traffic flow with its corresponding user. Since the traffic 
flows are changed in real time and dynamically, the Agent’s user identifi-
cation process is also in real time. User and traffic relationship information 
cannot be obtained outside the end system which produces the traffic. 
Therefore, the Agent must run within the measured system.  
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In the NIPON project, a kernel patch method is used to realize the 
Agent. The reasons we choose kernel patch method are: 
1. The main reason we choose kernel patch method instead of kernel 
modification method for implementation is: the kernel modification 
method implementation needs to modify the OS, whereas for most op-
erating systems the source code is not generally available. 
2. The kernel patch method does not need to modify the OS. This 
method can log all send or receive activities of user applications using 
the protocols such as TCP and UDP, which are usually sufficient for 
the purpose of IP accounting, since most of the Internet traffic is pro-
duced by these two protocols.  
3. The experiences and rules in the implementation of kernel patch 
method can also be applied to the implementation of kernel modifica-
tion method. 
The main functions of the Agent include: 
1. Capture packets; 
2. Extract Packets information and identify the corresponding user; 
3. Generate, store and transfer user and IP traffic flow relationship in-
formation.  
The Accounting Agent is operating system dependant. That means, dif-
ferent Agents must be implemented for different operating systems. In our 
NIPON project, two different packet capturing methods are utilized to im-
plement the Agent in Solaris and Windows 2000 Terminal Server, respec-
tively. 
7.3.1 Packet capturing methods  
7.3.1.1 Packets capturing method in Windows 2000 Terminal 
Server 
A TDI (Transport Driver Interface) [TDI] call redirection method is 
utilized for the implementation of the Accounting Agent in Windows 2000 
Terminal Server. The Agent is implemented as a TDI client driver. It runs 
in kernel mode.  
Figure 7.2 illustrates the Agent in the Windows network architecture. 
The dashed grey box is the Agent.   
According to [WinDDK], the Transport Driver Interface (TDI) defines a 
kernel-mode network interface that is exposed at the upper edge of all 
transport protocol stacks. The highest level protocol driver in each such 
stack supports the TDI interface for higher level kernel-mode network cli-
ents. 
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Windows 2000 includes interface modules for several popular network 
interfaces, such as Windows Sockets and NetBIOS. Each of these interface 
modules exposes a native set of primitive functions, which are accessible 
through standard calls from user mode. When called, the interface module 
maps the native function call and its associated parameters and procedural 
rules, to one or more calls to the underlying TDI transport driver.  
 
Figure 7.2 Accounting Agent in the Windows network architecture 
TDI clients, which are kernel-mode drivers such as Redirector and 
Server, interface with the transport provider through TDI. TDI simplifies 
the task of developing transport drivers in that only the TDI interface 
needs to be coded. It also simplifies the task of developing clients by 
minimizing the amount of transport-specific code that must be written. 
Transport drivers that expose only the TDI interface can be used only by 
TDI clients. To provide increased access to such transports, Win-
dows 2000 includes an emulator module for Windows Sockets. This emu-
lator module exposes its native set of functions, which are accessible 
through standard call mechanisms in user mode. When called, the emulator 
module maps the native functions and their associated parameters and pro-
cedural rules to TDI functions, and then calls the indicated transport driver 
through TDI. 
The Accounting Agent lies between the Socket Emulator and the TDI 
interface. It captures all Send and Receive TDI calls, which are mapped 
from user mode calls by the emulator module. If a TDI call returns suc-
cessfully, then the Agent collects accounting related information, such as 
source IP address and port, destination IP address and port, sent or re-
ceived bytes, etc., from the TDI call. Meanwhile the Agent extracts the 
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During this process, only the successful TDI send or receive related calls 
will be processed.  
In the implementation of the Accounting Agent with this method, the 











7.3.1.2 Packets capturing method in Solaris  
A system call redirection method is utilized for the implementation of 
the Accounting Agent in Solaris. The Agent is implemented as a Loadable 
Kernel Module.  
Figure 7.3 illustrates the principle of the system call redirection mecha-
nism. 
 
Figure 7.3 prin ciple of the system call redirection mechanism 
System calls’ reference addresses under Solaris are stored in an array 
“sysent[]”. Each entry of the array is a structure that holds information 
about a system call. The Agent redefines the accounting related new sys-
tem calls, and then modifies the original system calls’ reference addresses 
System call A’s reference 
Original system call A 






 Accounting Info collection 
Original System call A’s 
reference 
 
204      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
in “sysent[]” to the new defined system calls’ reference addresses. For ex-
ample, the “sendto” system call can be redirected as below: 
 
When a sys tem call is called, its reference address will be found from 
the “sysent[]” array. After the redirection of the sys tem call by the Agent, 
the newly defined sys tem call will be called. The newly defined system 
call calls the corresponding original system call at first. If the original sys-
tem call returns successfully, the accounting information will be collected 
from this system call, and the user information will also be extracted from 
the calling thread. Otherwise, the syscall will be returned without further 
processing. 
In the implementation of the Agent with this method in Solaris, the redi-











7.3.2 Agent workflow 
Although the packet capturing methods of the Accounting Agent are dif-
ferent in Windows and Solaris, the workflows of the Agents in these two 
different systems are the same.  
Figure 7.4 below illustrates the Agent’s flow chart. 
ssize_t (*oldsendto) (int s, const void *msg, size_t len, int flags, 
const struct sockaddr *to, int tolen); 
 
ssize_t newsendto(int s, const void *msg, size_t len, int flags, const 
struct sockaddr *to, int tolen); 
 
//Keep the old sendto reference address 
oldsendto = (void *) sysent[SYS_sendto].sy_callc;  
 
//replace sendto syscall with new sendto’s reference address 
sysent[SYS_sendto].sy_callc = (void *) newsendto; 
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Figure 7.4 Flow chart  of the Agent 
The collected packet accounting information and user information are 
stored in the following record structure: 
struct AccountingRecord 
{ 
 IPAddr sourceIPAddress; 
 unsigned short sourcePort; 
 IPAddr destinationIPAddress; 
 unsigned short destinationPort; 
unsigned short ProtAct;  //protocol & Action(connect, accept, send, re-
ceive) 
 unsigned long Bytes;    //number of bytes sent or received 
 USERID User;        //ID of the user 
}; 
These records will be collected by Meters for further processing.  
7.3.3 Agent implementation consideration 
The Accounting Agent runs in the kernel environment, therefore it 
should be carefully designed. According to the experiences of implement-
ing the Accounting Agent in the prototype system, the following issues 
should be taken into consideration: 
1. Reliability. The Accounting Agent runs in kernel mode. It should 
be designed reliably. It intercepts system calls, which will be 
called by threads concurrently, ther efore synchronization and 
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No 
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mutex techniques need to be applied. In addition,  the Agent 
needs to be designed as reentry-able. After the Agent is added to 
the system kernel, it should not affect the system’s stability.  
2. Efficiency. Since the Agent redirects the system calls, and the 
new system calls may be called frequently, the Agent may be-
come a bottleneck of the system. Therefore, high efficiency 
should be an important goal when designing the Agent. In our 
prototype system, the multi-thread technique is used to improve 
efficiency.  
3. Buffer overflow control. The collected user traffic information of 
the Agent is stored in the kernel buffer at first and then it is col-
lected by the Meter. It may happen that the speed of generating 
user IP traffic flow information records is faster than that of col-
lecting the records by the Meter due to busy network sending and 
receiving. This may soon exhaust all allocated kernel buffer. 
Consequently, the accounting information may be lost. Two 
measures have been taken to slow down the speed of the buffer 
exhaustion. On the one hand,  we can use history records compar-
ing technique to reduce the number of generated records. This 
may slow down the intercepted network system call execution. 
On the other hand, we can increase the records collection fre-
quency of the Meter. However, these two methods cannot totally 
solve the problem. They can only slow down the speed of buffer 
exhaustion. Nevertheless, buffer overflow must be avoided since 
otherwise accounting data will be lost. In order to prevent loss of 
accounting information the Agent will block the send and receive 
function calls, when no more buffer space is available. It is 
unlikely that the Agent will run out of buffer space, but if it hap-
pens this will certainly affect the network related performance of 
the measured system. 
7.4 Meter 
The Meter collects the traffic and corresponding user information from 
the Agent and classifies them into certain flows. For each flow, the Meter 
accumulates certain attributes, for example the numbers of packets and 
bytes observed for the group. It can also aggregate, transform and further 
process the recorded attributes before the data is stored.  
The Meter’s functions include:  
l accept and execute the Manager’s configure command and rule 
sets 
l collect user traffic relationship records from the Agent 
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l process the collected records according to accounting rules and 
classify them into different flows 
l convert processed records into SNMP records, and store them in 
the MIB database 
l respond to the Reader’s query requests and sending MIB records 
to the Reader 
The Meter is designed as an SNMP agent. All accounting records col-
lected from the Agent are processed (accumulating, classifying, aggregat-
ing, etc.) according to the rule sets downloaded from the Manager. The 
processed records are stored into the SNMP MIB database. The MIB for-
mat conforms to the [RFC 2720] specification. The “sourceSubcriberID ”, 
which is one of the flow attributes defined in [RFC 2720], is used to iden-
tify the originator of the flow. Reader can send SNMP query requests to 
Meter for collecting the MIB records. 
In the NIPON prototype system, traffic packets are classified into dif-
ferent flows. Rule sets are used to control the collection of the flow re-
cords. The rule sets can be edited for different usage purposes. The in 
[RFC 2722] suggested packets match algorithm is used to match the pack-
ets to the rule sets. 
Figure 7.5 illustrates the workflow of the Meter. 
 
Figure 7.5 Workflow of the Meter 
1. At first the rule sets are downloaded from a Manager; 
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counting Agent, the record format is as described in 7.3.2; 
3. The rule set matching machine matches every packet with the rule 
sets, the matched records are classified and aggregated, the not 
matched records are discarded; 
4. Matched records will be stored into the MIB after being classified 
and aggregated, the record format follows the specification defined 
in [RFC 2720]; 
5. The Reader sends SNMP data requests to a Meter at regular inter-
vals The Meter interprets the SNMP requests and executes the cor-
responding operations; 
6. The Meter responds to the Reader’s SNMP request, collects the 
corresponding MIB records and sends them to the Reader. 
 
Both the Meter and the Accounting Agent run within the same host. 
This can reduce the overhead of transferring records from the Agent to the 
Meter. Because the Meter can perform the classification and aggregation, 
this can help to reduce the generated data volume, which consequently can 
alleviate the overhead to the network.  
In Windows 2000 Terminal Server, the Meter runs as a Windows ser-
vice. In Solaris system, the Meter can run as a normal application or as a 
daemon. Both of them can be started or stopped manually.  
7.5 Reader and Manager 
After the Meter has accumulated the users’ network usage information 
into the MIB, the Reader collects the MIB records at regular intervals with 
the SNMP protocol. The collected records will then be stored into the da-
tabase.  
The function of the Manager is to configure Meters and to control Read-
ers.  
In the NIPON prototype system, the Reader and the Manager are im-
plemented in one software component. The Manager is capable of manag-
ing more than one Meter. Different Meters can be controlled by different 
rule sets. The RDRs records in MIB can be collected by the Reader at dif-
ferent intervals. 
The functions of the Reader and Manager component include: 
1. Start or stop the data collection of a Meter 
2. Edit the configuration parameters of each Meter 
3. Download rule sets and configuration parameters to a Meter  
4. Collect MIB records from Meters with the SNMP protocol 
5. Store collected records in the database 
Figure 7.6 illustrates the workflow of the Reader & Manager.  
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Figure 7.6 Workflow of the Reader & Manager 
The workflow is described below: 
1. Create a new Reader. This will add a new Reader into the Reader 
Table. The new Reader is created with default control parameters. 
These control parameters include: 
l Meter Name 
l Collection Interval 
l Configuration File 
l Garbage Collection Interval 
l High Water Mark 
l Inactive Timeout 
l Keep Alive Interval 
l Lag Time 
l Meter IP 
l Meter Port 
l MIB File 
l Rule File 
l Sample Rate 
These default parameters can be changed by the accounting sys-
tem administrator. A Reader table will be used to store each 




Download rule sets 
and configuration pa-
rameters to Meters  
Collect records from 
Meters 












210      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
2. Edit a Reader. The parameters of a selected Reader are displayed for 
editing. After modifying the Reader’s parameters, the modified re-
sults will be stored into the database. 
3. Delete a Reader. A record corresponding to the selected Reader will 
be deleted from the Reader table.  
4. If a Reader is chosen and started, a Reader thread will be created. 
Each thread processes one Meter’s information. Then the Reader 
downloads the rule sets and configuration parameters to the pre-
defined Meter. 
5. The Reader collects MIB records from the Meter at regular intervals, 
which are defined by the parameter “Collection Interval”. The SNMP 
protocol is used to retrieve MIB records. 
6. The collected records will be stored into an accounting record data-
base. Each Meter has a table in this database. Each entry of the table 
represents a flow. A flow record includes the following attributes: 
l Flow Index 
l User ID 
l First Time 
l Last Time 
l Source IP Address 
l Source Port 
l Destination IP Address 
l Destination Port 
l Sent Bytes 
l Received Bytes  
After a MIB record of a flow is collected from a Meter, it will then be 
matched with old flows to check if an entry with the same flow attributes 
exists. Three attributes, i.e. Flow Index, User ID, First Time, can be used 
to identify a flow uniquely. If there is no identical flow record, a new entry 
will be created for this flow. Otherwise, the accounting information (Sent 
Bytes, Received Bytes) of the new record will be aggregated with the old  
ones.  
7.6 User based IP traffic accounting information display ap-
plication  
Since this is a prototype system only, the Billing application was not 
implemented. A web based display application, which can display each 
user’s IP accounting information of one Meter, was developed. It can also 
display detailed information of all flows which are produced by different 
users. This application can be easily extended for billing purposes if pric-
ing modules are added.  
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The display application includes the following functions: 
1. Provide selection of different Meters. 
2. Display different users’ statistic accounting information in a Me-
ter 
3. Display the detailed accounting  information of each flow in a 
Meter 
The architecture of the display application is illustrated as Figure 7.7: 
 
Figure 7.7 Architecture of display application 
The display application runs in server side, and the clients can access 
the application via web browsers. Microsoft IIS was chosen as the server 
platform. 
The following screenshots illustrate the process of accessing the user 
based IP traffic accounting information: 
 
Figure 7.8 Choosing Meter  
Server side 
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Figure 7.9 Display of user based IP traffic accounting information 
 
Figure 7.10 Display of detailed user based IP traffic accounting infor-
mation 
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7.7 Performance analysis  
As described in 7.2 the Accounting Agent and the Meter are placed in 
the measured system. This will certainly affect the performance of the 
measured system. Therefore, the Accounting Agent and Meter should be 
carefully designed to reduce the performance decline of the measured host 
in which they reside.  
In order to analyze the influence on performance caused by the user 
based IP traffic accounting prototype system in the measured host, a per-
formance test has been made on the prototype system - NIPON. This test 
emphasized mainly on the prototype system’s influence on the network 
throughput caused by the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism in 
the measured host. 
7.7.1 Test environment 
The performance test bed is illustrated in Figure 7.11: 
 
Figure 7.11 Performance Test bed 
The hardware parameters are listed below: 
l PC1: AMD 800 MHz, 512M, 100M Ethernet card. Windows 
2000 professional. 
It is used as Reader and Manager. 
l PC2: Pentium III 500 MHz, 256M, 100M Ethernet card. Win-
dows 2000 Terminal Server . 
It is used as the measured host with Windows version Ac-
counting Agent and Meter.  
l SUN: UltraSparc 143MHz, 100M Ethernet card. Solaris 8.8.  
It is used as  the measured host with UNIX version Accounting 





214      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
The network performance test tool Netperf [Netp] is used to simulate an 
application generating network traffic and to record performance statistic  
data.  
7.7.2 Test Procedure 
The throughput test procedures are: 
1. Set up the test environment according to Figure 7.11. 
2. At first the NIPON system is not loaded. This is used to test the 
basis performance of the system without the NIPON prototype 
system. 
3. Run the netperf-server in PC2, and running the netperf-client in 
SUN.  
4. Use the netperf-client to send UDP, TCP packets to netperf-server 
with different packet sizes respectively. Record the throughput 
value.  
5. Run the netperf-server in SUN, and run the netperf-client in PC2. 
Repeat step 4. 
6. Load and start the Accounting Agent and Meter in the Windows 
2000 Terminal Server of PC2. Repeat steps 4, 5. 
7. Stop and unload the Accounting Agent and Meter from the Win-
dows 2000 Terminal Server of PC2. Load and start the Accounting 
Agent and Meter in the Solaris of SUN. Repeat 4, 5.  
8. The tests are repeated several times to obtain the average result 
values. 
7.7.3 Test results and analysis 
After the above described test process, we obtained the figures of per-
formance test result in Appendix B. Every figure shows the test results in 
environments with and without the Accounting Agent for comparing the 
effect on performance caused by the Accounting Agent. 
Two factors can affect the throughput: one is the network capacity and 
the other is the CPU speed of the host. In this test the network capacity of 
the three hosts are the same: 100Mbps. However, PC2 and SUN have dif-
ferent CPU speed. 
Figure B.1 and Figure B.2 in Appendix B depict the throughput of TCP 
send and UDP send in case with and without the Accounting Agent in the 
Solaris system, respective ly. These two figures show that the smaller the 
size of the sent packet is, the more performance impact results from the 
Accounting Agent. The frequency of activating the Accounting Agent de-
pends on the number of packets rather than the size of the packets, i.e. no 
matter for a packet with 1 byte or for a packet with 1000 bytes the Ac-
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counting Agent will be triggered for only one time. During the same period 
of time, the number of sent smaller sized packets is larger than that of sent 
bigger sized packets. Therefore, the Accounting Agent will be more fre-
quently called in sending smaller sized packets. Consequently, this will 
cost extra CPU time in processing these smaller sized packets by the Ac-
counting Agent, and the accumulated sending delay will increase. Hence, 
the throughput of the measured host will decline.  
Figure B.1 and B.2 also show that, when the packet size is increased to 
about 300 bytes per packet, the throughput of the measured system with 
NIPON is almost the same as that without NIPON. During a fixed trans-
mission period, more small IP packets can be  sent than larger ones. This is 
due to the fact that larger IP packets need more CPU time for processing. 
Therefore, the frequency of activating the Accounting Agent is reduced 
during this fixed period of time, and consequently less performance de-
cline results from the Accounting Agent. This result indicates that the per-
formance impact caused by the NIPON Accounting Agent on the through-
put is mainly in sending of IP packets of smaller size.  
The throughput results of TCP send and UDP send in Windows system 
are shown in Figure B.5 and B.6. These two figures show that the Ac-
counting Agent causes almost very little effect to the throughput in sending 
smaller  size packets comparing with that in Solaris. The reason is the 
higher CPU power of the PC2.  Compared with the UltraSparc 143 MHz 
CPU of the SUN, the Pentium III 500 MHz CPU of the PC2 is more pow-
erful. Therefore, less processing overhead will result from the Accounting 
Agent in the PC2. From the above observations we can conclude that the 
Accounting Agent causes less impact on the performance of the measured 
host if the CPU of the measured host is powerful enough. 
The test results of the receive operation in Figure B.3, B.4, B.7, and B.8 
show that the Accounting Agent has only a slight impact on the throug h-
put. The reason is that: although the sending host sends IP packets of small 
size, when the packets arrive in the receiving host, they will be accumu-
lated to one or more big-sized packets before they are forwarded to the re-
ceiving instances.  
Usually the receiving host will not use the same size buffer to receive 
the incoming packets as the sending host. Instead, a bigger -sized buffer 
will be used to receive the packets. Therefore less receive operations will 
be made. Considering that an Accounting Agent will be activated only 
when a receive operation is performed, the frequency of activating the Ac-
counting Agent in the receiving host is lower than that in the sending host. 
Therefore, the Accounting Agent causes less impact to the throughput in 
receiving packets. Certainly if the receiving site receives the packets with a 
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small-sized buffer, this will cause similar throughput decline as sending 
operations.  
From the test results we can conclude that NIPON  user based IP traffic 
accounting prototype system does not produce very much overhead to the 
measured system. Its performance decline becomes obvious only in the 
case of sending a large number of small-sized packets in hosts with lower 
power CPU.  
Using user based IP traffic accounting will certainly affect the perform-
ance of the measured host. We cannot avoid this performance decline. 
What we can do is to alleviate it. This can be done by carefully designing 
the accounting system, or choosing implementation methods with better 
performance. If the user based IP traffic accounting is needed, perform-
ance reduction must be taken into consideration. Just like the accounting 
function in Cisco routers, if the Netflow is chosen to run for the purpose of 
IP traffic accounting, the performance decline of the routers have to be ac-
cepted [LuCo99]. 
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Chapter 8 User based IP traffic accounting in 
distributed computing environments 
In the previous chapters, the user based IP traffic accounting mecha-
nisms are discussed and introduced in non-distributed computing enviro n-
ments. Users, applications, and measured hosts are regarded tightly cou-
pled in these environments. In distributed computing environments, users, 
applications and hosts distributed in different locations are joined together 
to form a virtual organization (VO) [FoKT01] to fulfill a task. A host that 
supports distributed computing can execute the jobs submitted by VO us-
ers on behalf of one or more local users. Hence, a local user account may 
not be used by a locally registered user. Instead, a local user account may 
be used by one or more VO users, and the local user identifier may become 
ambiguous. Under the distributed computing environments, even a single 
user system may become a multi-user system. These characteristics of dis-
tributed computing make the traditional IP address based IP traffic ac-
counting impractical to achieve accurate IP traffic accounting. Therefore, it 
is necessary to introduce the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism 
into distributed computing environments for the purpose of providing more 
accurate and finer grained IP traffic accounting information. 
In this chapter, the new challenges on IP traffic accounting brought by 
distributed computing will be analyzed. Accordingly, the user based IP 
traffic accounting solution is introduced to meet the new requirements on 
IP traffic accounting in distributed computing environments. VO users can 
be mapped to local user accounts with different methods. This requires dif-
ferent user based IP traffic accounting mechanisms to be applied corre-
spondingly. The user model described in chapter 3 is extended for provid-
ing finer grained IP traffic accounting information in distributed 
computing environments. User based network access control according to 
QoS requirements in distributed computing environments is also discussed 
in this chapter.  
8.1 Challenges on IP traffic accounting in distributed com-
puting environments  
As a consequence of the widespread usage of computers and the devel-
opment of Internet technology, distributed computing is becoming popular. 
On the one hand, many resources required by an application may no longer 
exist only in a single computer. On-line shopping, as an example, might 
need a customer’s authentication and purchasing information to be pro-
vided by the customer’s computer. Whereas authentication database and 
goods related database may be in different systems of the on-line shopping 
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company. On the other hand, geographically distributed computers can 
join together dynamically to accomplish a task. For example, the 
SETI@home [SETI] project distributes a radio telescope data analysis 
program on volunteers’ computers all over the world for the purpose of 
searching for extraterrestrial intelligence. 
A distributed computing system is the system architecture that makes a 
collection of heterogeneous computers, workstations, or servers act and 
behave as a single computing system. In such a computing environment, 
users can uniformly access and name local or remote resources, and run 
processes from  anywhere in the system, without being aware of which 
computers their processes are running on [HaPa04]. 
Especially with the emergence of Web Services [BHMN04] and Grid 
Computing [FoKT01, FKNT02], distributed computing is attracting more 
attention from not only academies and institutes but also from govern-
ments and the commercial world [BeFH03].  
8.1.1 Necessity of user based IP traffic accounting in distrib-
uted computing environments 
In traditional computing systems, users are tightly coupled with the un-
derlying hardware and the administrative domain. For example, users are 
bound to individual computers by means of user accounts. Users must own 
“real” accounts on every single machine to which they access. In distrib-
uted computing systems, users, applications and data are decoupled from 
individual computers and administrative domains. A user in a distributed 
computing environment may be not bound to an individual machine, or in 
other words, a user may not belong to any concrete host. A user can exist 
in a virtual organization (VO) which is constructed with distributed com-
puting technology, e.g. Grid, without binding to any host physically. If this 
user needs to submit jobs to a host, her VO user account must be mapped 
to a local user of the host at first, and then this job can be run on behalf of 
the local user in the host. With this mechanism, a user can execute applic a-
tions in remote machines. 
With the distributed computing technology, the computing resource of a 
computer can not only be utilized by people registered as local users in this 
host but also be shared by VO users registered in a VO. VO users can 
submit jobs to the distributed computing node (DCN), execute applications 
in the DCN, and utilize resources such as CPU, memory, storage and net-
work of the DCN. All these distributed computing activities performed in 
the DCN according to the requests of the VO users are executed on behalf 
of one or more local user accounts of the node. A VO user must be 
mapped to a local user before her job can be executed in the node. There-
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fore, the IP traffic of this DCN may be related not only to local users but 
also to VO users, or accurately to the mapped local user accounts of VO 
users. In this condition, it is apparently that the IP traffic related to this 
node cannot be identified uniquely with corresponding users through IP 
address, since the IP address of this node is in fact shared by several users.  
This coexistence of local users and VO users in a host makes network 
access control and network resource consumption management more diffi-
cult and complex. In a distributed computing environment, a host deliver-
ing computing services should be regarded as a multi-user host from the IP 
traffic accounting point of view, since the IP address of this host is shared 
by more than one user.  Considering the discussion in chapter 3 about the 
flaw of the traditional IP address based IP traffic accounting mechanism in 
multi-user systems, it is necessary to introduce the user based IP traffic ac-
counting mechanism in the distributed computing environments for the 
purpose of providing more accurate and finer grained IP traffic accounting 
information. With user based IP traffic accounting, accurate information 
about network resource consumption can be provided and finer grained ac-
cess control can be achieved in distributed computing nodes.  
8.1.2 Users in distributed computing environments  
In distributed computing there exist not only normal users bound to user 
accounts in a computer but also VO users that can execute jobs in remote 
hosts. Here user has the same definition as in chapter 4 and it means the 
real person who submits the distributed computing jobs. A VO user ac-
count or VO user is the user account registered in a VO for consuming dis-
tributed computing services. A user account is an account created in a 
DCN or a host. For example, a UNIX account can be a normal user ac-
count. An application or a job is allowed to be executed in the DCN only 
when it runs on behalf of a user account of the node. 
Traditionally, in a host a user account is directly related to a user. For 
example, a user account with the name “alice@192.168.0.100” relates to 
student Alice who has registered to the host 192.168.0.100. From the regis-
tration information of the user account “alice@192.168.0.100” we can find 
the real user Alice. However, in distributed computing environments a user 
may not be bound to a user account in a single computer, instead, she may 
be bound to a VO user account that will be mapped to user accounts in 
DCNs. Figure 8.1 illustrates the relationship among user, VO user and user 
account in non-distributed computing and distributed computing enviro n-
ments, respectively. 
220      A model for user based IP traffic accounting 
 
Figure 8.1 Relationship among user, VO user and user account in non-
distributed computing and distributed computing environments  
In a distributed computing environment VO users can be mapped to lo-
cal users with different methods: 
1. Mapping VO users to a single user account 
For this user mapping method a special user account is reserved for 
distributed computing. All submitted remote jobs are executed on be-
half of this reserved user account. For example, Condor utilizes a re-
served user ID “nobody” to execute jobs for VO users that do not have 
an account in the Condor flock [ELDE96]. Another example is the  
PUNCH system. It allocates different logical user accounts to VO us-
ers for executing jobs. All these logical user accounts are mapped to a 
single physical account [KaFo99]. Legion [Legi06, GrWu97] treats de-
fault Legion accounts as a “guest” UNIX account in the local host. 
This VO user to local user mapping method is very simple, since there 
is no need to create user accounts for VO users for executing jobs. 
This method also requires less resource in managing the account for 
VO users. However, this single user ID makes it difficult to distinguish 
different VO users’ resource usage so that accurate accounting infor-
mation is difficult or even impossible to be collected.  Furthermore, the 
accounting system needs to store the VO wide identifiers, such as X. 
500 [CCIT93] distinguished names (DN) along with the usual account 
information. IP traffic metering and accounting will still be done lo-
cally on the basis of the local UID, after that the second mapping from 
UID to VO UID must be made. 
Another situation in whic h applications are executed under the same 
user account is, when a user provides distributed computing services, 
the distributed jobs can be run under her user ID, i.e. under her own 
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install and run the SETI@home client program under her/his user en-
vironment. In this case the SETI@home client is not explicitly run for 
a VO user, therefore the user mapping between VO users and local 
user accounts is not required. The problem of this case is that it is dif-
ficult to isolate the user’s local execution environment from the remote 
jobs, which may make privilege control and security difficult. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates the principle of this user mapping method.  
 
Figure 8.2 Mapping VO users to the same user account 
2. Assigning every VO user  a unique local user account statically 
This user mapping method, in contrast to the first, does not reserve a 
single user account for all VO users. Every VO user, who has the au-
thority to execute applications in a DCN, will obtain a unique local 
user account from the host. The VO users can be mapped to local users 
statically or dynamically.  
The static user mapping is, when a VO user account is created in a 
virtual organization, correspondingly user accounts of this new VO 
user will be created in DCNs. When this  user submits jobs to a DCN, 
her VO user account will be mapped to her related “real” user account 
in this node. The Globus [FoKe97, BEFK00] utilized this method to 
map a X.509 [RFC2459, RFC3480] identit y to a single local user ac-
count statically. In Globus Tool a so-called “gridmap” file records the 
relationship between grid identifiers and corresponding user accounts. 
When a job of a grid user is received for execution, it is forked as a 
process owned by the corresponding local UNIX user, which can be 
found from the “gridmap” file. In the European Datagrid (EDG) Test-
bed 1, the “gridmap” file is updated by periodically querying authori-
zation information in LDAP servers [Alif03]. The process of binding 
VO users to local users in Legion is the same as the process in UNIX 
where an administrator must create a user account for a new user. A 
Process Control Daemon (PCD) with administrator privilege is used to 
regulate the ownership of every remote job.  
User n 
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VO User 1 
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User Account 
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The disadvantage of these static local user accounts is that they can-
not reflect the dynamic characteristic of distributed computing, in 
which users all over the world may submit their jobs. Static user map-
ping cannot meet the requirement for different dynamically joining 
VO users, and preconfigured user accounts cannot reflect the dynami-
cally changing policies. Statically allocated user accounts may also re-
sult in waste of resources in maintaining rarely used user accounts. 
Figure 8.3 illustrates the principle of allocating every VO user a 
unique user account statically.  
 
Figure 8.3 Allocating every VO user a unique user account statically 
3. Assigning user accounts to VO users dynamically 
Dynamic user mapping does not require the binding of a local user 
account to a VO user to be predefined. The local user account is cre-
ated for or assigned to a VO user dynamically. The single local user 
account mapping method and the static user account mapping method 
cannot reflect the dynamic characteristics of the users in distributed 
computing. Especially in Grid computing the number of Grid users 
may be tens of thousands, a single local user account will make man-
agement on Grid users very difficult whereas pre-defined user ac-
counts will consume or even waste a great number of resources for 
maintaining these user accounts in local systems.  
Many efforts have been made in providing dynamic local user ac-
counts to Grid users [McNa03, HaAt01, KeRD03, KaFF01, Pool05, 
TaBK03]. For dynamic user account mapping method, a local user ac-
count pool is usually built containing preconfigured local user ac-
counts for distributed computing purpose. These dynamic user ac-
counts in the pool may be grouped according to their different 
privileges. Unlike normal user accounts that belong permanently to 
their real world owners, a dynamic user account is bound or leased to a 
VO user temporarily. The selection of a pool and the binding of the 
VO user to an available dynamic user account from that pool are based 
User n 
VO User n 
User 1 
VO User 1 
User 2 
User Account 2 
VO User 2 
User Account 1 User Account n 
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on the VO user account management policies. The temporary relatio n-
ship between dynamic user and VO user must be written down in a log 
file to record the status of dynamic user accounts allocation and help 
future VO user accounts related management. After the binding of a 
dynamic user account to a VO user, the VO user’s activities are sub-
jected to the dynamic user in the local system. 
The dynamic user account is freed and reclaimed to the user ac-
counts pool according to the VO user account management policies. 
For example, when a job execution is finished, pre-configured term i-
nation time is reached, a VO user’s Quota is used up, etc. all can cause 
the temporary relationship between dynamic user and VO user to be 
terminated. At the termination time, all this dynamic user account re-
lated resources will be released. For example, the user account related 
processes are killed and files owned by this user account are deleted. 
Then the user account is returned to the user accounts pool. This activ-
ity should also be recorded in the log file.  
Figure 8.4 illustrates how a local user account “x” is bound to dif-
ferent VO users dynamically. 
 
Figure 8.4 A user account is repeatedly allocated to and reclaimed from 
different VO users  
The advantages of this dynamic user accounts mapping method are: 
l There is no need to allocate every VO user a real user account in 
the local system. This can prevent unnecessary resource allocation 
for temporary user accounts. 
  
l Therefore the scalability of this method is very good, which can 
meet the requirement for a potential huge number of VO users. 
l Different dynamic user accounts may be preconfigured with dif-
ferent privileges. VO users with different authorities can be 
mapped to their corresponding dynamic user accounts. This can 
Time 
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meet dynamically changed requirements on resources from differ-
ent VO users. 
8.1.3 Issues concerning IP traffic accounting in distributed 
computing environments 
   
In distributed computing environments, user based IP traffic accounting 
is necessary for providing more accurate IP traffic accounting information. 
The variety of the relationships among user, VO user and user account in 
distributed computing environments requires different mechanisms to 
identify the user of IP traffic. The user model applied in non-distributed 
computing environments should be improved to meet the requirements of 
identifying different users’ IP traffic in distributed computing environ-
ments. For example, if all VO users are mapped to a reserved user account 
in a DCN, all applications, which are executed for different VO users, are 
run on behalf of the same reserved user in the DCN. Under this situation, 
according to the user model defined in chapter 3, the Traffic-Originators of 
the IP traffic related to these applications are all identified by the same re-
served user and the IP address of the DCN. Therefore, with the user model 
defined in chapter 3, IP traffic of different VO users cannot be distin-
guished. That means that the IP traffic of all these different VO users’ ap-
plications might be treated as being related to the same user.  
In non-distributed computing environments, a user account in a host is 
directly related to a user. In distributed computing environments, a user 
account in a host may be related to one or more VO users, statically or dy-
namically, temporarily or permanently. A VO user account is directly re-
lated to a user account, whereas the user is directly related to the VO user. 
Figure 8.1 – 8.4 illustrate the relationship among user, VO user and user 
account in different conditions. 
This variety of the relationships among user, VO user and user account 
in distributed computing environments also makes the correlation between 
Traffic -Originator and user becoming complex. Since the relationships 
may be temporary or permanent, different measures should be taken to re-
cord the relationship among user, VO user and use account for the purpose 
of correlating TOs to corresponding users. 
8.2 Improved user model for user based IP traffic accounting 
in distributed computing environments 
The user model defined in chapter 3 is based on the assumption that dif-
ferent users have different user accounts in a host, and different users’ ap-
plications are executed on behalf of the corresponding user accounts regis-
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tered in the host. Therefore, the Traffic -Originator can be identified with 
the 2-tuple <Host-Identifier, User Identifier> without ambiguity. Consid-
ering that different VO users may be mapped to only one user account in a 
DCN, the 2-tuple Traffic-Originator may be not able to identify the traffic 
originator of IP traffic. For example, VO user 1 and VO user 2 submit two 
jobs to a DCN which has the IP address 192.168.0.100. This node provides 
a reserved user account, e.g. “dummy”, for running applications of VO us-
ers. Therefore, VO user 1’s job related application 1 and VO user 2’s job 
related application 2 are executed on behalf of user account “dummy”. Ac-
cording to the user model in chapter 3, IP traffic related to application 1 of 
VO user 1 is identified with TO <192.168.0.100, dummy>, whereas the IP 
traffic related to application 2 of VO user 2 is also identified with the same 
TO <192.168.0.100, dummy>. Therefore, this TO cannot be mapped to the 
corresponding VO users correctly.  
Considering the dynamic VO users and user accounts mapping method 
in a DCN with IP address 192.168.0.100, VO user 1 is mapped to user ac-
count x for executing applications in this computer, consequently the IP 
traffic related to applications are identified with TO <192.168.0.100, x>. 
After VO user 1’s jobs are finished, the user account x is not bound to VO 
user 1 and the user account is reclaimed. When VO user 2 submits jobs to 
this host, supposing user account x is allocated again to VO user 2 for run-
ning applications, the IP traffic related to VO user 2’s applications are also 
identified with TO <192.168.0.100, x>. When RDRs related to VO user 1 
are not correlated to the corresponding user in time, this TO will also make 
confusion in distinguishing RDRs related to VO user 1 and VO user 2. 
8.2.1 Improved user model for user based IP traffic account-
ing in distributed computing environments 
In order to solve above described problems, the user model described in 
chapter 3.3.1 can be improved as follows: 
l Host-Identifier is a unique identifier for an end-system of the network 
layer. In the context of IP networks, an IP address can be used as a 
synonym for a Host-Identifier, since IP addresses are unique numbers 
for network layer devices, at least within an administrative domain.  
l User-Identifier or UID is a unique identifier for an account on a 
measured host.  
l Application-Identifier is a unique identifier of an application on a 
measured host during a period of time. An example is the Process ID 
(PID). 
l Timestamp identifies the time when TO information is collected. 
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l Traffic-Originator ::= <Host-Identifier> [< User-Identifier> <Applica-
tion-Identifier> <Timestamp>]. A Traffic-Originator (TO) is used to 
uniquely identify the entity which is responsible for specific outbound 
and inbound IP traffic flows.  
l VO User ::= 1*<Traffic-Originator> is a unique identifier for a user 
account in a Virtual Organization (VO). 
l User ::= 1*<VO User> is a unique identifier for a real person or a 
group of persons which are associated with one or more VO Users. 
Each VO User is associated with exactly one user. Usually a user 
identifies one real person who has one or more VO user accounts. 
When a group of real persons share a VO user account, this group 
may be described by one user. 
l Purchaser ::= 1*<User> is a unique identifier of a person or an insti-
tution who will pay for the IP traffic related to one or more users. 
Figure 8.5 illustrates the improved user model for user based IP traffic 
accounting in distributed computing environments. 
With this improved user model the TO of IP traffic can be identified 
with the 4-tuple <IP Address, UID, PID, Timestamp>. IP address is used 
to distinguish different DCNs. UID is the user account in the node for run-
ning distributed computing applications. The PID is the process ID of the 
application used for the purpose of distinguishing different users’ applica-
tions. The Timestamp is the time the above three identification information 
is collected. Through that, IP traffic related users can be identified without 
ambiguity. 
8.2.2 User identification of IP traffic with improved user 
model 
In this section, we take three different user mapping methods into con-
sideration to illustrate how user based IP traffic accounting can be 
achieved with the improved user model in distributed computing environ-
ments. 
1. Mapping VO users to a single user account 
With this user mapping method, different VO users’ applications are 
executed under the same user account. The PIDs of different applic a-
tions can be used to distinguish the corresponding VO users running 
jobs in a host. Below an example is used to depict how the users of IP 
traffic are identified. 
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Figure 8.5 Improved user model for user based IP traffic accounting in 
distributed computing environments 
Supposing student Alice and employee Bob of a university have 
registered accounts in a VO for the purpose of using distributed com-
puting services. Alice registers a VO user account as alice@VO, and 
Bob registers as bob@VO. A DCN N owns an IP address 
192.168.0.100 and provides a reserved user account “dummy” for exe-
cuting distributed computing jobs.  
Alice submits a job to the distributing resource manager, which al-
locates this job to node N for running this job, and a corresponding ap-
plication with PID 1234 is. Bob submits a job which causes a corre-
sponding application with PID 1678 to be started also in node N by the 
distributed resource manager. The user of IP traffic related to Alice’s 
job and Bob’s job can be identified as Table 8.1. 
From the above example we can find that, despite the fact that dif-
ferent users’ different distributed computing jobs are executed under 
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PIDs. The 2-tuple <192.168.0.100, dummy> cannot uniquely identify 
the traffic originator of Alice and Bob related IP traffic. The PID com-
bined with UID and HostID distinguishes the TOs. IP traffic related to 
PID 1234 (Alice’s application) and PID 1678 (Bob’s application) can 
be identified with the 4-tuple <192.168.0.100, dummy, 1234, 
06/01/01-10:10:12> and <192.168.0.100, dummy, 1678, 06/01/01-
10:11:37>, respectively. Through that, different VO users’ IP traffic 
can be distinguished without ambiguity.  
UID HostID PID Time TO VO 
User  
User Pur-chaser 








alice@VO Alice@Home Alice 








bob@VO Bob@CS UNI 
Table 8.1 An example of identifying user of IP traffic when VO us-
ers share a user account 
In non-distributed computing environments, a similar situation oc-
curs. Some applications or services require special privileges to be run 
in a host properly. Usually these applications or services run on behalf 
of the same user, e.g. root, but they belong to different users of the 
host. In this case, the 4-tuple TO can be used to distinguish between 
the users of the IP traffic related to different applications or services. 
2. Assigning each VO user a unique local user account statically 
With this user mapping method, a user account in a DCN belongs to 
a VO user permanently. The relationship between a user account and a 
VO user can be described as n:1 (n>=1). It means that a VO user may 
be mapped to different user accounts in DCNs. Therefore, the 2-tuple 
<IP address, UID> can be used to identify the traffic originator that 
can be correlated to a VO user without ambiguity. This case is the 
same as the one of normal multi-user systems discussed in chapter 4. 
Still using the aforementioned example, but this time alice@VO is 
mapped to a user account “user1”, whereas bob@VO is mapped to a 
user account “user2”. In this case, the PID is not necessary for distin-
guishing VO users, since UIDs of different users are unique. There-
fore, user identification of the IP traffic related to Alice and Bob in the 
node 192.168.0.100 can be achieved as Table 8.2. 
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UID  HostID TO  VO User  User Purchaser 
user1 192.168.0.100 <192.168.0.100, user1 > alice@VO Alice@Home Alice 
user2 192.168.0.100 <192.168.0.100, user2> bob@VO Bob@CS UNI 
Table 8.2 Example of identifying user of IP traffic when VO users 
are mapped to unique user accounts statically 
3. Assigning user accounts to VO users dynamically 
With this user mapping method, a user account is not allocated to a 
VO user permanently. A user account belongs to a VO user only for a 
period of time, for example, during the lifetime of the VO user’s appli-
cation. After that, the user account may be allocated to another VO 
user. For this case a 3-tuple < IP address, UID, Timestamp > can be 
used to identify the traffic originator of IP traffic uniquely. In this 3-
tuple, Timestamp identifies the time when the UID information is col-
lected. 
Considering the similar situation as in the above described exam-
ples, the DCN 192.168.0.100 provides a reserved user account pool for 
executing distributed computing applications. At first, the user Alice 
submits a job to the node and the job is executed under the user ac-
count “user1”. After Alice’s job is finished, the user account “user1” is 
reclaimed by the user account pool. Then the user Bob submits a job to 
the node, and the user account “user1” is chosen from the user account 
pool to be allocated to the VO user bob@VO again for executing 
Bob’s job. With the 3-tuple the user identification of IP traffic in this 
case can be described as Table 8.3. 
UI
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alice@VO Alice@Home Alice 




bob@VO Bob@CS UNI 
Table 8.3 Example of identifying user of IP traffic when user ac-
counts pool is used 
The improved user model provides the mechanism of distinguishing us-
ers of IP traffic related to applications executed under the same user ac-
count in DCN. Therefore, the improved user model can facilitate supplying 
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more accurate IP traffic accounting information in distributed computing 
environments. 
8.3 User based IP traffic accounting solutions in distributed 
computing environments  
Since in distributed computing environments the DCNs, which provide 
distributed computing services, may become multi-user systems, the IP 
traffic related to these nodes maybe generated by either normal local users 
or different mapped virtual users. In order to distinguish between the users 
of IP traffic in the DCNs, in the previously illustrated user based IP traffic 
accounting principles, schemes such as in-band scheme and out-of-band 
scheme can be applied to realize user based IP traffic accounting systems 
in distributed computing environments. The Multi-IP scheme can also be 
applied for user based IP traffic accounting in distributed computing envi-
ronments through assigning different IP addresses to different VO users in 
a DCN.  
Considering the new characteristics in distributed computing, some im-
provements should be made to the previous mechanisms and some new is-
sues should be taken into consideration when integrating user based IP 
traffic accounting systems in distributed computing environments.  
1. Accounting Agent 
One of the Accounting Agent’s functions is to extract TO informa-
tion and to identify the traffic originator of IP traffic. In distributed 
computing environments, the Accounting Agent is still required to be 
integrated into every measured host, i.e. the DCN, for the purpose of 
collecting the TO information and using it to identify TO of IP traffic. 
The Accounting Agent should gather TO information according to the 
user mapping mechanism used by the DCN. For example, the Ac-
counting Agent may be required to gather not only IP address, User 
ID, but also PID of the application which is related to the IP traffic. 
The user identification methods are introduced in 8.2.2.  
2. Correlation 
In a normal multi-user system, user accounts are related to users di-
rectly. Hence, from a user account in a host the corresponding user can 
easily be identified. In distributed computing environments, a user ac-
count is not directly related to one or more users, instead, it is directly 
related to one or more VO users. A user account may be allocated to 
different VO users at the same time or at different times. This makes 
the user correlation process more complex than that in non-distributed 
computing environments. 
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For the user mapping method that several VO users are mapped to a 
single user account, a TO & VO user Mapping Table is required to re-
cord the Host ID of the host which provides the distributed computing 
service, the User ID which is the user account allocated to different 
VO users, the PIDs of the executed jobs submitted by the VO user, and 
the Timestamp when the three attributes are collected. With the TO & 
VO User Mapping Table, the TO information recorded in the RDRs 
can be correlated to the corresponding VO users. In addition, the VO 
User & User Mapping Table can correlate the VO user to the corre-
sponding user. Figure 8.6 illustrates the correlation process with the 
TO & VO user Mapping Table on the basis of the example in Table 
8.1. 
 
Figure 8.6 Example of correlating IP traffic meter information to the 
corresponding user in case several VO users are mapped to a single 
user account 
For the dynamic user mapping method, the correlation process is 
similar to the single user account mapping method except that the PID 
information is not necessary to be collected as a part of the TO infor-
mation. The Timestamp attribute must be recorded to indicate at which 
time the UID is recorded, so that the VO users sharing the same UID 
VO User & User Mapping Table 
Per User Usage Records 
HostID UID PID Start Time End Time VO User 
192.168.0.100 dummy1 1234 ts1 te1 alice@VO 
192.168.0.100 dummy1 1678 ts2 te2 bob@VO 
 
HostID UID PID Timestamp Bytes sent Bytes rcvd 
192.168.0.100 dummy1 1234 t1 100 6000 







Alice@Home 100 6000 
Bob@CS 200 2500 
 




TO & VO User Mapping Table 
RDRs with TO information 
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at different time can be distinguished. For the static user mapping 
method, the correlation process is similar to the dynamic user mapping 
method except that the time information is not necessary to be re-
corded in the TO. Figure 8.7 gives an example of the user correlation 
process under the dynamic user mapping method. 
 
Figure 8.6 Example of correlating IP traffic meter information to the 
corresponding user in case the dynamic user mapping method is applied 
8.4 User based network access control in distributed com-
puting environments 
With the user based IP traffic accounting mechanism, finer grained IP 
traffic accounting information can be provided. The user based IP traffic 
accounting information can facilitate more accurate network access control 
on the basis of VO users. Using the single user account mapping method 
as an example, although different VO users may have different network 
QoS such as bandwidth, IP traffic quota, etc., it is impossible to control 
these users’ network usage according to their QoS requirements with the 
traditional IP traffic accounting mechanism which can only provide IP ad-
dress based IP traffic accounting information. With the user based IP traf-
fic accounting mechanism, the network usage information of every VO 
user’s applications in a DCN can be gathered and calculated. When a VO 
user’s IP traffic quota runs out, the Accounting Agent can block this VO 
HostID UID Start Time End Time VO User 
192.168.0.100 user1 ts1 te1 alice@VO 
192.168.0.100 user2 ts2 te2 bob@VO 
 
HostID UID Timestamp Bytes sent Bytes rcvd 
192.168.0.100 user1 t1 100 6000 








Alice@Home 100 6000 
Bob@CS 200 2500 
 




VO User & User Mapping Table 
TO & VO User Mapping Table 
Per User Usage Records 
RDRs with TO information 
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user’s applications from accessing the network. Figure 8.7 illustrates the 
process of user based network access control with the help of the user 
based IP traffic accounting mechanism. 
 
Figure 8.7 User based network access control in a distributed computing 
environment 
1. When a user wants to use a distributed computing resource, she regis-
ters to the VO Manager to obtain a VO UID.  
2. When this user’s corresponding VO user is created, corresponding 
policies such as network access control, network resource quota, etc. 
are set for this VO user.  
3. The user obtains a unique VO UID identifying the corresponding VO 
user. 
4. After the user is authenticated with the corresponding VO user crede n-
tial, she can submit jobs to the Distributed Resource Manager (DRM). 
5. The DRM finds out a suitable Distributed Computing Node (DCN) 
from the resource pool, and allocates the user’s job to the DCN. If this 
DCN owns enough resources to run more jobs, other users’ jobs may 
also be allocated to this DCN. As in Figure 8.7, both User 1 and User 2 
‘s jobs are allocated to the same DCN. 
6. If the DCN utilizes the single user mapping method or the dynamic 
user mapping method for mapping VO users to local user accounts, a 
user based IP traffic accounting mechanism must be introduced to 
achieve user based network access control. With the user based IP traf-
fic accounting mechanism, the Accounting Agent integrated in the 
DCN monitors the IP traffic and collects user based IP traffic accoun t-
ing information, which is then sent to the meter in the DRM. The me-
ter in the DRM aggregates and calculates the network resource con-
sumption on the basis of VO users according to the user based IP 
7. User based network ac-
cess control 
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traffic accounting information. Then the calculated results are com-
pared with the policy data.  
7. When a user’s resource consumption violates the policy, the DRM will 
inform the Accounting Agent in the DCN to perform corresponding 
operations according to the network access control policy to control 
this user’s network access.  
8.5 Summary 
This chapter illustrates how the user based IP traffic accounting concept 
can be applied in the distributed computing environments to provide more 
accurate IP traffic accounting information, and how user based network 
access control can be achieved with the help of the user based IP traffic 
accounting mechanism. 
The users in distributed computing environments may be different from 
the ones in non-distributed computing environments. A user needs to be 
registered as a VO user before she can access any distributed computing 
resource. In a DCN, a user account can stand for a local user, a VO user, or 
even different VO users. Moreover, a user account may be used by differ-
ent VO users at the same time. Therefore, in this chapter the user model 
defined in chapter 3 is extended to accommodate the new characteristics of 
users in distributed computing environments. With this new user model, 
application identifier and timestamp may be required as a part of Traffic-
Originators. Through that, different users’ IP traffic can be distinguished in 
a distributed computing environment. 
The in-band scheme or the out-of-band scheme can be applied for user 
based IP traffic accounting in distributed computing environments. The 
Accounting Agent and the correlation process of these two schemes should 
be improved to accommodate the new user model. With the user based IP 
traffic accounting mechanism, accurate user based network access control 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion and future work  
In this dissertation, a user based IP traffic accounting model is proposed 
and discussed. For user based IP traffic accounting, a user model is neces-
sary to distinguish the meanings and functions of a user in Meter Layer, 
Mediation Layer and Billing Layer. According to the user model suggested 
in this dissertation, a Traffic-Originator (TO) is used to specify who is re-
sponsible for generated IP traffic. A TO consists of a Host-identifier and a 
User Identifier. In a distributed computing environment, a TO may even be 
extended to contain HostID, UID, PID and Timestamp. In IP address based 
IP traffic accounting, a TO contains only a Host-Identifier, i.e. an IP ad-
dress. Therefore traditional IP address based IP traffic accounting can be 
described as the process of collecting and processing network resource 
consumption information on the basis of the Host-Identifier, i.e. IP ad-
dress, whereas in user based IP traffic accounting, IP address, User ID 
(User Identifier) and even process ID are required for identifying who gen-
erates the IP traffic. Hence, user based IP traffic accounting can be de-
scribed as the process of collecting and processing network resource con-
sumption information on the basis of the Traffic -Originator.  
The key of user based IP traffic accounting is to identify the IP traffic 
with its corresponding TO information. The IP address of a TO can easily 
be obtained by checking the IP header of an IP packet. However, the User 
ID or the Process ID cannot be extracted from an IP packet directly. An IP 
packet’s User ID and Process ID cannot be obtained outside the measured 
host, e.g. a multi-user host. Hence, the Accounting Agent mechanism is 
suggested to be integrated into the measured host for the purpose of gath-
ering user information of IP traffic. This Accounting Agent can not only 
identify the user of IP traffic, but also store and transfer the user IP traffic 
relationship information to the meter. The Accounting Agent can also pro-
vide the access control ability to control users’ network usage according to 
access control policies, which may be triggered on the basis of the user 
based charging information. 
In this dissertation three different schemes, which can achieve the user 
based IP traffic accounting with the Accounting Agent mechanism, are 
proposed and discussed. 
The in-band scheme utilizes the IP header to convey the user inform a-
tion of the corresponding IP packet. The Accounting Agent residing in the 
measured host intercepts IP packets passing through it, and then it identi-
fies the users of these IP packets. After that, it inserts the user information 
into the IP packets. With this mechanism, a meter located in a key position 
of the network can intercept the IP packets tagged with user information, 
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and then it extracts not only statistic information such as bytes sent, bytes 
received, but also IP addresses and User IDs from the IP packets. Through 
that, the meter can generate accounting records with user information eas-
ily. The Accounting Agent can identify users of IP traffic on the basis of IP 
packets or IP traffic flows. With the IP packet based user identification, the 
Accounting Agent identifies the user of every IP packet, and then it inte-
grates corresponding user information into every IP packet. With the IP  
traffic flow based user identification mechanism, the Accounting Agent 
identifies only the user of the first IP packet of a flow, and then the user in-
formation of this flow is transferred to the meter with this IP packet. Both 
Accounting Agent and meter build a Dynamic User Traffic Relationship 
Table (DUTRT) to record the user and flow relationship information. With 
that, the successive IP packets of the same flow can be identified by the 
meter directly by searching the DUTRT. The Accounting Agent is not re-
quired to identify the user of the successive IP packets of the same flow. 
This scheme requires the IP protocol to be extended to accommodate user 
information.  
The out-of-band scheme is a contrast scheme to the in-band scheme. It 
also uses an Accounting Agent to intercept IP packets and identify the us-
ers of IP traffic. However, the user information of IP packets is not trans-
ferred together with the corresponding IP packets. Instead, the user infor-
mation is transferred through a separated channel which is different from 
the corresponding IP packets’ transmission. IP packets and their corre-
sponding user information are transferred separately and independently. 
With the IP packet based user identification mechanism, the Accounting 
Agent generates accounting records with user information directly from IP 
packets and corresponding user information. Then it sends each IP 
packet’s accounting record with user information to the meter at once. In 
this case, the accounting records are IP packet based and they are not  
stored in the measured host. The IP traffic flow based user identification 
mechanism requires the Accounting Agent to identify the user of the first 
IP packet of a flow, and then sends the user and IP traffic flow relationship 
information to the meter. The successive IP packets of the same flow will 
not be processed by the Accounting Agent. For this mechanism, a Dy-
namic User Traffic Relationship Table (DUTRT) is required to be main-
tained in both Accounting Agent and meter. The DUTRT is updated and 
synchronized by messages exchanged between Agent and meter. The Ac-
counting Agent can also function as a standalone meter, which measures 
IP traffic and generates accounting records with user information in the 
measured host. This standalone mechanism can reduce the network traffic 
by compressing the accounting records before they are transported and the 
accounting records can be transferred in batch. 
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The Multi-IP scheme provides a different solution for identifying users 
of IP traffic. It assigns each user in a measured host a unique IP address. 
Through that, an IP address can be used to identify a user uniquely without 
ambiguity. With this scheme, traditional IP address based accounting tec h-
niques can be applied to achieve the goal of user based IP traffic account-
ing. In this scheme, the Accounting Agent is responsible for assigning IP 
addresses to users when they login or register, and reclaiming IP addresses 
from users when they logout or their accounts are deleted. This scheme re-
quires a reserved IP address pool. In case IP address resource is scarce, the 
NAT mechanism may be required to guarantee that enough IP addresses 
are available for users.  
In the NIPON project, a user based IP traffic accounting prototype sys-
tem was developed in Solaris and Windows 2000 Terminal Server accord-
ing to the standalone meter mechanism of the out-of-band scheme. The 
Agent was implemented with a kernel patch method in both Solaris and 
Windows 2000 Terminal Server systems. The traditional meter NeTraMet 
[Netr] was improved to support the user based IP traffic accounting func-
tion. The prototype system successfully provided IP traffic accounting in-
formation of different users in both Solaris and Windows 2000 Terminal 
Server systems. The prototype implementation shows that, although the  
Accounting Agent mechanism will cause performance decline in the 
measured host, if it is carefully designed and if the CPU of the measured 
host is powerful enough, low performance decline will result in the meas-
ured host. 
The user based IP traffic accounting technique can not only be applied 
in multi-user systems, it is also meaningful that the user based IP traffic 
accounting technique is applied in distributed computing environments to 
provide finer granular IP traffic accounting information. A potential appli-
cation is in Grid computing. In a distributed computing environment, a lo-
cal user account may be shared by different remote users at the same time 
or at different times. In this case, user based IP traffic accounting can pro-
vide more accurate IP traf fic accounting information. The possible policies 
are: assigning every user’s job an IP address, assigning every job a user 
name, extending TO to <IP address, User ID, Process ID, start time, end 
time> and with standalone meter mechanism. Maybe the real time User ID 
correlation is required to map the User ID from a temporary ID to a fix ID. 
With the rapid development of the Internet, the traditional time based 
flat rate charging and billing model will be replaced with IP traffic based 
or even service based charging and billing models in the future. Therefore, 
accurate accounting mechanisms must be applied to provide accurate and 
finer granular accounting information of IP traffic generation or network 
service consumption on the basis of users, instead of current coarser 
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grained IP address based accounting information. The user based IP traffic 
accounting mechanism suggested in this dissertation can facilitate solving 
the insufficiency problem of traditional IP address based IP traffic ac-
counting. The user based IP traffic accounting technique is not only sig-
nificant for academies or institutes which own a lot of multi-user systems 
but also meaningful for the increasing number of distributed computing 
applications. As discussed in this dissertation, despite that the necessity for 
user based IP traffic accounting is increasing, currently user based IP traf-
fic accounting solutions are rare and no standard exists. More accurate and 
finer granular accounting on Internet usage will be a trend, which may re-
quire IP traffic, or even service and content based accounting mechanisms 
to provide technique supporting. In order to help the user based IP traffic 
accounting systems to be widely applied, standardization of the proposed 
techniques and methods in this dissertation should be made for user based 
IP traffic accounting. For example, considering that the IPv6 is still not 
widely applied, we expect that the user based IP traffic accounting mecha-
nism will be taken into consideration in its design. With the user based IP 
traffic accounting technique, the network resource consumption can be 
measured accurately and cost allocation can be fair and reasonable. 
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Appendix B – Performance Test Results 
Figure B.1 TCP send in Solaris 
 
Figure B.2 UDP send in Solaris 
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Figure B.3 TCP receive in Solaris 
 
 
Figure B.4 UDP receive in Solaris 
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Figure B.5 TCP send in Windows 
 
 
Figure B.6 UDP send in Windows 
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Figure B.7 TCP receive in Windows 
 
 
Figure B.8 UDP receive in Windows 
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Appendix C Glossary 
ASP--------------------------------Active Server Page 
BSS--------------------------------Business Support System 
DCN-------------------------------Distributed Computing Node 
DN--------------------------------Distinguished Name 
DNS-------------------------------Domain Name Service  
DHCP-----------------------------Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
IETF-------------------------------Internet Engineering Task Force 
IP-----------------------------------Internet Protocol 
IPDR-------------------------------Internet Protocol Data Record 
ISDN-------------------------------Integrated Services Digital Network 
ISP----------------------------------Internet Service Provider 
LDAP------------------------------Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
MIB--------------------------------Management Information Base 
NE----------------------------------Network Element 
OSS--------------------------------Operation Support System 
QoS--------------------------------Quality of Service 
RADIUS--------------------------Remote Access Dial-In Usage Server  
RAS-------------------------------Remote Access Server 
RDR-------------------------------Raw Data Record 
RMON----------------------------Remote Network Monitoring 
RSVP------------------------------Resource ReSerVation Protocol  
SMTP-----------------------------Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
SNMP -----------------------------Simple Network Management Protocol 
TDI--------------------------------Transport Driver Interface 
VO---------------------------------Virtual Organization 
VoIP-------------------------------Voice over IP  
VPN--------------------------------Virtual Private Network 
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